

GA-GN 1942

CONT'D

GA-GN 1942

CONT'D

January 24, 1942

The Honorable
The Secretary of the Navy
Washington, D. C.

Dear Frank:

I am enclosing a copy of the script written for Senator George to be broadcast to China. You will note that far from contradicting your statement, Senator George quotes at length from your remarks, and quotes them with approval. The newspapers do not appear to give the correct version of the Senator's broadcast, or what he may have told the reporters.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

January 22, 1942

MEMORANDUM

To: Col. William J. Donovan
From: Irving Pflaum

This is the script written for Senator George to be broadcast to China.

You will note that far from contradicting Secretary Knox, Senator George quotes at length from Secretary Knox' remarks and quotes them with approval.

The attached Herald Tribune story does not appear to give a correct version either of the script or of what Senator George may have told the reporter.

Encls.

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FROM PIS

NY 22

GEORGE

U. S. Senator Walter F. George today (Tues.) gave strong reassurance of American aid to China. "He will withhold nothing to crush Japan and to assist China," The Senator said.

The message was prompted by recent Axis propaganda tactics. The Japanese radio has been protesting that United States aid cannot reach China in sufficient volume to alter the course of the war.

Senator George quoted Navy Secretary Frank Knox' speech to confute the Tokyo radio propaganda. The Secretary said: "There are endless lines of ships crawling over the waters of the earth...in the Atlantic and in the South Pacific ...carrying to us the numberless things our friends need everywhere -- our friends embattled with the common foe. These supply ships must be protected."

Senator George pointed out that this was conclusive proof that China will have the reinforcements she needs.

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NY DESK ATTN LAGERMANN VICTORY FOR CHINA BY MURRAY 1/19

Today "Victory for China" presents a special message to the Chinese people by Chairman Walter F. George of the United States Senate Committee on Finance. Senator George [REDACTED] is also a member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and was formerly Chairman of this committee.

We speak as a friend of China who has consistently supported the cause of China both before and since the war of the United Nations against the Axis. As a leader in the backing [REDACTED] President Roosevelt's foreign policy, he has been instrumental in shaping the defense and war program of the United States. [REDACTED]

The subject of Senator George's message is "The Facts About Aid To China."

The special message of Senator Walter F. George to the Chinese people follows:

/ To the people of China:

"When the United States and Great Britain, followed quickly by 10 more nations, declared war on Japan, a spirit of jubilation mixed with grim determination swept [REDACTED] China. This was because of the prospect of large-scale aid, with men, airplanes, ships and men, in the struggle which [REDACTED] had waged alone for nearly five years.

Add 1 - Victory for China - By Murray - 3/19

"Today, just a few weeks later, doubts of receiving such aid and cooperation have been voiced by Chinese sources. These doubts are not based on any actions by the United States or any other United Nations, ~~or any other~~ but entirely on some words spoken informally by Secretary of the Navy Knox in describing the relative importance to all of the United Nations of victory over Japan and Germany.

"I come to you today, people of China, because your doubts and fears are understandable to me, and yet are not ~~especially~~ founded. When their basis is analyzed in the light of the plain facts, you will see that there is no foundation whatever for any doubt that of the comradeship and fullest cooperation of your sister nation across the Pacific.

"Both Tokyo and Berlin are delighted with this misunderstanding. They are doing their best to capitalize on it, sowing seeds of mistrust through their radio propaganda as much as they can. Tokyo, indeed, has gone so far as to make peace overtures to your nation, offering inducements to you to put an end to the devastating campaigns which your armed forces are now carrying on.

"But your great leader, Generalissimo Chang Kai-shek, was ~~surely~~ the very first to see and understand the full implications of the war that opened in December. Realizing that victory for China or India would be a temporary victory of Japanese forces ~~and~~ Chinese only, but the striking forever of militarism in ~~the~~ Japan and her Axis partner nations, your

Add 2 - Victory for China - By Murray - 1/19

Government instantly declared war on Germany, Italy, and Japan alike. Your leader proposed almost at once a full military alliance of the United Nations, with a pooling of resources and a united strategy. It is unnecessary to tell you how far this program has progressed, with China taking a leading part in it.

"Since that time there have been many developments in the world-wide war. There have been victories and reverses for both sides, with the ~~present~~^{present} total world picture showing gains on the part of the United Nations--gains to which the brilliant achievements of your armies in China have contributed in no small way.

"As to the policy being followed by the United Nations in the fighting of the war, from the point of view of the United States, it is not necessary to seek informal statements. The President of the United States himself defined that policy in plain words in his message to the United States Congress on January 7-- and every one of those words breathes the spirit of the union existing between China and the United States and our ~~other~~^{our} other partners.

"President Roosevelt said in his message:

"We shall not fight isolated wars, each nation going ~~its~~ ~~one~~ ~~way~~. These forty-six nations are united not in spirit and determination alone but in ~~the~~ ~~same~~ ~~united~~ ~~effort~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~same~~ ~~direction~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~same~~ ~~cause~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~war~~ ~~in~~ ~~all~~ ~~its~~ ~~phases."~~ ~~This~~ ~~message~~ ~~tells~~ ~~us~~ ~~that~~ ~~the~~ ~~President~~ ~~answered~~ ~~any~~ ~~doubts~~ ~~and~~

Add 3 - Victory for China - By Murray - 1/19

fears strongly and flatly.

"Let me quote a little more from the President's message, to show exactly what our policy is. He said:

"Plans have been laid here and in the other capitals for coordinated and cooperative action by all the United Nations, military action and economic action. Already we have established, as you know, unified command of land, sea and air forces in the Southwestern Pacific theatre of war.... For the first time since the Japanese and the Fascists and the Nazis started along that blood-stained course of conquest, they now face the fact that superior forces are assembling against them. Gone forever are the days when the aggressors could attack and destroy their victims one by one, destroy them without unity of resistance. We of the United Nations will so dispense our forces that we can strike at the common enemy wherever the greatest damage can be done. The militarists of Berlin and Tokyo started this war, but the massed, angered forces of common humanity will finish it."

After quoting the President, Senator Walter F. George's message to the Chinese people continues:

"As a matter of fact, the point which Secretary Knox was trying to make was an endorsement of the policy of unity. It was one of the most important tasks facing the United States to avoid that of shipping and conveying materials of war to China and other areas on the Pacific. Secretary Knox said:

[REDACTED]

Add 4 - Victory for China - By Murray - 1/19

"These are the endless lines of ships crawling over the waters of the earth--in the North Atlantic, in the South Atlantic, in the South Pacific--carrying to us the numberless things we need for life and war and carrying away the numberless things our friends need everywhere--our friends enlisted with the common foe. These supply ships, these myriads of ships are long to and fro across the face of the earth must be protected."

This protection which Secretary Knox insists upon means that China will have the reinforcements which she needs, and that you, the Chinese people, and your interests will be cared for by the United States to the limit of our power.

Secretary George's message continues in these words:

"The events of this past week alone in the Pacific show that the United Nations are not just fighting a defensive war. In the Philippines, in Singapore, in Malaya, and elsewhere, all the United Nations are giving of their strength and their manpower to the end that China, along with the other partners, may live and win to the endowment. We will withhold nothing to crush Japan and to assist China. Developments will demonstrate that England and the United States propose to give all possible assistance, in conjunction with China, in the war in the middle and southern Pacific area."

This ends the personal message from United States Secretary Walter F. George to the people of China.

END WALTER GEORGE

"To the people of China:

"When the United States and Great Britain, followed quickly by 15 more nations, declared war on Japan, a spirit of jubilation mixed with grim determination swept through China. This was because of the prospect of large-scale aid, with arms, airplanes, ships and men, in the struggle which China had waged alone for nearly five years.

"Today, just a few weeks later, doubts receiving such aid and cooperation have been voiced by Chinese sources. These doubts are not based on any actions by the United States or any other of the United Nations, but entirely on some words spoken informally by Secretary of the Navy Knox in describing the relative importance to all of the United Nations of victory over Japan and Germany.

"I come to you today, people of China, because your doubts and fears are understandable to me, and yet are not correctly founded. When their basis is analyzed in the light of the plain facts, you will see that there is no foundation whatever for any doubt of the comradeship and ~~and~~ ~~the~~ ~~comradeship~~ ~~and~~ ~~solid~~ ~~cooperation~~ ~~of~~ ~~your~~ ~~sister~~ ~~nation~~ across the

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Pacific.

"Both Tokyo and Berlin are delighted with this misunderstanding. They are doing their best to capitalize on it, sowing seeds of mistrust through their radio propaganda as much as they can. Tokyo, indeed, has gone so far as to make peace overtures to your nation, offering inducements to you to put an end to the devastating campaigns which your armed forces are now carrying on.

"But your great leader, Generalissimo Chung Kai-shek, was among the very first to see and understand the full implications of the war that opened in December. Realizing that victory for China no longer meant a temporary ousting of Japanese forces from Chinese soil, but the crushing forever of militarism in Japan and her Axis partner nations, your Government instantly declared war on Germany, Italy, and Japan Alike. Your leader proposed almost at once a full military alliance of the United Nations, with a pooling of resources and a united strategy. It is unnecessary to tell you how far this program has progressed, with China taking a leading part in it.

"Since that time there have been many developments

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in the world-wide war. There have been victories and reverses for both sides, with the total world picture showing gains on the part of the United Nations -- gains to which the brilliant achievements of your armies in China have contributed in no small way.

"As to the policy being followed by the United Nations in the fighting of the war, from the point of view of the United States, it is not necessary to seek informal statements. The President of the United States himself defined that policy in plain words in his message to the United States Congress on January 7 -- and every one of those words breathes the spirit of the union existing between China and the United States and our other partners.

"President Roosevelt said in his message:

"We shall not fight isolated wars, each nation going its own way. These twenty-six nations are united not in spirit and determination alone but in the broad conduct of the war in all its phases." In those two sentences the President answered all doubts and fears strongly and flatly.

"Let me quote a little more from the President's speech, to show exactly what our policy is. He said:

"Plans have been laid here and in the other capitals

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for coordinated and cooperative action by all the United Nations, military action and economic action. Already we have established, as you know, unified command of land, sea and air forces in the Southwestern Pacific theatre of war . . . For the first time since the Japanese and the fascists and the Nazis started along that blood-stained course of conquest, they now face the fact that superior forces are assembling against them. Gone forever are the days when the aggressors could attack and destroy their victims one by one, destroy them without unity of resistance. The forces of the United Nations will so dispose our forces that we can strike at the common enemy wherever the greatest damage can be done. The militarists of Berlin and Tokyo started this war, but the massed, angered forces of common humanity will finish it."

After quoting the President, Senator Walter F. George's message to the Chinese people continues:

"In a matter of fact, the point which Secretary Knox mentioned in this was an endorsement of the policy of unity. In one of the most important tours leading the United States he found that of shipping and conveying materials of war to China and other ports on the Pacific. Secretary Knox said:

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"There are endless lines of ships crawling over the surface of the earth--in the North Atlantic, in the South Atlantic, in the South Pacific--carrying up to us the numberless tanks we need for life and war and carrying over the numberless tanks our friends need everywhere--our friends embattled with the common foe. These supply ships, these myriads of ships crawling to and fro across the face of the earth must be protected."

"This protection which Secretary Knox insists upon means that China will have the reinforcements which she needs, and that you, the Chinese people, and your interests will be served for by the United States to the limit of our power.

Senator George's message continues in these words:

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with China, in the war in the Middle and Southern Pacific area."

This ends the personal message from United States Senator Walter F. George to the people of China.

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January 15, 1942

Mr. Lewis Galantiere
11 East 73rd Street
New York City, New York

Dear Mr. Galantiere:

Thank you very much for the
manuscript concerning Nazi fifth columnism
and espionage which you forwarded to me.
I have read it with a great deal of interest.
In case we should find it necessary to
interview the narrator, I shall let you
know.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan

WJD:msj

Monday this follow is
(debonair)
a notorious bad egg. should
be avoided. Jimmy Duran
at State Dept. knows all
about him according to
Doss.

His staff is very hot
& good, almost Wallis style
according to Doss. He names
places & people. This should
be duplicated & circulated to
radio & k-t. Also good
enough for Col. D. to read
orally. we would hit 2 copies
to State Dept. & one for ourselves.

Wolfgang Gauß zu Edder Putlitz

11 East 73rd Street,
New York City,
January 18, 1948.

Dear Colonel Donovan,

In the autumn of last year I spent some weeks talking to a German friend whose last post in the German diplomatic service had been that of counsellor of the legation at The Hague. Some of the things he told me, especially concerning Nazi fifth-columnism and espionage, I wrote out, in the expectancy that I might later re-write the material and thus get him a little money from the magazines. The first such article will appear in the February issue of Harper's.

It may be that some one in your Office -- perhaps you yourself -- would find it useful to have a look at the original material, which I send along under this cover.

The narrator's name is Wolfgang zu Putlitz. He is staying here with Ernest Angeli, for the time being, but can always be reached through me, in the event that your Office think him worth interviewing, on the score of the stuff enclosed.

Sincerely yours,

Lewis Galantier

Lewis Galantier.

William J. Donovan, C.S.I.,

Washington, D.C.

I am very glad to find that we are carrying
out our work in the interests

Loyd C. Garrison
11 East 73rd Street
New York City

Wulf is sick

- Wulf for Muller 4-18'

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Although fifth columnism may be defined as the art of national disintegration, definition is made difficult by the fact that this activity is a ~~reproduction~~ of a great number of separate strands. The press, the radio, the service; trade regulations, labor regulations, social relationships, military and intelligence and espionage -- these are only some of the strands.

It would be a profound error to imagine that the fifth column of the Nazis was a great smoothly working machine, built according to a super-blueprint, a thing that "only those efficient Germans could think up." Its characteristic is not organization but diversity; not efficiency but determination. There is no doubt that the Nazi fifth column did come eventually to achieve a certain coordination, but muddle and duplication, though not externally visible, were the traits I distinctly saw in it, first as secretary of the German embassy in London, and later, in 1938 and 1939, when I was counselor of the German legation at The Hague. One head, one directing agency, one central office in the Reich, the Nazi fifth column never had. Fifty is a likelier number.

There is first that special department of the Nazi Party known as the "Foreign Organization." There is Goebbels' propaganda ministry, working via press and film and radio agents in the non-German world. There is Goering's own staff of foreign operatives, travelling ostensibly as representatives of his physics accomplice, the well-known Nationalsozialist of

Bureau, but to my knowledge frequently engaged in contact and observation on behalf of the additional aviation arm of the military establishment. There is the famous Bureau Ribbentrop, the private fifth-column agency of Hitler's Minister for Foreign Affairs. It was the agents of this bureau who, in England for example, were chiefly instrumental in the founding of the Anglo-German Fellowship into which they snaked such illustrious appeasers as the late Lord Lothian, Lord Londonderry, Lord Mount Temple, the late Lord Russell, and other innocents of the highest intelligence, or station, or doubt concerning the democratic processes. There is the ~~Luftwaffe~~ -- ^{confidential} ~~combined~~ High Command embracing the land, sea, and air branches under a single authority in which the espionage and intelligence services are centralized under the direction of Admiral Canaris. And there is the ~~Reichs~~ ^{intelligence} ubiquitous and ever-present Gestapo, permeating every arm and agency of the Nazi regime, -- for amongst the multiple functions of the ~~Reichs~~-~~SS~~-~~SA~~ (the Secret State Police), one of the most important is the relentless frightening of German nationals abroad into the ruthless and unceasing performance of their duties as loyal Nazis. In this way the Gestapo has its hand in everything, including fifth columnism.

Besides these chosen instruments there are the foreign branches of what the Germans call "military" agencies. They are of course too numerous to list, but among them is the ~~Landes-Auslandsdienst~~ (Association of German Abroad), operating out of Stuttgart; the Pfeile Union and Dr. Johnson's Bureau, whose headquarters are in Hamburg; the Student Exchange Service, which maps students and professors with foreign universities; and the networks established in many foreign countries with their members and a strict surveillance. All such organizations ~~immediately~~ ^{at} point to one important fact, which is that "totalitarianism" is not merely a ~~governance~~ ^{potential}, it is a ~~governor~~ reality. If, for example, all the professionals and cultural associations in the United States

were guided by strict political principles and spied upon by an American Gestapo -- the dentists, the history teachers, the osteopaths; the Rockefeller Foundation, the Carnegie Institution, the Bible societies, the lodges and fraternal groups -- this would be but a beginning of what totalitarianism represents. And every one of these associations that worked in foreign countries would be a fifth column agency before it was anything else -- exactly as the German archaeologists digging ^{and spying} ~~reservists~~ in Syria were fifth columnists first, and scientists only afterwards.

In the past, such organisations were represented outside Germany by people of good will who, not being in Nazi hands, were certainly harmless and may even have been useful to the world at large. By 1948 most of the decent Germans in these parts had been forced out and replaced by Nazi party members. But even where some secret anti-Nazis remain, they are helpless to do otherwise than serve as paid agents so long as they cling to their German nationality; and the reason is that somewhere in the organisation, somewhere in the country in which they live and work, there is a man or group of men whose orders they are forced to take, whose power could break them, at whose pleasure and word they tremble. And that man is by no means necessarily an agent of the Gestapo: that man is -- but who he is, is for the substance of my story.

You have never heard of Dr. Banting. There is no reason why you should have. He is not a great man, merely a representative one. He like others in every country there is a considerable number of German nationalists people. As far as Dr. Banting is for America, I do not know. And as I intend to speak only of what I have seen with my own eyes, and know of my own knowledge, I shall not speak of African colonies in the United States, for I have nothing about it. But I do know ~~that~~ ^{very} ~~that~~ that there is Dr. Banting in every large American country where clusters of Germans live, and in these cities and influential, besides, work, and

carry on business. I know that the South American Butting^s employ exactly the same methods as my Butting employed; and because the story ~~is~~^X have to tell is by and large the story of how the Nazi fifth column works in Latin America, I ~~would~~^{want} to tell it in these pages.

II

I have already said that in 1939 I was counsellor of the German legation at the Hague. Few countries were more important in the pre-war Nazi strategy than Holland -- and for many good reasons. Holland possesses a frontier on the North Sea from which attack upon England is immeasurably easier than from the German coast. With its independent shipping lines for men and mail as well as goods, Holland was the ideal base for Nazi espionage operations against both England and the Americas, as well as the natural port of entry for the merchandise which the Nazis needed and preferred to buy through Dutch purchasing agents. The Dutch themselves were rich in goods indispensable to the Nazi war economy, both in their domestic industries and in their colonial empire. Their commercial relations with Germany were so interlaced that these countries could scarcely live without each other. And there were over 100,000 men and women of German nationality -- not refugees, but loyal German citizens -- resident and working in Holland. For all these reasons it was imperative that the Nazi party members in the Netherlands be vigorously organized, and their knowledge and influence employed for the destruction of the Dutch people. This was Mr. Butting's job.

It was not a job of state any one could work openly. The Dutch ~~were~~^{were} too democratic, therefore it permitted the existence of a Dutch social-democratic party, and that party even had a handful of representatives in the Dutch Parliament. Any German resident in Holland were forbidden to speak for or against politically. This being as, both their

organization and their leader had to work under cover. The cover for the Nazi party organization was an outwardly social and cultural body that went by the innocent name of Reichsdeutsche Gemeinschaft, the German Citizens' Association. Every member of this association was a member of the Nazi Party of Germany. The president of the association was Dr. Butting, -- and the cover furnished Dr. Butting was an appointment as attaché of the German legation at The Hague.

Dr. Butting was by profession a nose and throat specialist in an unimportant south German town. His practice had been small, his income insufficient, and his grudge against the world prodigious. He had first become a Nazi, then an ardent Nazi, and in the course of time an agitator in Austria. Among the unfortunate Austrians he had acquired such skill in the art of national disintegration (which is to say, fifth columnism), that, rising in the Party ranks, he was eventually rewarded with the high and lucrative post of Landesgruppenleiter, or National Group Leader, for Holland. As diplomatic attaché, he was my subordinate -- or would have been had he ever taken part in the legation's work. As Party leader for Holland he was in absolute fact the unchallenged king of every German national institution in that country. He reported solely and directly to Bohle, who was at one and the same time head of the Party's foreign organization and Aussentabakat for Foreign Affairs. Thus Butting had a double grip on us of the legation. As between Butting and Count Zech, our Minister Plenipotentiary, there was no question which of the two was, in Bohle's eyes, the more tractable and more useful to the Nazi cause. Because Butting was the very model of a Nazi high executive, the pattern of the ambitious and efficient way in which the world is to be ruled if the Nazis can but conquer, it must be something more about him. I beg the reader to bear in mind that this is a summary judgment and you will find further details in the following pages.

Dr. Rettberg was a true social revolutionary. Not only did he and his good wife sincerely despise titles and everything that smacked of high living; not only did they refrain with almost inhuman self-discipline from ~~many~~ good cheer and good things to eat; they hated all the oppressors of the poor, including the bourgeois employer class. Rettberg honestly considered himself the defender of the humble and a great worker in their cause. The hundred thousand Germans in Holland were regaled by him; he held them in the hollow of his hand and terrified them, -- but only for their own good and in order to preserve them from exploitation by "Jewish plutocracy." For this reason it was with a happy heart that he directed what I may be allowed to call the Tammany aspect of Banian (carried out in this case by the ladies' and other auxiliaries of the Citizens' Association) -- visits to the sick, coal for the indigent, home evenings and other get-togethers for the various German communities in the Netherlands.

Meanwhile, a positive genius for inefficiency and disorder inhabited this little man. He never personally put a letter into an envelope but it was the wrong envelope. He never borrowed a file from the legation but it became lost forever. It was through his carelessness that the presence of a ^a ⁱⁿ ^{Dutchland} ^{other} ^{formations} ^{of} ^{the} ^{German} spy ^{organization} was revealed to the Dutch, as their former minister, van Kleffens, reports in his recent book, Documenten over Nederland. His letters and dispatches were written in phrases of such wild obscurity and peculiar jargon that only another Soviet Espy, effective to the rings of the Party, could by Hitlerian ^{methods} guess their import. Is not the sort of man who, having agreed to meet me on Sunday, would forget that he ^{had} agreed, and declare with perfect good faith on Tuesday that you must have misunderstood him, -- how could he have agreed when all the negotiations were to the contrary! twice and again his orders were given in a language so muddled that they

would not be carried out -- with the result that the very clerks who took the orders were in the end rendered haphazard and inefficient through working for such a chief.

Yet it was a fact that Butting got things done. By power of will, by persistence, rage, trial and error, despite his ignorance and incapacity, and at the expense of immense waste and undisciplined energy, he got things done. In nothing was he more typically Nazi than in this.

III

In 1939 the German legation owned two houses in The Hague. Both were of course the subject of diplomatic immunity and therefore inviolable in case of search and seizure by the Dutch police. I shall call the house in which Dr. Butting had his office House No. 2.

That went on in House No. #1. It had been remodelled and was divided like a two-family house -- vertically, not horizontally; but between the two halves there was a communicating door. One side the house was Dr. Butting's. The other half housed the Nazi military intelligence agent for Holland. I shall come back shortly to Dr. Butting. First I will say something about this Second Dutch man.

The day in June 1939 I received an official visit from the German military attaché at Brussels. He was accompanied by two army colonels, von Bismarck. They had come to inform me that a civilian agent of the military intelligence would henceforward work out of The Hague, and that it would be useful if he could be accorded diplomatic status as an attaché of our legation. (at that time, and until the spring of 1940, there was no representation of the High Command resident at our legation. The London military attaché covered Holland as regards air and navy, the Brussels man [REDACTED] (see map.)

"Do you think the Dutch will stand for it?" I asked.

"Oh," they answered; "we have already spoken to the Dutch, and they have agreed. We told them that this man could operate only in England, although making his headquarters here, and promised that he would not work for or against Holland."

I said to myself that either the Dutch were very naive, or the military men were lying to me and had not spoken to the Dutch at all. If they were not lying, would the Dutch let their fellow democrats, the British know, I wondered.

My visitors asked if I would agree to the appointment they had in mind. So at the beginning were already somewhat embarrassed by the presence of Dr. Butting on our list. Not socially -- though Butting is a top not and his good lady in elbow-length gloves looked more like a pair of Queen Victoria's gloves than anything else. The embarrassment was professional. That Butting did on his own was no business of ours, but he had a habit of pestering us with a thousand questions -- insisting for instance that we protest to the Dutch Foreign Office against the publication of a caricature of Hitler, the presence of an anti-Nazi book in a Dutch shop-window, the showing of an American film; all petty nuisances in which he was invariably supported by his reporters in Berlin on instructions they received from their reporters -- Party headquarters. With this in mind, and also with the professional jealousy of the senior diplomatist, I refused my consent. The army men did not insist, and we compromised on my agreeing to the appointment of their man as auxiliary clerk in the embassy. Thus it was as a humble novice, and not as an accredited chargé d'affaires, that an important secret agent of the Nazis was certified to the Dutch Government. Symbol of that self-assurance was that although we did not possess diplomatic status, he took it anyway, and his car carried a diplomatic library plate -- with Dutch compliance.

That was the last time I saw him until in 1937 I have forgotten,

But in my time at The Hague he went by the name of Schultes-Bernett. Like the others practising his trade, he had a code name too. It was that very "Jonathan" mentioned in van Kleffens' book as a spy "whose identity was never revealed."

We at the Legation always referred to Schurle-Bennett as S.B., and I must say that S.B. was not a bad fellow. Of medium height, dark-haired, with a hooked nose, he had bright blue eyes that looked out fixedly from beneath black eyebrows. He would sit habitually with his head on one side, staring with a steady blank gaze at a corner of the ceiling. I used to find myself imitating him unconsciously: it gave me a queer feeling of being some one else, of being suddenly a primitive, empty-minded, yet determined some one else. S.B. spoke fluent Dutch, which it appears he had ~~been~~ learnt as a planter, or a clerk on a plantation, in the Netherlands East Indies. How he came by his second Bureau job I have no notion. He certainly bore none of the earmarks of a military man. But he was more astute than Dr. Rettig: a little sly, physically not quite clean, but gentle and modest, and never unbearable.

With S.D., we had a great deal less to do than with Dr. Butting. He made no apology, and as was to him not much more than a post office. One of the legitimate offices had been put at his disposal, to which he alone had the keys. Post and packages that came for him were in the custody of the ~~other~~ office until he chose to have up. When he arrived, he would take away what he wanted, look up the rest in his own safe, and be off again. His ~~presentations~~ to and from Berlin went by diplomatic pouch of course. Beyond this he seemed not to stand in the special need of our services.

This is as good a chance as any to explain the role of the German
Government -- it has been a long time since the world -- in
the first place of course had time to discuss. I should say -- there

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are exceptions, no doubt, but this has been my experience -- that the best place to look for best underground workers is among the ^{Senior} career officers of the permanent diplomatic service. Of course there are spies and fifth column workers attached to diplomatic and consular offices. But the real operatives are almost ^{surely} to be found among the ^{older} career men who ~~serve~~ ^{serve} the embassy in their respective ~~countries~~ ^{as} imperial ~~days~~ days, for the good reason that these career men have never been trusted either by the Party or by the new ^{State} ~~State~~ ^{officials} -- those two partners in the repressive government of the Third Reich. A person listed on the embassy payroll as auxiliary clerk, or furnace man, or messenger might be in reality the heart of the Nazi show in that country. If so, he would rarely be seen in or round the embassy or legation; and certainly his work would never be reported to the ambassador or minister, and it could never be reflected in the diplomatic files.

The older career men serve the Nazis as camouflage and decoys, and this is the reason why, up to the war at any rate, they were retained by the Party and who despised them. My own chief at The Hague, for example, was Count Zech, a son-in-law of the one time imperial minister, Batmann-Dollwey. He was an ~~old~~ ^{old} Hitlerite ~~and~~ Hitler's ~~son~~ ^{son} in law, as a reactionary, as an old ~~man~~ friend, that Hitler used to write him. Yet Count Zech was kept at his post for the very reason that, ^{from} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~the~~ dirty work ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~the~~ outside the legation and not in it, his responsibility was useful to the Nazis as camouflage. All the leading Dutchmen were his friends, and they tended to say to themselves that "as long as old Zech is here, the threat is not so great." They did a ~~lot~~ not enough ~~merely~~ because the bulk of our service hoped desperately that if they stayed they might prevent the more serious outrages; believed that if they left everything would be worse, and the German people would be ~~ruled~~ ^{ruled} solely by ~~old~~ ^{old} party representatives.

In view of that nothing remarkable, that the career men were made ~~use~~ ^{use} of by the special agents in ~~one~~ ^{one} ~~or~~ another. They were friendly with

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*(prolonged to be as long as they were, and doing what they did).
had a little longer with them, but found it too long, too "now,"
the "Austrians" and some others that he and I had changed.
none of us, especially if we were not in the same place.*

*Conc. for
to continue
I think it's been
as far as
for today:*

44-6 442.

Final ed.

In this case, they would loosen up and tell us a good many things. But we assume almost never know the whole story about anything they did. In the London embassy under Ribbentrop there were actually two sets of personnel. He who were career men would refer to the other set as the "staff" men, that is, the ~~men~~ ^{men} ~~were not selected~~ Ribbentrop men. They ~~ever~~ ^{always} reported to the Foreign Office in Berlin, and ~~suspect~~ ^{know} they knew a lot that we never dreamt of. In a sense this was the position at the Hague.

Not all of S.D.'s correspondence was with Germany, and of his British correspondents by far the most interesting were his financiers, the International banking firm that styled itself Dodes, Incorporated. If you will consult the British (not American) Bankers' Almanac for 1939-40 you will know that Dodes was established in 1910, that its president is Captain H. G. P. J. Dodesimus, and its managers are H. W. von Goerschen and Mr. S. S. Rosenberg. Its London correspondents, you will observe, are Hansen & Son and Company.

S. S. was a spy, and I have no doubt a very good one; but the Dodes group were as probably a collection of fifth column agents as you could wish to conceive. No ~~other~~ people could fit together more satisfactorily than the A.D.—Dodes partners.

"Dodesimus" I said to myself when first I saw the connection. ~~He~~ ^{He} ~~belongs~~ to a highly respected name in Cologne, not a Dutch name at all. Isn't it to Cologne that S.D. used to frequently to deliver his ~~lectures~~ and take his orders from the General Surveyor who has a desk in ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~new~~ ^{old} company called ~~Miner and Schlesier~~ ^{Miner and Schlesier}? Of course it is! Yes this — and here I thought ~~nothing~~ ^{nothing} ~~but~~ for a moment — this.

Dutchmen must be a Dutchman. He puts four initials in front of his name; and while the first Indians also do that, in Europe it is only the Dutch who are so considerate of the feelings of their godparents. But of course he is more useful to the Nazis as a Dutchman than he would be as a German, -- and very likely he has lived in Holland and been a Hollander for many years.

"He has been a Hollander," I went on, "precisely as his ^{old} correspondent, Kleinwort, has been an Englishman for years and years." Truly in the British Government could better old Kleinwort to-day, for he must be over eighty years old. Therefore I need not scruple to recall that when I approached Kleinwort's son-in-law in London after the war had started, to ask if he couldn't do something towards financing an ^{Free} "German" emigrant group in Britain, he assured me with sincere regret that it was impossible "because the old man is so violently pro-Nazi, you know."

At Birmingham I have nothing, but the jigsaw pieces started "Herr von Gerecke" fit exquisitely into the puzzle. Gerecke was one of a number of famous army officers who, after the war of 1914-1918, had found refuge in Holland and settled there. I used to see him at the legation on days when he personally would deliver sacks of gold coin or packets of gold bullion -- one packet contained a quarter of a million guilders, say 600,000 -- triple-sealed and addressed simply "Jonathan." There was always something strange about Gerecke's evident care to avoid meeting Ambassador personally, as if not even we at the legation should suspect that he might keep suspicious company. Yet once, at the end of 1938, when I was returning to my post from a Christian holiday in Germany, and had just left Gerecke in the train, he forced himself upon me and talked at length about the Adjutant white to the High Command in Berlin -- particularly, I g. Storch, to Admiral Canaris' intelligence and espionage department. The High Command was located in the street called

Mullerstrasse, and was generally referred to by the street name, just as the German foreign office was always referred to as the Wilhelmstrasse.) Gourschen repeated to me with extraordinary indiscretion what he knew of Mullerstrasse opinion about political matters, meagrely and I had the impression that he would like me to let some one in high place know that Mr. Gourschen, was a good egg, was on "our" side, and so on.

Even more curious was the way in which this impression was confirmed by the chatty German train conductor after Gourschen had left my compartment. Seeing him leave, the conductor, an old acquaintance, had begun to talk about him.

"That gentleman must be on bad terms with the Gestapo," the conductor remarked.

I was rather startled. "What makes you think so?" I asked.

"Well," said the conductor, "for one thing, he goes back and forth all the time between Holland and Germany, and he never takes the same route twice in succession. He is always crossing the frontier at a different point."

"Trying to avoid some one?" I suggested.

The conductor nodded. "The Gestapo, I'll bet."

He went on. "Another thing I don't understand is this. He's a German, isn't he?"

"Of course," I said.

"Maybe he is and maybe he isn't," said the conductor, enjoying his little triumph. "I mean, he used to carry a German passport, and now for sometime he has been travelling on a Dutch passport."

Such things had happened before to my knowledge, therefore I was not so astonished as I might have been. Gourschen had certainly been living long enough in Holland to entitle for Dutch citizenship and a Dutch

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passport. What was slightly peculiar about his situation was that, on recommendation of the High Command, he was at the same time permitted to retain his German nationality. "Legitimate" passport tricks were common in the Nazi espionage and Fifth column system. For instance, every now and then we at the legation would receive a letter from the Wilhelmstrasse written "at the request of the High Command", which meant at the request of the Gestapo Bureau. It would inform us that certain Nazi agents would turn up at the legation to whom we were instructed to deliver new German passports bearing indication of a fairly long Dutch residence. These persons would be coming from Germany in transit across Holland ~~now~~ on their way to seek for the Gestapo Bureau in England or the Americas. Thus an innocent Dutch residence was substituted for what, in British or American eyes, might be a suspicious German-soldier residence, and an innocent business connection in Holland was substituted for a perhaps suspicious official connection in Germany.

The web centering at Cologne could doubtless be followed thence by thread round the world. There is in Cologne a highly respected banking family called Detmers. This family is closely related to that other Cologne banker, Schleicher, at whose house Hitler and Papen held their secret meeting in the course of which the first sold out his social democratic convictions connected to big business and the army, and the second sold out conservative and aristocratic Germany -- including his then chief, Schleicher -- to the first stage. A young Detmers, whom I used to see at parties in Berlin when I was at our embassy there, turned out to be in the employ of Himmler. Then there was Haillancourt, also a member of a Flemish banking family and brother-in-law of Schleicher. This Haillancourt had been a minor figure notably in the German colony in Paris. Suddenly, in August 1933 he turned up as another representative of the Hitler crew. Of

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course he and Deichmann might readily have been innocent instruments of the Nazi banking agents; yet there was something curious about the concentration of Cologne talent in the Rotterdam bank called Wedan -- particularly as Cologne was the center of Nazi espionage operations for western Europe and, ^{of course, A.} Deichmann, overseas.

Such, then, were S.B.'s bankers -- a firm with which the legation did no business and where the legation had no account. As for S.B.'s crew, I am reasonably certain that he worked with only a handful of pals in Holland itself. There was a mysterious individual called Paermann who, I know, was in Holland on a German mission. Paermann was certified to the Dutch (under their labor regulations) as a clerk in the German Railway Information Bureau at Amsterdam -- one of the scores of offices formerly maintained ^{abroad} in the interest of tourist service all over the world. (This bureau, incidentally, was a favorite form of cover for Nazi underground workers abroad.) But Paermann was, unlike S.B., a man of distinguished appearance, and his means were presumably greater than the salary of a tourist-agency clerk, since he lived in the most fashionable and expensive ^{Louise Valley} suburb of The Hague, a sort of Lake Forest, or Burlingame, or ^{Sunder-Park} called Haarlemmer. He at the legation saw him very rarely, and it is my guess that the railway bureau saw him not at all.

Closer to S.B. was one Jabs (pronounced Yapps), who was listed as S.B.'s chauffeur and was in reality his wireless expert. There are two things of interest to say about Herr Jabs:

As this is written, in August 1941, the newspapers report that the Argentine Government has ordered the German Ambassador at Buenos Aires to send back to Berlin a 500-kw. wireless transmitter whose presence in the diplomatic pouch was revealed at the chance result of a postal inspection. It can just well be inferred that Herr Jabs had installed ~~and used~~ the equipment in the office of Wedan's half of House No. 2, in code

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communication with the ~~Dutch~~^{French} government-in-exile. Machine transmissions are among the very rare articles that do not enjoy diplomatic immunity under international law, yet Herr Jabs' playing on Mr. Ingraham's name never disturbed the slumbers of the Dutch counterespionage people.

The other item is also a ~~gross~~ report, concerning the presence in Paris of a Herbert Jabs, said to be "of military bearing," and posing as a communist agent, though in reality the "head of German military intelligence on the Isthmus" (The New York Times, August 11, 1941). The "military bearing" of our Herr Jabs was ~~distinctly~~ ^{distinctly} and not ~~more~~ ^{more} than that of a corporal ~~than~~ ^{of} an officer, but of his army background there could be no doubt. So far as I can judge, he should still be a subordinate in the service of some one else, rather than "head" of intelligence work in any region. Yet it is not ~~suspectably~~ ^(with a transmitter buried somewhere) improbable that this French Jabs is our Jabs of The Hague, for he did a good job in Holland. His routine work there was of course useful; but the greatest service he rendered (if his own boast was true) was the radio receipt from a secret transmitter in Paris, and the re-coded transmission to Berlin, on or about September 10, 1939, of the complete British Staff Plan for the disposition of their armies across the whole of Europe. How the plan then fell into the hands of the German agent in Paris, I am unable to say.

In the book to which I have already referred, Kynoch van der Linde reports that his people picked up in Holland a German document which claimed that a man who had been attached to the (Dutch) legation ~~had~~ ^{had} given the "head of military espionage in Holland" and had ~~been~~ ^{been} informed that, when Germany was more advanced, but who worked ~~under the name of Jabs~~ ^{under the name of Jabs}.

I would like to add my opinion, as our big friend G.B.

The "attache" cannot be other than Dr. Butting; for until the summer of 1940, when we were assigned a naval intelligence officer, there was absolutely nobody else round the legation who worked in any sense directly with S.B. But Butting was not S.B.'s chief. S.B., indeed, had a very important post, with more than Holland for his province. The true situation was this.

S.B. may have had as many as a dozen subordinates working in Holland, all sub-agents of the German bureau. These were professional spies who knew their trade. But they could not possibly know Holland as intimately as was required by the strategy of the German High Command, as it was revealed following the invasion of May 1940. For this, not a dozen but perhaps several hundred sources of information were necessary. And it is at this point that Butting and S.B. come together. Through his German Citizens' Association, Butting had a pair of hard eyes, a pair of hard ears, in every town and hamlet of the Netherlands. They were the eyes and ears of his many party officials. Whenever S.B. needed information concerning something a corner of Holland which his people had not yet explored, or was anxious to check information relayed to him by one of his own people, he would go to Butting.

"Does you employ along such-and-such a canal?" he would ask; "or is such-and-such a town..."

Butting always lied.

"But no one the fellow's good," S.B. would say. And having driven out to investigate the fellow (most often a party member, but sometimes a Dutchman), having interviewed him and been sufficiently satisfied with him, S.B. would write him down as a *Vertrauensmann*, a man to be trusted. Through him a man he could learn, among other things, which of the Hollanders in the locality might be considered "friendly." The *Vertrauensmann* would not,

however, become a Gagaris sub-agent. If he were a Hollander, he would continue his work for the Dutch National-Socialist Party run by Mussert and Bert van Tendeloo. If, as was incidentally more likely, he were a German, he would go on working intermittently for S.D., but would continue his direct and normal Party service as fifth columnists, that is, as a man who, standing well in the Dutch community in which he lived, was able to spread Nazi doctrine and win sympathy for the Nazis of Germany and their way of life.

Incidentally, I ought to say that everything done by the Nazis is double-checked -- and even triple-checked, if we take account of the Gestapo. That S.D. learnt from one of his own people he checked with a Dutch spy, and that the Dutch spy reported was unfailingly checked with an S.D. man, or by S.D. himself.

"I know every stone in Holland," S.D. once boasted to me. By "stone" he meant canal, lock, bridge, viaduct, culvert, highway, by-road, airport, emergency landing field, and the name and location of Dutch Nazi organizations who would help him breaking away when the time came. Had Dr. Buiting's Party organization not existed under the innocent cover of the Citizens' Association, S.D.'s knowledge of Holland would have been as nothing compared with what it was. Then the Citizens' Association served a double purpose: it was available for espionage at the same time as it masked the primary function as a Hitler's fifth column agency. Or, to put it more truly, there is no such thing as fifth columnism divorced from espionage. Thus and notwithstanding, they can't be the same thing; and when you permit fifth columnism, "new presents", you are at the same time intensifying espionage without any contact with it. Only through Latin America [redacted] [redacted]

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The dispatch already referred to in which I found the name of Jabs mentions that the Nazi organization in Panama "is reported to number in its party membership virtually every one of German nationality in the Americas." The important words in this statement are "German nationality." They remind me -- since I am speaking for Americans -- that, contrary to popular belief, the case of foreign citizens who happen to be of German birth or descent from a far less reliable instrument of Nazi action than those residents of a foreign country who are still citizens of the Nazi State.

Of course there are many American citizens of German origin who are sympathetic with the Nazi cause. Some are sympathetic because they are simple-minded believers either in the myth of German ^{Racial} superiority or in the myth of Nazi social achievement, or both. Some are sympathetic because for one reason or another they have had a hard time in America, and their adherence to the Nazi idea is a cheap fashion of taking their "revenge" on the country in which they failed to make good. Many thousands are sympathetic because, being of German origin, it is unavoidable that they should feel in their hearts a warm generous impulse to side with Germans instead of with English-speaking peoples, so long as America herself is not at war. These are people who, never having lived in the inconceivable horrors of Nazi corruption and Nazi grand and petty tyranny, really believe that the Germany they know and loved still exists, and that everything said against the Nazis is just the old outcry of Germany by her enemies.

Now, then, are the dangerous American citizens of German origin the ones who the Gestapo, individual Government and their like in banking and business, who have a financial stake in the Nazi regime, either ~~because they hold Nazi properties or because they are being paid~~ ~~to do their bidding and to do their bidding their business.~~ Secondly,

individual fools and hooligans, or criminal types happy to pick up a bit of Nazi "easy money." Obviously these latter are material for the purpose of Nazi agents in ~~among~~ the Americans; but not collectively, merely individually; not as intelligent cogs in an organized machine of which they know themselves to be a part, but as mere tools earning the small pay and the great contempt of their Nazi employers. Could there be a more complete failure than Price Dunn's Band of German-American citizens? Does not the very threat for publicity and boasting of its fifth-rate leaders show how futile and amateurish the Band was, coaxed with true fifth columnardreams described? The Nazis were far too shrewd to bank the Band wholeheartedly, and the reason was thin. Their American citizens of German origin is useless to the Nazis ~~as Nazis~~ because the Nazis have no direct and appreciable hold over them. On the other hand, over the German citizens resident abroad, over the Germans who secretly loathes the Nazi regime, the Nazis again enjoy terrible hold, and they exercise over such Germans a severe and implacable discipline. The real strength of the Gestapo, in Asia America as in Holland, lies in their power over German nationals. It is easy to show how that power is exercised, and what results it produces.

A LITTLE later I shall sum briefly over one of the endlessly brutal activities carried on in Holland by the Nazi Party under its cloak as a German children's organization, particularly because this may throw light upon the scale of the Nazi SD/SA camps in the neighborhood of the Hague, all too familiar to the Western Hemisphere. At this point I want to add a few more general aspects of the torturing procedure.

There are approximately 4000 schools in Holland --- a highschool, secondary and primary. Many others outside in other cities. German Nazis have been the leaders and initiators of Hitlerites and of some members of the

diplomatic corps, attended these schools. The schools were subsidised by the Nazi Government. Their teachers were sent out from Germany and were all Party members. The curriculum was prescribed by Berlin and was mostly that taught in Nazi Germany. Such schools, it is well known, flourish throughout Latin America.

Now the great danger of these schools -- apart from the poisoning of young minds with ludicrous notions of race and history, and Nazi doctrine generally -- comes from the fact that, more than any other category of Germans living abroad, these school teachers are completely under the thumb of the Gestapo. They are not merely Germans and Nazis; they are civil servants participating in a hierarchy and a pension system in which they cannot afford to lose their rank and all the benefits accruing from their past service. Therefore, if a Gestapo instructor then to nourish the seed of anti-American feeling that lies in many a Latin-American heart, they will do so. If they are ordered to undermine the confidence of an employer (the father of one of their pupils) in a given employee, even by lying about him, they are bound to obey the order -- particularly as the fundamental legal and moral code of the Nazi State is, "Right (or Law) is that which is useful to the German People" (Recht ist das deutsche Volk selbst). Today in the Third Reich one of the highest responsibility, and in the second place almost the only literate members of the Party abroad, they can make extremely effective use of the propaganda material furnished them by the agents of Goebbels and Hitlerstrop. In little Asuncion, for example, Nazis may now, with utmost innocence, spread complete fall employment in Germany with unemployment in the United States, and labor "peace" in Europe and station in the United States, to show the "superiority" of the Nazi system. (Of course they do not add that the Nazis have from the beginning had other motives, and as the United States has had only since

1940, and that Nazi labor "peace" is the "peace" of prison workers.) They use site figures to display what great quantities of goods Germany normally buys from a given Latin American country in contrast to the small quantities bought from the same country by the United States. Literate people such as the readers of this magazine can have no notion of the astonishment which with which illiterate people are filled when the most commonplace facts are suddenly revealed to them — with a little twist of the truth that the Germans do not see. And it is upon the illiterate that the Nazis count as their easy victims in foreign countries (as at home).

In Holland three teachers had still another function. Dr. Butting maintained at House No. 2 an enormous ~~index~~^{not} file, a card file, in which he registered everything that his agents knew about the German population of Holland, as well as about non-Germans. Having no wish to draw attention upon himself by the presence of a large clerical staff in House No. 2, he obliged the teachers to do his clerical work for him after hours. Here was an instance of the sort of procedure a Butting could bring to bear upon anyone not a German national, no matter how much that person loved Germany and wished to defend the Nazis because there had once existed a Beethoven and a Goethe. And here, always, was information which a Butting would never want a German citizen to know the existence of. In every aspect, this was Hitler Party work.

One of the most pliable and skillful agents of Dr. Butting's organization in Holland was the number he personnel over the German working population, even those who were sympathetic to policies of secretly anti-Nazi.

He has in Holland, you will recall, at least 100,000 Germans who had been communists, and by and large still not intent to surrender, their former sympathies. An ordinary, working-class, citizen, common

laborers, or even housemaids, they were all required by Nazi law to be members of the Labor Front. The Labor Front, you may have forgotten, is that Nazi government department which has replaced the outlawed labor unions of Germany, and administers the workers' insurance, benefit, and pension system first instituted among us by Bismarck in the 1880's. In and out of Germany, every German worker must carry a Labor Front card and must have entered on that card the monthly contributions he makes to the Fund out of which the benefit payments are ~~disbursed~~ disbursed.

Consider what it has been this represented to Dr. Butting. Who in Holland shall collect these social contributions? Who but the Party members? From whom collect? From every single German in Holland below the status of an executive or proprietor of his own business. Thus, leaving aside the refugees, who had lost their nationality, every German man and woman in Holland was known to Butting's Party men; every one was identified and his personal history summarized in that vast card file upon which the teachers spent their evenings.

Now to be a German citizen and to be known to the Nazis is to be in the power of the Nazis. As long as you do not surrender your citizenship, the Buttings are able to coerce or blackmail or bribe you into doing their bidding. They can break you, or they can induct you into the Party -- exactly as their vest-pocket Schopenhauers chose. That you happen to reside outside instead of inside Germany makes no difference. You are their men, and this is of course especially true of the poor, for the poor by definition live in uncertainty, have no influential friends, and abhor the constant threat of authority -- whether it be the Gestapo or the police.

I remember that in the winter of 1940-41 Butting had received orders to negotiate to Germany, because of the war-caused labor shortage, fifteen thousand of Dutch housemaids who had been working in Holland,

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The great family card file was consulted, and Butting himself decided which women were to go and which were to be allowed to remain. Those who were most "useful" to the Party stayed; and I know personally that the German maids in the household of the Dutch prime minister, Mynheer Colijn, were allowed at a special favor to the minister. Since the papers of those women had to be examined, it was to our legation that they were brought in droves twice a week. We had a large room at the back of the house into which they were herded. I used to call that room the Slave Market, and had you seen it filled with those hundreds of pale, drawn, unhappy faces you would have agreed that there was no other name for it.

These girls knew what was ahead of them. They did not want to serve the Nazi State by doing rough work on farms, or which they were unused; or heavy work in industry, for which they would be hastily trained. They who had lived in rich, well-fed Holland had no mind to live in the thin spartan economy that they must had bastened upon the Germans. They had no wish to surrender the savings they had put away in sound Dutch guilders in exchange for Reich reichsmarks of uncertain purchasing power. But what could they do? They knew nothing of the law of nationality. They were aware that if a Dutch lad married you, you became Dutch and thus escaped this transportation to what was to effect a national prison camp. But it wasn't every day that a Hollander married one of these girls; and aside from this there was no way out for them.

Later, after the invasion of Holland began, I was told that some of these girls, because of their knowledge of certain regions of Holland, had been among the paratroops who dropped out of the Dutch skies in May 1940. This may or may not be true; I can only say that none of the women I saw in the Slave Market impressed me as volunteers for that kind of service.

It was not far different with the men of German nationality. Somehow, if you didn't toe the line you lost your job. And what then? Holland, like all countries without a war economy, had her share of unemployed. Jobs were scarce, and the foreign unemployed were instantly deported by the Dutch, who had no wish to extend the dole to them. So you found yourself back in Germany. What sort of work could you get in Germany if you were in Hitler's black books? Labor camp work, and no other.

But there were other reasons than terrories why you should submit
to Dr. Butting. There were those little ^{every day} practical reasons which play so
large a part in our lives that we never think of them as decisive, never
doubt that the importance they possess. For example, you -- and the women
too -- enjoyed certain advantages by being a "good" German, that is, at
least externally a Nazi sympathizer. The next "Social Department" of the
~~German~~^{Adolf Hitler} Association through which your Labor Front dues were collected,
also furnished you sports, recreation, and entertainment through its local
branches. If you had to send money home to your family in Germany, "the boys"
there where you could get a favorable exchange rate for your guilders. Suppose
you were in Spain, and wanted to Germany for Christmas. You could get
out of Spain all right; but the only way to be reasonably sure that you
would be allowed back was to impress the "boys" with the idea that you
could make yourself useful to them. So you spied on your employer; you
checked conditions about what went on in your shop; you told "the boys"
that the submarine captain ~~about Hitler~~ of the Dutch colonel in those
days you could not bring him back to work-and-work a place next month;
you told them that your agent A., the shipping agent, had said to Synthesis B.,
"We all know about it, but when you come you will be a Hitler." It didn't seem to
matter if the American agent said, "Don't worry about it, you're no Nazi."
You heard by this system that everybody on a whole was being tapped, --

friendly gleam came for a moment into a Party official's eye that ordinarily was cold and suspicious. If, two months later at the club, you chanced to overhear that the shipping man was no longer agent for the German line his family had long represented, it meant nothing to you, -- unless you were a very clever lad in which case you were on the way to being one of "the boys" yourself.

And so the Butting organization worked upon the humbler German people in Holland, as they were able to work upon the humble Dutch people. What I am about to tell will find no analogy in Latin America, but it is still of contemporary significance because the same trick is being played today upon the humbler people of France.

It was in 1938. That German labor shortage of which I have spoken was serious. The Nazis, for their part, were still experiencing an embarrassing degree of unemployment. The Nazis decided to import labor from Holland. In the Dutch labor ministry there was a highly placed civil servant, van Heezen by name, who was a fervently enthusiastic admirer of Nazi Germany. Butting and his friends had seen to it that van Heezen and his wife were often invited to Germany at government expense. As the lady was apparently very extravagant, the van Heezens managed to get themselves pretty heavily into debt to German shops -- which debts, I was told, were written off the books of their Nazi friends. What else van Heezen may have been up to, I happened not to know; but it is a fact that his own Dutch militia put him into prison -- or would, too late -- in the spring of 1940. It was with the aid of this van Heezen, and with the advice of another member of the Dutch national-socialist party, that the Dutch government officials were suddenly enabled for me to be sent to work in [redacted] a number and kind of these young men who were at once the best and most effective agents among the Dutch unemployed.

The young men were shipped off to Germany and given work at fair wages. The foreign exchange regulations were relaxed in their favor, and they were permitted to send home to their families, in Dutch guilders, up to two-thirds of their pay. They were decently housed, quite well fed, and gaily entertained with free beer, movies, and dances, sometimes three evenings a week, by the officials of the "Strength Through Joy" or one of the other Nazi agencies for keeping up the spirits of the Nazi slaves at home. With their habitual cunning, the Nazis rotated these Dutch unemployed. They would keep a man in Germany, in these favorable conditions, not above six months, send him back, and replace him by another. The total turnover, I recall, was about 80,000 men.

Thus one of those men returned to Holland, and found himself again out of a job, he was more than ever dissatisfied with the government and authorities of his own country, and more than ever an admirer of the Nazi ways. Often he became a member of the Dutch national-socialist party; and even if he did not, he became at least a semi-partisan of the German invasion. The wives of these men, meanwhile, who suffered through their unemployment had suffered not only from want, but also from the despondency and ill-temper of a husband instilled by the thought that he could not make a living for his family. More perhaps were produced than their husbands. Thus, one woman who came before a court to claim my house at Scherpenzeel, and whose husband had done a six month's' stint in these circumstances, said to my servant: "I don't care if the Germans invade us. My husband says they are certainly better than the government and the bosses we have. Let them come. At least they'll give us work."

The results of this measure are something so extraordinary that it could have been conceived only in the perverted imagination of the Nazi ~~Government~~. I saw -- indeed I saw this with my own eyes -- that in ~~Germany~~ Hitler, after the war had provided me against England and France,

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I want to say something more about the Dutch before I leave this subject. ^{The Dutch} They fought magnificently against unbeatable odds. The Dutch people were in an immense majority loyal to their Queen and their way of life. The number of those who were deluded by the Nazis, or who sold out to the Nazis, may have been as small as 200,000 or as great as 400,000 out of our 4,000,000 adults in Holland. ^{of which} One of this number, only can be called traitors in the usual sense, for many of them must have believed that they were acting in the true interest of the nation. In themselves, these 200,000 or 400,000 are but no power. The Dutch government is not in their hands. The Dutch army was not theirs. The banking and industrial community can by no means completely be satisfied. The strength of the economy was created directly and absolutely by Nazi fifth columnists, and the real danger of fifth columnism is not that it makes converts but that

Do you think PIAA associations which are the businesses in the Dutch Republic and especially Rotterdam did regulate them. Because you are
commercial and industrialists, they promoted, you have unemployment. Because
of the poor work policies Godt has demanded. Because of this you have

governors who are weak and cowardly and not leaders of men. Thus Nazi fifth columnism influenced the non-Nazi Hollander by making him skeptical of the value of his traditional Dutch institutions. Without being actually disloyal to those institutions, the non-Nazi Hollander was not entirely sure that they were worth defending. He was not absolutely certain that they would not, in reality, be swept away by a "wave of the future" as the Nazis were constantly telling him they would be. So he became not a Nazi, of course, but a passive non-resister, a man who unsure of himself and of his world. This you may take to be gospel -- it is not the convert but the doubter, the non-resister, who explain the collapse of their nations. ^{the doubter} and the ~~Non-resister~~, product of fifth columnism is not the convert, I repeat, it is the non-resister.

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I have more than once emphasized that German citizens are resident in foreign countries in large number. These are people who hope sooner or later, when the world has quieted down, and when they have made their little fortune abroad, to go home to Germany to live. As long as the Nazis were going great guns, a ~~non-resister~~ emigre like the German Citizens' Association had a quite special attraction for these Germans.

Elsewhere in Germany itself the Nazi Party has been closed since ~~long~~ ^{since} late 1945, and virtually no new members admitted, it is still possible for a "Wandering" German living abroad to attain to the honor and achieve the material advantage of ~~partizipation~~, or Party number. Out of 80,000 inhabitants there are only some 8,000,000 Party numbers in Greater Germany. In some cities saying that, such as the ~~non-resister~~ social level, they constitute the propertied and the preferred class of present-day Germany -- exactly as the ~~Non-resister~~ number of members of the Communist Party in the USSR constitute

the preferred and governing class is that other one-party despotism. Therefore, those Germans who cling to their nationality while they live abroad cannot but yearn to become Party members and enjoy the solid dollars-and-cents advantages of Party membership in the mother country. Any one of them who possesses the least tendency to unscrupulousness can be led round by the nose, if only the promise of Party membership is dangled before him as an eventual reward for his services to the Butting of the country in which he resides.

The Party organization in Holland (as in any Latin American country) followed that at home as closely as its smaller numbers would permit. Under Dr. Butting served a corps of district leaders. Each district leader had his chapter of precinct captains, so to say. And each precinct captain was in command of his troops. In solemn imitation of the Party bureaucracy at home, the Party in Holland was administered by a large staff which included an almost canonical variety of specialists (most of them high ranking Party dignitaries). Did a German football team arrive to play against a Dutch team? The *Jugendwart*, or sports warden, dressed thus with a band at the railway station, organized a cheering section, and arranged for the ghettoization of Dutch and German teams and enthusiasts at a great beer hall after the game. Did a delegation of Nazi schoolteachers come to attend a convention with their Dutch colleagues? A *Schulwart*, or school warden, himself a clergymen and Party leader, was on hand to aid in demonstrating that one could be a Nazi without ceasing to be a pious Christian and a fan of culture. Was there an exhibition of German fine printing in Holland? A *Buchwart*, or book warden herded the Dutch publishing houses to the show, indicated who among them were important enough to be given complimentary copies of expensive books, and arranged that a German speaker at the opening banquet should say flattering things about the Dutch press.

Indeed, the means of action at the disposal of Dr. Butting were without end. One was the Nazi Youth Movement. Since Holland lay alongside Germany it was natural that this movement should have its initiators among the Dutch, and should be used to further enthusiasm in the Netherlands for the Nazi way of life.

There was a vigorous, self-made industrialist in Rotterdam, Joseph by name, who financed Dutch youth camps on the Nazi model. Mynheer Joseph was a man who wished his workers well with all his heart. They were given their lunch and furnished recreation, sport, and entertainment without stint under his steely charitable eye. They had good wages, and nothing was denied them except independence of spirit and the possession of their own souls. Butting, originally so wrathful against the capitalist employer class, was delighted with Mynheer Joseph. It was hard for a Dutchman to see anyone enthusiastic in our little Ructing, but of Joseph he would exclaim: "There is a real man, a man of our own kind!"

Joseph had one great delight in life, which was to attend the annual Blitzkampf, the Four Days' March, in which about a hundred Nazi youths and the same number of Dutch youths tramped and camped round Holland in the happy brotherhood of the young out-of-doors. This circus always closed with a review of the dutch forces footer, before a smiling Dr. Butting, a hearty and happy Mynheer Joseph, and a May general of the Dutch army, still in active service, whose name was something like Blighmore. The general, I am sure, was pleased in the line of his duty, not out of Nazi enthusiasm.

The show that I was able to witness in August 1939 was a very fine affair. The camp after the march -- for they were competing in the number of feet and speed -- the boys strode through the villages hung with bunting and flags and crowded with audiences whose faces beamed with

delight at the sight of all these healthy attractive lads -- as if here really was true fraternity, true internationalism, a true promise of peace on earth.

Again it was a little thing, a minor species of fifth columnism; yet what could go deeper than the implanting of this cheerful impression of the innocence and decency of the Nazi spirit? I have spoken to many Americans who travelled through Germany in the years between 1933 and 1939. Hardly as they used to extol Mussolini as the great man who caused the Italian trains to run on time, so they would praise Hitler because the youth of Germany, walking in the woods, strumming its guitars and singing the folk-songs, proved that justice and freedom were the outstanding characteristics of the Nazi regime. Of the poisoning of minds against all foreigners including those Americans themselves, of the corruption of souls and of daily life, these travellers saw nothing; and it goes without saying that no one dared talk them anything. Between these youths and their two kids or Nazis there was approximately the same relationship as between ~~the American summer campers~~
^{from America} for whom children and the lands they really live in.

Before I come on to a more important topic I must tell a story of another one malignant Nazi charlatan in propaganda, a vast scheme in which no less than the Legion found executives involved.

The Berlin Bibliothek had its own foreign press and propaganda division, very much to the chagrin of Goebbels, who deemed this his exclusive province. Over this (and much else) Hitler, the great man would decide personally, and it was part of the present evening of Hitler that he would never pressure a final decision between them. By this refusal of ~~any~~ ^{any} ~~other~~ ^{any} ~~other~~ Hitler was able to keep these all fearful last

they were slipping in his esteem, and therefore more anxious than ever to demonstrate their loyalty to him.

In the summer of 1938 Ribbentrop particularly enraged Goebbels by suddenly putting up his own teletype machines in the foreign embassies and legations, for the transmittal of German news. This served a double purpose. It cut severely into Goebbels' domain, and it furnished spot news with Nazi coloring to the foreign press long before most other foreign press agencies could pass along matter to the local newspapers. But my story concerns something other than press service.

At the time these machines were installed, the Bureau Ribbentrop had another trademark. It conceived the notion of mailing out dull and contentious propaganda material to hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of non-Germans. The business was almost as complicated as it was comical.

First, all missions abroad were instructed to send to the foreign office at Berlin lists of foreign names and addresses. We at The Hague collected the local telephone directories, club and association lists, Who's Who in the Netherlands, and like sources, and shipped them off. Next we began to receive, personally delivered by diplomatic courier, pouches stacked with thousands upon thousands of envelopes. These envelopes contained the propaganda material -- endless speeches by Hitler, and other things no one but a student or a fanatic would read. The envelopes bore no indication of the sender, and were addressed in German block hands by men who had misspelled every other name of person and street. Since the lot we received for mailing from Holland was addressed only to people in England and France, I take it that the Dutch addresses received their reading matter from the Legations in France or England or Switzerland.

Obviously, this will had to be stopped. How to buy 100,000 or 200,000 five-cent stamps for five legations a Niedlich business, especially in a small country like Holland. Dr. Herting was summoned to the rescue,

and it was the Party people who bought the stamps in all the post stations of Holland -- \$25 worth here, \$50 worth there, perhaps \$200 or \$300 worth in each of the big city offices.

Suddenly it was discovered that licking the stamps was an even bigger problem than buying them. The teachers had been brought in, the local Party groups commanded; but still the job was too big. And when a second enormous shipment was threatened, Dr. Butting was able to arrange a compromise with Berlin. His people in Holland would buy the Dutch stamps, but Berlin would have to lick them. And off went the stamps to Berlin in the diplomatic pouch.

Of course the matter did not end here, since, carrying Dutch stamps, the envelopes had to be mailed in Holland. So back came the stamp, this time stuck to new envelopes transported by the existing carriers, and the mailing problem was taken in hand. It was solved by ~~shortcomings, compounding Party members~~^{and} to distribute his quota through all the post offices and mail boxes over an area of perhaps fifty or a hundred square miles.

Thus, at enormous expense, tons of virtually useless matter were diverted for the underground business of perhaps millions of non-Germans the world over. I think of \$100's and of like incidents each time that I hear the government of a democratic country attacked for its ~~shortcomings~~. I wonder if the Communist government may well be; but if you want to see real political subversives, a real pork barrel and really gigantic waste, go to the Nazis. They control the whole of the ~~German~~ ^{German} economy, and a great book could be written on the whineies ~~and~~ they have great claim of the former national income.

VI

The Citizens' Association was dominated by perhaps fifteen leading Nazis resident in Holland. Some of their purposes they carried out through the association itself; others were effected through collateral organizations whose directors were more presentable and less obvious Nazis than the vulgar Dr. Butting, though still working closely with him. For instance, there was the Dutch counterpart of the Anglo-German Fellowship, also called the German-Netherlands Society (*Duits-Nederlandse Vrienden-Verein*, and ^{as a Nederlandse en een Duitse groep opgericht} *Gesellschaft Deutscher Freunde Niederlande*). It was a curious thing that whereas the Anglo-German group was led, on the British side, by titled noblemen, the Dutch-German society was represented on the Dutch side almost altogether by business men. The Court of the Queen of Holland ^{als hoge autoriteit} seemed to be old-fashioned and severely exclusive. It had its Nazi sympathizers — the very rich Count ^{affiliation} *Wiemersdorf*, for example — but they were totally without influence at court, and the entourage of the Queen was throughout absolutely above suspicion.

Now, the president and other officers of the German-Netherlands Society were all representatives of the Dutch business world. At their tables stood the important members of the German business community in Holland. The fraternization between the two elements was complete, but on a strictly business foundation. At their banquets, certain conventional strictures were pronounced concerning the racial affinity between the two Nordic peoples, but the chief stress was laid upon the commercial ^{interpenetration} of Holland and Germany, upon Holland as Germany's gateway to the Atlantic, and so on. I recall sitting at one of their dinners beside a Dutchman ^{from} London who crowded me with questions that he would not dare ask in either the German meeting for his nation, now that the British were no longer leading men. The Blue cheese producers used the ^{same} language. Recently in ^a night a British-American reporter asked his stars

for German buyers whom neither the Americans nor the English were in the market for his product. It was all innocent enough on the Dutch side. They would entertain Punkt, the Nazi Minister of National Economy, when he came to Holland. They held dinners for German commercial missions, and for the delegations who arrived to discuss the German-Dutch debt-clearing program; but it was all in the line of trade.

The Nazis had been extraordinarily clever about going about deeply into debt wherever they could. There is a saying among us that "It can money is to be weak." The contrary was true of the Nazis. "You have only to buy more from us and clear off your credits," they would say smoothly to the Dutch banks and chambers of commerce. Their aim was always to make the Dutch dependent upon German sources of industrial supply. They could take Dutch orders readily, in order to keep the Dutch out of other conflicts, and then would fill the orders or not, as it might suit their book. For example, they never let the Dutch buy airplanes anywhere but in Germany if they could help it; and I am reasonably sure that all, or nearly all the Dutch war planes were Focke-Wulfs from Germany, probably delivered in fulfillment of order. Another example: The Dutch were trying in the late spring of 1940 to place orders for artillery pieces. The French and the British, whom they had approached, could promise only 2nd best delivery. Like von Papenham, the German military attaché at Brussels, got wind of the negotiations, and immediately pressure was put upon the Dutch to break off with the others and contract for Krupp guns -- 2nd best products of delivery that the French and British dared not offer. (Previously the same procedure was used in dealing with Germany's Italian and Baltic surface craft.) Considering the late date of the order, I suspect that none of these guns were ever actually delivered to the Dutch and so, to some extent, does it the more strongly they should be

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delivered. At that late date the true intent was that the Dutch be as little equipped for war as possible. Incidentally, Dr. Butting was a party to these negotiations; and it speaks eloquently of the number and weight of strings in his hands that I never had the least idea how he happened to be involved in that, on the surface, does not seem to be a fifth column job at all.

There was in Amsterdam a prime fifth column center called The German Chamber of Commerce for the Netherlands. Its officers were exclusively German and Nazi, and its president was a certain Dr. Fleische. Fleische was one of the High Priests of the Citizen's Association, a key man who served as a gushing fountain of information for the spy, S.B., even more than for Dr. Butting. It was he, as well as one Sperling, head of the German railway bureau which I have already mentioned, who were the chief consultants and sources of data for the special war-economy attachés assigned to manning/running our Austrian consulate in 1939 to make a complete census of Dutch business properties. The same sort of census was taken by the same sort of specialists in other European countries; and it was thanks to the information they gathered that the High Command was able, after the invasion, to see that German supplies of raw materials and manufactures were possibly supplemented by the stocks present in the invaded countries. The same data, also, told the Nazi predators what foreign properties to "buy up" with the paper currencies they issued in the invaded countries and stand upon the foundations of the properties they coveted.

Another task carried out by Fleische and Sperling had to do with the selection of S.B. Because it was a High Command job, and not a straight fifth column job, all the S.B. and not Butting who was instructed to appoint ~~other Germans who he believed~~ as agents for a purpose which I shall describe.

and it was Fleische and Sparkling who nominated those agents out of the German Chamber of Commerce membership. But as a committee, but individually, each ignorant of the fact that others were also working for the High Command, one German business man was appointed by A.B. agent for the quiet purchase of oil supplies on their behalf; another was always employed to engage cargo space in advance for the import of war materials to go to Germany; a third was sent into the market to pick up gold coin; and so on. All this was arranged in May and June 1939. Thus, having taken Czechoslovakia, the Nazis had made up their minds to start war that summer and were hastening their final preparations.

Dr. Fleische's position in Hatch as well as German business circles in Holland was absolutely unassailable; and had he been attacked in the Dutch press before September 1939 it is probable that every decent business man in Holland would have cried "For shame! The man is being persecuted!" Not only one week before the invasion of May 1940 the Dutch police arrested Fleische as a Nazi spy -- and, incidentally, expelled the attorney Dr. Irving. I mention this not to attack Fleische personally -- for my story deals with bigger things than personalities -- but to let the reader see just no quarter is too respectable, no circle too exalted, to be infected with espionage, with treason (as in the case already cited of van Horne), and with fifth columnism. There was in the Dutch civil service a Dr. von, von, who tended to the German colony in Holland, without always at the guest table when the German-Netherlands Society or the German Chamber of Commerce gave a banquet, professed the greatest admiration for the Nazis, and was in the end awarded a Nazi decoration by Ruthmann -- although after consisting of a little snafu with Ruthmann. The man's name was Hinsfeld; his function was the drafting of commercial treaties between his government and foreign governments; and he had the dubious task of making a difficult current ear obtain -- inflation

permanent Assistant Secretary of Commerce. Yet by reason of some quirk in his nature, the man ~~now~~ was doubly a renegade -- to his nation as a Hollander, to his people as a Jew.

A minor aspect of Flesche's function -- if any aspect of fifth columnism can be called minor -- was to flatter Dutch business men, for example by whispering to them that Minister Pohl, on his last visit, had spoken especially about them. When the Utrecht Fair was held -- the greatest annual event in Dutch business -- it was Flesche who saw to it that the eight Hollanders were decorated with the Order of Merit of the German Eagle, the final reward reserved for meritorious foreigners. He was always present at the powwow where it was determined which Dutch business men should be accorded the signal honor of an invitation to the annual Congress of the Nazi Party at Berchtesgaden -- though the Dutch national-socialists dreaded the semi-fascists, and Buiting's approval was necessary for the final decision about the list.

The simplest fashion in which the Nazi fifth column worked upon the Dutch business world was ~~to~~^a to eliminate executives unfriendly to the Nazi regime from business organizations and replace them by their own tools. In the beginning the process was more or less haphazard, the Nazis being still uncertain how far they might go. As an actual plan, it matured only in 1939. In that year, for the first time, it was determined to get rid of ~~all~~^{as many} Jews possible outside Germany. As there was scarcely an important Dutch firm without Jews among its officers or directors, Holland was immediately affected. After the Jews came other undesirable, from the Nazi point of view -- and the interesting thing is that it was not the Communists but the semi-fascists who on the first day the ~~Communist~~ ~~semi-fascist~~ ~~semi-fascist~~ ~~semi-fascist~~ ~~semi-fascist~~ and replacing them by "safe" people in ~~the~~

Dr. Banting and his colleagues of the fake Citizens' Association worked upon both Germans and Hollanders. It must be borne in mind that ~~there was scarcely any important business in Holland that was not in some measure dependent upon the German market and a German connection.~~ This was especially true of the numerous Dutch commission houses, import and export businesses, agency and factoring firms, and transport and insurance companies. A large part of Holland's shipping and transit trade was done for German account. Wherever a Dutch business man turned he found himself faced with the problem of Germany. And of course this was particularly true of the banks.

The German in Holland who was not amenable to the dictation of Banting and his friends had no choice whatever to stay in business. ~~that~~ ~~was~~ ~~nothing~~ ~~but~~ ~~the~~ ~~beginning~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~end~~ ~~of~~ ~~his~~ ~~business~~ ~~and~~ ~~his~~ ~~connection~~ ~~with~~ ~~Germany~~ He was threatened first of all with the loss of his passport. Here is a threat so serious that ~~anyone~~, citizens of a really free republic, can hardly grasp its import. It puts a man before three alternatives: either go back to Germany, or declare yourself a refugee and cut yourself off from your country and your family at home. But this particular German a job with a German firm in Holland? He was fired automatically. With all a Dutch firm! A word in the proper ear and the man was out of work. Was this the agent of a German principal? Banting had only to write to Berlin, in Berlin, that one J. Bitterlin agent of the German firm J. von Richter ~~was right~~ ~~nowhere~~, not trustworthy. A peremptory note from Bitterlin (Party headquarters) to the German firm to exertion, and J.'s agency contract was immediately rescinded. Was the man proprietor of his own business? As he was a German, his business was liable to have a German basis of connection, and he was promptly ruined. His source of supply was blocked; his credit line was withdrawn by the banks, his market was closed to him. In one way or another the

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German in Holland had three alternatives placed before him: Come in with us or lose your brains out! Fifth columnism has its tragic side even for the Germans; and I cannot but believe that many a German business man in Latin America is to-day playing a part he loathes and of which he is ashamed. The reader will forgive me if I add that I say this without partisanship. It is simply in the nature of things that not all the Germans in the world can fail to see the hideousness of the Nazi regime, not all of them can wish to conspire against the whole world and too foolish enough to dream of ~~conservatism~~ it.

How was it much harder to get at the Dutch, -- not of course in their strictly Dutch enterprises, but wherever there was any connection at all with Germany. Assume a Hollander who for years has had a profitable connection with an agent for a German firm. If his agency was valuable to him -- as in the case of a machinery distributor, a shipping firm, an oil importer who sold his product in the German market -- that man had reluctantly to live in the good graces of Mr. Butting and his friends, or go out of business. Nothing might be suspicious of the man, or not like Mr. Butting. If so, he would explain up one of his litigations.

"Get something to re-cut-toe for me," he would order; and the
Mentor, having informed a German lad working for the agency, would
report back that the Italiano had spoken slightly of the inferior
grade goods available going into the German product he handled, or that
his wife was a Jewish dentist. (You don't believe that about the
Jewish dentist? I myself, who was to a Dutch -- not Jewish -- barber,
had no desire whatsoever from getting because I did not give my trade to
no large Jewish barber on the hoger.) ~~High-class~~ ~~High-class~~ ~~High-class~~ ~~High-class~~

~~...and you're going to have to come to Lemburg-schotter...~~

soon, soon after, that agent was replaced, his successor was bound to be a Hollander who knew which side his bread was buttered on. A man who would do as he was told.

How could Butting hesitate to put in an incompetent Hollander -- if the man was a good Nazi and useful to the Party. The Dutch national-socialist leader, Mussert, might drop a word to some one in Berlin. Or it might be Roet van Teningen who spoke, Mussert's partner and rival -- for all Nazis are at one and the same time partners and rivals, standing shoulder to shoulder against the world with their knives drawn, ready to cut each other's throat. The Dutchmen would say to the Germans:

"Look here, I have a wonderful fellow in Rotterdam, a great Party worker. He's down on his luck and needs a job. See what you can do for him. It could help us a lot."

By the grapevine, the appeal would reach Butting's desk. In a couple of months the Dutch Nazi would have been given a small agency. His pals would think him a great fellow -- yesterday unemployed to-day representative of a German firm, no less! And he would say to his pals: "You see the sort of thing the Party could do for everybody if only we got rid of this anti-Nazi government of ours!"

The reader can imagine that this sort of dictation to Dutch business and disruption of Dutch business personnel irritated and disturbed the Hollander agent terribly. To what lengths the Nazis in Holland went I can in the case of the great worldwide Dutch shipping agency, William H. Fijller & Co. This honorable firm had for many years been agent in Dutch territory for a number of European reinsurance companies, including the Swiss Reinsurance Company, and North German Lloyd. Show the next fifth column

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got well under way, and was doing great sums, it was determined to inform the Muller company that the personnel of its board of directors was unacceptable to the Nazi Government and would have to be changed. The problem was that the Nazis could not have "untrustworthy" people, some of whom were, directing an agency which represented German lines. I imagine that the Mullers were in their wrath and told the Nazis what they could do, for no change was made. Negotiations went on for months, the Mullers fought the Nazis toe to toe; and the last I heard about the case was that the Nazis had been forced to give way at least to this extent, that they were逼迫ing the Mullers to incorporate a separate company for the German-linen agency and set up a board of directors that would be half Muller and half Nazi. If these negotiations dragged out to May 1940, then of course they had to withdraw, and the Mullers were dictated to by the invaders, not engaged with.

I may have hinted, dear Mile, that Dr. Butting was not the sort of man with whom the real leaders of Dutch business would consent to deal. I mean by real leaders, for example, ~~Piet~~^{Ferdinand} van Vlimmeren, the predecessor of Mr. Thome J. Stettinius as President of the International Chamber of Commerce, and Stephanus Gosschalk, another Hollander of unquestioned probity and character. Not only were these men too intelligent and experienced in business affairs to be impressed by a Butting, presupposing their good will did the necessity in the Nazis for a Butting to be allowed to dominate Butting's men. Anybody with even slight blemish and distinction, however small, can be brought up fire against the capitalist system and can be used to appoint functionaries of their quality and their caliber. This was the task set before the Dutch Ribbentrop was cut out.
 ~~He was a man of influence, the Ribbentrop was~~. Their principal

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characteristic was a combination of good breeding with some flaw or other that made them not quite suitable for Party membership. Rittmeister (cavalry captain) Kickel, for example, the Ribbentrop man for Holland, had Jewish blood and was therefore not a Party member. He wore a glass in his eye, was distinctly a "gentleman" and something of a swell, and the way in which he affected a tolerant contempt for the Nazis was both charming and impressive. "My dear fellow," he could say in substance to the members of the German-Netherlands Society, "you know of course that in Germany I dare not open my mouth. But here in Holland, and to a man like you, I can talk freely. Believe me when, speaking as a good German, I give you my word that the Nazis are swine. Not all of them. Not all ^{The Functionaries, after all, are mostly a good man, a good person.} of them, mind you. But practically all of them. Swine." And he would chat merrily on until the moment came for him to slip into his discourse the falsehood he wanted you to be impressed by and to repeat everywhere, "What?" it would come further. "No, my dear chaps! Impossible. I know for a fact that the Nazis haven't got eight days' oil supply in Germany. How can they make war?" And he would add hastily: "But for heaven's sake, don't tell anyone anything I should not! It's as much as my life is worth to be telling ~~the truth~~ this." It is a fact that Captain Kickel actually made this statement about oil in late August 1939, one week before Ribbentrop presented the second war ultimatum. A Function of a Corps might know too much to believe it; but most of the members of the German-Netherlands Society were one of their class, and they were impressed.

Since the Dutch business and other affairs were constantly being threatened with financial difficulties (related upon them by the Nazis and the British), but had no means of defense: they were compelled to do whatever the Nazis in Germany in order to be able to get over the burden of these difficulties. (In we find a Function, a

Gruen arranging to maintain friendly relations with Ribbentrop, with Stroessner and later Hess, with Hess, with Bohle (Hess' subordinate and Hitler's superior). They had to be able to go to Berlin and argue that the ~~absent-of-makers~~ must be called off, and the protest they invariably gave was one that invariably worked. "If this is permitted," Pfeiffer could say, "your Dutch business must inevitably suffer, and your status in Dutch guilders must inevitably diminish." The one thing that the Nazis were ~~shorter~~ of than anything else was foreign means of payment, and international currencies like the guilder, the Swiss franc, the pound sterling, and the dollar. Only with such currencies could they pay cash for essential imports in those parts of the world -- the United States for example -- where they had been unable to arrange barter agreements and had no credits. Thus, up to a point at least, the big Dutch business men -- but only the big ones -- had a mode of defense they could ~~not~~ set up against the Nazis.

It follows from this that there was something excusable in the expansionist policy of the Nazis and their kind, and in their endeavor to make as good terms with the East leaders. They wanted no war; they ~~wanted~~, to prevent ~~disruption~~ disruption to the world at large; they took no pleasure from these startings or from the contacts they had to maintain with Berlin. To say freely again that they wanted peace quite as much because they were patriotic Hollander, we know that trade was the life blood of the Dutch people, as because they had a private material stake in the continuance of the existing order. They took, perhaps without knowing it, almost ~~unconsciously~~ the line that the German business men ~~were~~ ~~not~~ ~~to~~ ~~blame~~ from 1938 on. Only all in the case of the German business men, the Nazis seem to feel ~~unconsciously~~ that these Hollanders were ~~guilty of~~ ~~knowing~~ ~~and~~ ~~aided~~ to themselves that over the ~~first~~ case,

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Sect. 2

even if the Nazis took them over, Dutch workers could at any rate have employment; they, the leaders of Dutch business, would all say that be taken into partnership by the Nazis; and the New Order in which they ~~were~~
~~were~~, their place would at least not be communism, and might not be very different from the existing order. But they were wrong, on three counts.

Sect. 3

First, the pickings left by the Nazis to their partners -- another German business man or others -- are small pickings indeed. Secondly, for a first class business man, a decent income, even a large income, is not enough. The memory that he who is now tied to the ball of the Nazi cart was once a free agent, free to ~~improve~~^{use his true talents} exercise his talent, his imagination, and his energy, to the profit to the running of his business, is bound to gnaw at the vitals of any big businessman who caught in the Nazi machine, and make his life miserable. To the smaller executive, who used to thwacking out the big man's orders, it makes little difference; and so goes as a rule that it is the ~~second~~^{first} rate, or the ~~third~~^{and lower} rank executive who is an ~~enthusiastic~~^{really} Nazi or Fascist sympathizer. But of course big men this is not ~~not~~ true. They also did Fritz Thyssen ^{Thyssen fled} well away from his country and his erstwhile family business because he was reflecting ~~completely~~ the ~~unpleasantness~~ of seeing incompetent Nazis ~~overrule~~ him and his ~~conquerors~~ by a corrupt and greedy governmental gang of hoodlum and scum, helpless to reason their predilections, that in a day ~~beautiful~~ structure, the United Steel Works of Germany, from the rails that he was engineering it is the hands of this car-worshipping country, the Nazi Party, which is not ~~but~~ ~~but~~ important enough to finance as a bulwark ~~against communism~~.

And the third point is this, that the Nazis will surely be ~~overruled~~ because every day and their junior partners shall erect a New Order and begin to repeat the ~~successes~~ of those illusory victories of 1933-41.

It does not matter that the Soviet Russians may be too weak for them. It does not matter that the United States may not jump into war with both feet. Such circumstances would hasten the Nazi overthrow; but that overthrow will come in any case.

Those who assume that the Nazis may found an enduring order forget entirely what the peoples of Europe are. The peoples of Europe are far too advanced in civilization, too self-respecting and independent in spirit, too astute and ingenious to remain for any significant length of time the slaves of a New Order which they know to be built upon their enslavement. The Europeans are not gentle and unresisting South Sea Islanders. They have seen chains before, and they know very well that chains are not mere bracelets and necklaces. They are not primitive Redskins helpless against Siouxans. They themselves have forged firearms; and as soon as they have got their second wind they will fight this tyrant with all the resourcefulness that the mind of civilization can command. They will begin by sabotaging, and they will end by destroying their Nazi masters.

anybody, German or non-German, employer or worker, who has put his money on the Part here is bound to lose it. Not because European man has forgotten about liberty and democracy, not because he bothers his head to remember the struggles of the past in which his liberty and his dignity were desperately won. Details of history do not concern us, and I am not discussing them. I am discussing a reality, which is this: unknown to themselves, -- on the present, the labourers, the clerks, the mechanics, the small shopkeepers, -- there lives living within them a spirit that is always crying to itself, "But there's so much dirt we will not eat!" It is this spirit that still sometimes makes as it overthrew Napoleon.

...and already hearing the voice of that
man of many voices, and no single hour fit for Germans in

Germany if the Nazi war criminal did not drown it out. Sooner or later, that voice will say that form of government these men shall live under. And it will not be the oppressor who will be consulted about that form of government. Not because the oppressor's "class emotion" will deny him a right to a voice, but because the patriotic members of his own class will brush him aside. It is to be thought that the Greeks in exile, the Poles in exile, the Free French French, the Serbs in exile, the Germans in exile will welcome into any restored government of Europe those of their compatriots who succumbed to the Nazi line, or sold out their peoples to the Nazi power.¹ When Europe is restored to freedom it will be even plainer than it is now that it is the
^{the last and true standard which is} the true interest of the men of property, to fight with his people against the Nazi domination. Only then will his people accord him a share in the world to be restored, and only then, out of respect for him, out of recognition of some of his qualities, will his people fight with him against all other forces that seek to destroy property, regeneration and freedom upon mankind. It is not by the Nazis that the men of property will be preserved from extinction. If he is wise and loyal, his own workers will preserve him.

Memorandum
Copy

VII

I have still something to add, both by way of summary and conclusion, and concluding myself and my hand.

The Nazi's calculation is a three-ring circus, built one ring inside the next. The innermost ring is represented by the normal espionage and intelligence service of the military establishment common to all governments. The middle ring is the Nazi Party organization with its internal organs operating as foreign cells. And the outermost ring is the economic system of the nation and business run in the non-German style where the Nazi regime and SA/SS calculations are at work.

S-2

Against the innermost ring the sole remedy is a first class counter-espionage service. This might seem to the reader too obvious to be worth saying, but if we look at the Dutch Government in the years 1933 and 1938, if we read the book of the Dutch foreign minister published in 1938, we are bound to say to ourselves that to men as intelligent as the Dutch, it was not obvious at all. Minister van Kleffens admits that the people did not know who "Jonathon" was; yet S.B. drove a car with a Dutch diplomatic license plate, harbored with the leaders of German Nazis in Holland, scoured every square foot of the country, crossed the German-Dutch frontier by motor innumerable times. There was the little counter-espionage bureau? Why did they not know what was going on to those No. 2? Why were they not aware that a radio transmitter was installed in the office. One wonders if they knew, even, that the Dutch police itself -- in particular the Rotterdam police commissioner -- would transport over German refugees to the Gestapo without the formality of identification papers.

Against the middle ring the remedy is of two kinds. First, infiltration: so long as the Nazis rule Germany, all organizations of Germans of any kind, former country, including, whether open or concealed as chessie and working clubs, must be infiltrated with the most disloyal in appearance. The officers and the rank and file must be infiltrated, i.e., members who accompanied to judge meetings of their organizations, persons who attended the meetings of Nazi organizations, etc., persons who worked in their ranks, etc. Second, infiltration: the informant must be strong enough, have access to funds, will enough care of its own true interest, to sketch every place that organization of which it is part visit. In the case of Holland I cannot believe that the Dutch did not at least suspect that the German government assassinated me, all that Dr. Bobbing's role was, and I am forced to believe that they did this quite voluntarily, out of fear and out of trust in the strength of their own true interest.

-10-

As for the German & Ring, a nation whose social and economic house is in order will not need to fear that its own nationals will willingly collaborate with foreign fifth columnists. When orders are showing on the other books, and workers are opening weekly pay envelopes, neither employer nor employee will take time to listen to subversive talk on the small radio or the street-corner, or to discuss among themselves what ought to be done about "the situation." This is the basic, the fundamental problem. A healthy society is immune to fifth column poison; a sick society will be killed by it.

As for me personally, I am a German refugee. Not a Jewish refugee. Not an involuntary refugee. Had I chosen, I might have remained for many years in that diplomatic service in which I represented first the German Republic and then the Third Reich until the war broke out in September 1939. Why I chose otherwise is a story I shall tell another day.

These are too reasons for the publication of what I know about that fifth column. The first is that I wanted to show who the fifth columnists were, and to show that all by and large there were no true German refugees among them. Certainly there are fake refugees in the Nazi G-2 system. Certainly there are economical emigrants who, being refugees, have nevertheless allowed themselves to be bribed or blackmailed into serving the Nazis. But these regrettable circumstances cannot be held and should not be held against the great mass of honorable bona fide refugees living abroad.

Finally, I wish to dispel that of the Nazi fifth column. Not this or that individual. Not even I. My story above is considerable detail and considerably different to you in the Britzervlaude. But what was really true to me then, and still is true to me is to bear the veil from this

particular enemies. It is only when facts are revealed that measures can be taken against them. And when we find ourselves taking measures against the enemy, he ceases to be a bogeyman, and we cease to fear him. We no longer tremble about who may be lurking under the bed: we drag him out and beat him over the head.

The whole item of fifth columnist is a great boon to the Nazis. It makes their work easier. It may frighten the rest of the world. It gives the impression of a tremendous secret weapon against which there is no defense. And it reassures Hitler because, by casting suspicion upon every German refugee, it cripples and paralyzes the powers of those refugees whose knowledge and ^{information} ~~intervention~~ might be useful to the rehabilitation of the land in violence. Fifth columnist is at work.

April 27, 1948

The Honorable
The Secretary of the Treasury
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Thank you very much for your letter of
April 17.

I am glad to know that the situation which
arose in connection with the operations of the
General Airlines and Film Corporation has been so
promptly and competently dealt with, and that
this corporation may now be safely trusted on the
same basis as any other American company.

Yours very truly,

William J. Donovan





TREASURY DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

April 17, 1942

Dear Colonel Donovan:

You will recall that on January 10, 1942, the Department forwarded to you a memorandum relating to a number of situations found to exist in connection with the operations of General Aniline and Film Corporation, at that time owned and controlled by German interests and operating under Treasury Department supervision.

We called your attention to the fact that the Osalid Division of the company was in an unusually good position to obtain defense secrets, inasmuch as its sales and service men (in some instances German aliens or German-born American citizens) had access to many defense plants and Government offices; that the Agfa Ansco Division of the company processed and developed official Government films of a confidential nature; and that the company in general could be used as a cloak for subversive activities in many respects.

Since that time the situation has changed materially and the purpose of this letter is to bring you up to date.

The Government took title to the foreign-owned shares of the Corporation on February 16, 1942, and has installed a thoroughly competent American management of unquestioned loyalty. Some forty-odd executives and employees of the company have been removed because of doubts as to their loyalty, and the Department and the management are proceeding as rapidly


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2.

as possible with a program calculated to remove every vestige of German control or influence.

Although the reorganization of the affairs of the company, particularly the elimination of all personnel of doubtful allegiance, has not been completed, I can say with confidence that the situations described in the memorandum accompanying our letter of January 10, 1942, have been corrected, and that you may safely deal with the corporation on the same basis as any other American company.

Sincerely yours,



Secretary of the Treasury.

Col. William J. Donovan,
Coordinator of Information
Twenty-fifth and K Streets
Washington, D. C.



TREASURY DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

January 10, 1942.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

Secretary Morgenthau sent the attached memorandum in regard to General Aniline and Film Corporation to the President last evening.


This morning he directed me to send a copy to you and the other interested departments and agencies of the Government having contracts or dealings with this company, with the suggestion that steps be taken to eliminate situations of the character described in the memorandum.

Sincerely,

E. F. Foley Jr.
Acting Secretary of the Treasury.

Hon. William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Twenty-fifth and K Streets
Washington, D. C.

Attachment



SECRET

January 7, 1942

Secretary Morganthau
K. H. Foley, Jr.

Since our entrance into the war we have had a group of Treasury people under Joe O'Connell supervising and investigating from the inside the General Aniline and Film Corporation, which has been blocked under the freezing order. Several months ago we prevented the sale of this company to General Dyestuffs because we were convinced from our study of the German dominated industrial setup in this country that General Dyestuffs, like General Aniline and Film, was part of the I. G. Farbenindustrie, the huge German dye trust.

Our investigation to date has disclosed serious situations affecting the national interest.

1. The Optical Division. This division, headed by F. W. von Koenig, who came to this country direct from an association with German Zeppelin Works and Maibach Auto Works, has succeeded by several devices in providing access for its men -- often German aliens or German-born American citizens -- to the drafting rooms of about 3500 industrial plants, including defense installations and Government experimental laboratories, and in amassing valuable industrial information; the device used was the leasing, and then the continuous servicing, of a reproduction or blue-printing machine. The corporation has also succeeded in obtaining contracts for the microprinting of United States government archives. We already have found documentary evidence that United States Navy information so obtained has been transmitted to Germany by the corporation.

2. The Advertising Division. It has been found that this company has succeeded in a variety of ways in obtaining access to confidential military files of the United States Government. For instance, a company laboratory, in charge of a German alien assisted by two other

- 2 -

SECRET

German aliens, was found to be developing and processing films of experimental United States Army tanks, taken at the Aberdeen proving grounds. A related field under current investigation is the use of Agfa-Annes for the development of military and reconnaissance film of value to the German Government. For instance, the company's laboratories were used in 1938 and in 1940 for the development of film taken in the Indian region between the Canal Zone and the Pacific Coast by a so-called "scientific" expedition sponsored by the German Government.

3. The Company as a cloak for subversive activities. The fact that the company has over 3000 employees and expends about \$50 millions annually, provides the German Government, through I. G. Farben, with unusual opportunities for the concealment of German agents and expenditures for propaganda and other subversive purposes. For example, a person, educated in Germany and a confessed Nazi Party member both in Germany and the United States was sent by the company "to the Homeland" to undergo training in various subjects with the avowed purpose of enabling him to become the "confidential assistant" to the head of the film and cameras division of the company. Other instances have already been discovered where young Germans of military age were given temporary employment in the company after which they left for China and Japan for purposes not yet established.

The facts in these cases have been turned over by us to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and to Army Intelligence. We are continuing our investigation and expect to be in position, in the near future, to make specific recommendations as to personnel and other changes which should be made in the public interest.

(Initialed) K.H.P.D.

February 5, 1942

Dr. Isaac M. Gale
Coordinator of Information
Washington, D. C.

Dear Dr. Gale:

Pursuant to the understanding entered into with the Department of State, I have pleasure in confirming your designation as special representative of the Coordinator of Information in the Far East. Under the circumstances now prevailing, your headquarters will be at Shanghai. But should conditions make it advisable, you should take appropriate steps to preserve your mobility and establish your headquarters elsewhere.

Special information representatives of the Coordinator of Information assigned to the Far East will report to you and operate under your direction.

Other officers appointed by the Coordinator to the Far Eastern Center of operations will be directed to maintain contact with you in order that a coordinated service may be established in the Far East.

In the event that a general representative should be sent to that area to supervise and take charge of all work there by all branches of this office, you shall report to and be governed by the instructions and orders of such general representative so designated.

You are requested to keep in as close communication with the Coordinator of Information as circumstances will permit.

Sincerely,

George F. Kennan
Undersecretary of State, Mr. Statman, Mr. Earley, Mr. Mygatt,
Mr. Fletcher and Rep. Brown.

William J. Donovan

Gale 2/27

Dear Mr. Shaw:

Subject: Esson M. Gale

Referring to my letter of November 27, 1941, it is now desired that Mr. Gale proceed to Chungking and it is suggested, for your consideration, that he should be appointed Special Assistant to the Ambassador, and I should be glad if you would inform me if this can be arranged.

Mr. Gale can travel via Pan-African Airways plane scheduled to leave January 6th, if passage can be arranged.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM J. DONOVAN

Ramseyble Newland Shaw
Assistant Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

November 27, 1941

Dear Mr. Smith:

Subject: Mr. Jason M. Gale

Referring to my letter dated November 27th, it is desired that the Department of State advance payments to Mr. Jason M. Gale, to be charged to the amount of the Coordinator of Information, as follows:

A salary of six hundred dollars (\$600) monthly to commence from December 1, 1941.

A per diem allowance of Ten Dollars (\$10) to commence from the date of his arrival in Shanghai.

Transportation and such other allowances due him as are ordinarily granted by the Department to its Foreign Service Officers.

Your kind attention will be appreciated.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM J. DONOVAN

William J. Donovan
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington D. C.

WJD:JW/MS/122


LARTH, SHERIDAN H. 13,182
x Grouitch, Mabel

6 December 1943

NAVAL COMMAND, OSS

In answering the attached letter from Madame Grouitch, it would be helpful if you could indicate to us whether your records show that Lt. Garth is being transferred to OSS and, if so, what the status of the transfer is.

C. A. Bane
Lt. (jg) USN



PENSION PLANNING COMPANY
PENSION, BONUS & PROFIT-SHARING PLANS
527 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK 17, N.Y.
MURRAY HILL 2-1800

December 29, 1943

Mr. Robert "Bob"
Assistant to the Executive Officer
Office of Strategic Services
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Sir:

Thank you very much for your letter of December 18
indicating that you have taken such good and prompt
care of the application of Mr. Gendel.
With my personal thanks,

Sincerely,

Meyer M. Goldstein
Dr.

MS2-177

(25)

18 December 1943

Mr. Meyer W. Goldstein
527 Fifth Avenue
New York, N. Y.

My dear Mr. Goldstein:

I am replying to your letter of December 7, 1943,
due to the illness of Colonel Doering.

Mr. Gendel telephoned Colonel Doering's office shortly after your letter arrived and, through that office, interviews were arranged for him with our Personnel Procurement Branch and with the head of a Division which we thought might be interested in Mr. Gendel.

As we explained to Mr. Gendel at the time, no request for his services may be made until he has completed his basic training. After that time it is possible that we shall request his transfer. We cannot make a definite commitment now because our ability to use him efficiently depends largely on whether or not approval is given to a projected program. If the program is approved, Mr. Gendel should be very valuable to us.

Thank you for calling him to our attention.

Yours very truly,

Robert Burns
Assistant to the
Executive Officer

Permit me to add

PENSION PLANNING COMPANY
PENSION BONUS & PROFIT SHARING PLANS
527 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK CITY
MURRAY HILL 2-800

December 7th, 1943

O. C. Deering, Jr.
Lieutenant Colonel, AUS
Executive Officer
Office of Strategic Services
Washington, 25, D. C.

Dear Sir:

Thank you for your letter of December 2nd, with reference to Mr. Milton L. Goldstein.

He just came in with the enclosed letter of his dated December 7th, stating that he had been reclassified 1A and thought that this might facilitate his use by OSS rather than hinder it because being in uniform and subject to the direction of OSS he could be assigned to do any undertaking, it seemed wise.

As his letter indicates, he was going to be in Washington on Thursday, December 9th and so I took the liberty of asking him to telephone your Secretary to see if you might be inclined to have him talk to anyone while in Washington. I hope you will not consider this presumptuous under the circumstances.

With my personal thanks, I am,

Sincerely,

Meyer M. Goldstein
Meyer M. Goldstein.

MM/JL
Enclosure

CAMOUFLAGE ENGINEERING CO., INC.
136 EAST 37 STREET - NEW YORK CITY - TELEPHONE PLAZA 4-3790

December 7th, 1943

MR. Meyer M. Goldstein
327 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Mr. Goldstein:

Yesterday, notice arrived from my Local Board informing me that I have been reclassified in IA; that of course affects my application to the OSS.

However, it has occurred to me in the light of my interview with Mr. Armstrong (in the course of which I expressed willingness to serve in uniform) that my new status may make it simpler for the OSS to sign me up. In the case that they decided to have me work for them, OSS was planning to have me serve in uniform; as I shall be in the Army shortly wont that facilitate things both for them and for me?

On Thursday, December 9th, I expect to be in Washington, and I would welcome the opportunity to find out from OSS their attitude toward this new situation. I think, therefore, that on Thursday I ought to take the liberty of telephoning General Donovan's office to ask for an interview. Would you agree with that?

Thank you again for the interest which you have so kindly taken in my problems.

Sincerely yours,
Milton L. Gendel
Milton L. Gendel

13,130

Gendel, Milton

x Goldstein, Moyer

4 December 1943

COLONEL CONNELL

Attached is a letter from
Mr. Moyer H. Goldstein, addressed
to General Donovan, regarding Mr.
Milton L. Gendel.

Could you ascertain from
the various branches whether there
is a position which calls for Mr.
Gendel's particular qualifications?

Also attached for your infor-
mation is a copy of Col. Deering's
reply to Mr. Goldstein.

S. A. [unclear]
S. (S) [unclear]

(25)

2 December 1943

Mr. Meyer L. Goldstein
Penion Planning Company
327 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Mr. Goldstein:

In General Donovan's absence your letter of November 28, 1943, with reference to Mr. Milton L. Gendel has been referred to me for reply. We are very grateful to you for calling Mr. Gendel to our attention and for the information which you have given us about his background and qualifications. Your letter and the attached memorandum have been referred to the branches of this organization who might be interested in a man with Mr. Gendel's qualifications. I shall let you know as soon as we have further news to report.

There is one point which Mr. Gendel may wish to consider carefully. It is the policy of this agency not to request draft deferments for any of its civilian employees, with very few exceptions of the most urgent nature, and for this reason it is quite possible that Mr. Gendel would be re-classified if he were to join us here.

Yours very truly,

G. C. Deering, Jr.
Lieut. Colonel, AGC
Executive Officer

LEO BLACK

~~SECRET~~

FROM: Jack Springer

ROUTING AND RECORD SHIFT

Accession No. 10-10-1

Date Rec'd.: 12 : 9/2/63

file

Bart *An*

Fund
comparat =

July 16th

numbers to correspond with number in To column.
Leave space under each row.
Delete all lines in To column.
Delete all lines that contain subject before further routing
and those which are indicated in Comments column.
Delete all lines on beginning.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

SECRET

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Brig. Gen. William F. Donovan,
Director, OSS

FROM: Earl Brendan

SUBJECT: Sardinian Personnel

DATE: 2 September 1943

Referring to your recent oral request concerning people with underground connections in Sardinia or people otherwise familiar with this island, I wish to advise that aside from Lusso, on whom I have already advised you, and in addition to the personnel who are already connected with our organization, I know of only two men who could possibly be considered in this category.

One of these has been suggested by one of our friends in the Italian Socialist Party who has been invaluable to us in the recruiting of agents in the past. This man, we find, falls into the classification of "small fry" politically and has no real underground connections in Sardinia. We believe that he would be little or no help to us.

The second is a Mr. Dino Giacobbe, who undoubtedly has certain Sardinian political connections. I attach hereto copy of a memorandum from Mr. DeVoeckel of our New York office concerning this man. In view of the information supplied by Mr. DeVoeckel and other information which we have, I believe that it would be extremely unwise to have dealings with this party, and I strongly advise against it.

PL/3
R.P.

Attachment

SECRETC
O
P
Y**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**

22986

INTEROFFICE MEMO

DATE: August 27, 1943

TO: Major Ricca
FROM: R. DeVecchi
SUBJECT: DINO GIACOBBE

Complying with your request I obtained the following information on the above subject.

Name: Dino Giacobbe
Aliases: Felice Angalo; Armando Giacobbe; Felice Armandino Giacobbe;
 Dino Jacoby.
Born: January 14, 1896 at Borgali, Italy
Height: 6' - weight approximately 175 pounds - black hair, brown eyes, ruddy complexion.
 January 23, 1943 was reported at 92 Appleton St., Boston, Mass.
 c/o Mrs. Ella Cassidy; next 759 Cherokee St., Bethlehem, Pa. He left this address on March 10, 1943 leaving forwarding address
 102 Fifth Avenue, New York City. It is stated that he can always be reached c/o Miss Helen F. Murphy, 64 Commonwealth Avenue, Boston.

The British Consulate reported that he had been communicating with individuals in Italy through an intermediary in Buenos Aires, and for this reason was suspected of espionage. The investigation, though still pending, shows nothing wrong on the part of the above subject.

He entered the United States illegally as a political refugee from France and is reported as anti-fascist in both the U.S. and in Europe. He is reported to have received support from the Mazzini Society of New York City. From the records of the Immigration Department, file No. Ellis Island 99642-632, it shows that after investigation it was decided not to deport Giacobbe and he was allowed his departure from the United States at his own expense, and that he was a member of the anti-fascist Giustizia and Libertà movement.

He registered as an alien in Boston, Registration No. 5280173. The records reveal that he was granted a license to travel by the U. S. Attorney's office in Boston. He gave as references various prominent individuals in Boston - a former assistant attorney general, a prominent Boston lawyer and also Prof. Cesare Salvinini whom he presently a professor at Harvard University.

SECRET

- 2 -

He is reported to be an engineer by profession but worked in the United States as a tailor's assistant having obtained the position through an official of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union. He was reported to have been an officer in the Italian Army. On leaving Italy he commanded a battery in the Royalist Army during the Spanish Revolution in 1938. His employment record in the United States is satisfactory. He has no police record and no credit record is available.

R. D. V.

SECRETOFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.X Sardinian
Chicago25 August 1943
8 A.M.

From: Mr. Freguro.

The following notations were made after your telephone message last night.

Dino Giacobbe is probably the best-informed Sardinian now in this country. He is intimately acquainted with all aspects of Sardinian life. He may still be living in New York. Since he has frequently been approached by Italians and Americans with regard to political activity during the present war, it may be assumed that he is acquainted with a variety of plans that have been entertained with regard to political activity in Sardinia or Italy.

It appears that a certain Mathieu, said to be a Sardinian, is employed by MO. I have had occasion to wonder about his background, etc., but I have not pursued inquiries to anything like a satisfying point because I thought it was not my concern.

I have not made a comprehensive study of Sardinian elements in this country as I once had hoped to do.

It is worth remembering that North Africa - Tunisia, Algeria - is "full" of Sardinians.

Mrs. O'Donnell

8-13-43

Returned. Many thanks.

JM

John McGruder, Brig. Gen.
184362 Deputy Director, OSS — Intelligence Service

*S. E. [unclear]
I got the
[unclear]
and you
and carry
you can / and
[unclear]*

**EXCERPTS FROM LETTER TRANSMITTED FROM COLONEL B. J. PAYLOR FROM
PARIS/ASIA****SUMMARY**

Revised my report on the take over of the Island.

**Wilson went to visit the P country, and General Attilio and I flew in an
A-10. We went in the air and with 12 - 1500 ft. air cover and crossed the 2000s by
this method.**

**We have never been applying like the underground leaders and underground
army leaders. According to our information. All wired by the 45 Germans for
information. This order, however, was not given by the Italian Admiral. In command,
we had in place one commander for this. A 4000. tank in the diesel
and the anti-air. There are tanks by the hundred. The plane would have been
able to take away - they all the tank has but never any equipment?**

**The outcome of the four months - now capable to burn or military
explosives. Damage to buildings very great - more damage to commercial
and civilian during the time than about like on land. This was effective
for the camp people. But the island could have been held by 5 to 10 light troops
with information she would have stayed in their cover pile till we lifted our
last and much longer and with the tanks in there force would have strengthened
our forces - tanks by tanks, ammunition, food, water, medical supplies for months**

**Now to the next scenario plan - when consider - the whole place a litter
of equipment and chemicals which are only with a complete lack of the
use of your own kind of protection. The whole military and civil population anxious
to do it every way - only one could drive to here first and as they took out the
population and then returned to with your own and helped to get everything in
[REDACTED] That would have been much easier and easier of what is to come.**

After word of the people, you help us [REDACTED]

- 2 -

The first article of prime quality - the German food stores - French butter - canned salmon, sausages, canned vegetables, prepared like fine tin foil.

All equipment of top grade except one gun. The signal center reached but seems to be very well organized and maintains system of R/T with direct trunk along ~~with~~ important points in Sicily.

In the Sicily offensive the group has done well but over this small island shows the lack of organization and careful planning for even the earliest stages. Identical division units needed at least 10 and 15 minutes to digest movement and evacuation at the earliest moment. No tanks shot dead or healthy. Most important to have a Col. third at the right hand of the Commander to take quick decisions and carry them ~~through~~.

One of the next problems - our own troops pinching off (ours & captured), our own supplies (fuel tanks, vehicles, guns), enemy equipment. It would be wise to issue strong orders based on this before arrival.

~~SECRET~~

X War Dept

S. O. A. C. I.
Office of the Adjutant General
Washington, D. C.

43-201-Gibbons, Henry, Jr.
(19 Jul 11) FO-4

JHD/LL1/1015
Sr. 7 LSC

Subject: Movement Orders.

29 Jul, 1943.

To : Director, Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.

S. O. C. I. C.
Auth. TACG
Initials: H.A.
Date: 29 Jul

To : First Lieutenant Henry Gibbons, Jr., 0368721, SAC

1. The Secretary of War directs that First Lieutenant Henry Gibbons, Jr., 0368721, SAC, proceed on temporary duty from Washington, D. C., to Chungking, China, effective upon departure in compliance with this order. He will proceed from Washington, D. C., to New Delhi, India, via Navy transport, reporting upon arrival to the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in China-Burma-India, for transportation to destination. Upon arrival at Chungking, China, he will report to the Director, Office of Strategic Services, for duty and upon completion of this temporary duty, he will return to his proper station, Washington, D. C. TD 1-3000 P 432-02, CIA 0625-24.
2. Travel by military, naval or commercial aircraft, Army or naval transport, commercial steamship, belligerent vessel or aircraft and rail is directed from New Delhi, India, to Chungking, China. TD by air from New Delhi, India, to Chungking, China, is necessary for the accomplishment of an emergency war mission. A baggage allowance of fifty-five (55) pounds, to include all personal effects, clothing, medical kit, canteen and emergency rations, is authorized while traveling by military, naval or commercial aircraft.
3. In view of circumstances, a flat per diem of \$7.00 is authorized while traveling outside the continental limits of the United States, and for the period of temporary duty outside the continental limits of the United States, in accordance with existing law and regulations. When Government quarters or billets are furnished and mess facilities are available, per diem allowances are suspended.
4. Personal baggage to be shipped will be limited to one hundred and seventy-five (175) pounds, and an excess baggage allowance of one hundred ninety-five (195) pounds (official equipment) is authorized while traveling by water.
5. Prior to departure from present station, he will be equipped with standard gas mask; 1 pistol, auto. 45 cal. M1911; 1 holster, leather, 45 cal.; 1 pouch, cartridge, clothweb; 1 belt, pistol; 1 pocket, first aid; 1 pouch, first aid pocket; 2 magazines, auto. (clip) 45 cal.; twenty-one rounds cartridge, 45 cal., and 1 carb., Remington, pistol. Field equipment will be obtained at destination.
6. Officer is authorized to wear civilian clothing in the performance of duty outside.

~~SECRET~~

8. Officer should advise his correspondents that mail will be delivered to him at APO AGO, c/o Postmaster, New York, N. Y. Immediately upon arrival at destination, no will complete and mail DAGO Form No. 204, Change of Address Card, to advise friends and relatives of his permanent APO address. He will also send a completed DAGO Form No. 204 to the theatre postal officer.

卷之三



Adjugant à nos v.

Classification:

Officers Branch, Record Section, AGO, Room 2429, Annex
Hq. & HQ. Detachment, Office, Strategic Services. (5)
OIC, Rehabilitation AFU, 164 Lexington Ave., NY, NY (2)
CG, AGC 879, c/o PW, NY, NY (AIRMAIL)
CG, AGO 885, c/o PW, NY, NY (AIRMAIL)
Personnel and Budget Section, Operations Br., AGO, attn: Maj. W. L. Clark, AGO 885
Army Postal Service, Room 3552, Pentagon
Specifications Div., 2215, DDCO, Pentagon
Postal Officer, AFU 879, c/o PW, NY, NY (AIRMAIL)
The Quartermaster General, Room 2067, Annex B



(28)

JUL 12 1943

SAC
Div. 2
1943

Chief, Accounting and Bookkeeping
Division
General Accounting Office
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Mr. Warner

Dear Sir:

I wish to advise that authority to
issue and sign "Requisitions for Disbursing Funds,"
Standard Form No. 1027, has been delegated to
Mr. E. R. Woodring, Finance Branch of the
Office of Strategic Services. Mr. Woodring, who
is an authorized certifying officer, will be
required to issue "Requisitions for Disbursing
Funds" from time to time in order to have avail-
able funds to cover small turns made by the
Office of Strategic Services.

It will be appreciated if all "Requisi-
tions for Disbursing Funds," Standard Form No.
1027, signed by Mr. E. R. Woodring may be honored
by the General Accounting Office.

Very truly yours,

E. R. Duxton

E. R. Duxton
Acting Director

28 June, 1943

Colonel Bennett F. Connally, A.U.S.,
Chief, Field Operations Branch,
Officer Procurement Service,
6745 Munitions Building,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Spike:

Your letter to General Donovan has
been referred to me, as he is out of the country.

I know he will be very appreciative
of your remarks about our mutual friend Gamble,
and I take this opportunity to express to you
my very sincere thanks for arranging for his
transfer. I know he will be a great help to
the Office of Strategic Services.

I am also very glad that we were able
to effect his promotion promptly.

Sincerely yours,

CHARLES J. CHRISTON
Special Assistant to the
Director, OSS

OSS

**WAR DEPARTMENT
ARMY SERVICE FORCES
OFFICER PROCUREMENT SERVICE
WASHINGTON**

28 June 1943

Brigadier General William J. Donovan,
Director, Office of Strategic Services,
Administration Building,
15th and E Streets,
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Donovan:

As you know your special assistant, Mr. Charles S. Cheston, after discussing the matter preliminarily with me arranged with General Danielson, Director, Officer Procurement Service, for the transfer of Lt. Colonel Edward W. Gamble, Jr. my executive officer, to the Office of Strategic Services. My small part in consenting to this transfer was not accomplished without running the gamut of mixed emotions.

From the standpoint of being willing to give up a top notch, intelligent and extremely conscientious officer my selfish inclination was to say "no", but when I considered that duty with your Service gave him a bigger opportunity to serve his country, and that the Army could capitalize to a greater extent on his superior ability then of course I could only say "yes".

I am sure you will find that Colonel Gamble combines the highly desirable qualities of loyalty, initiative, susceptibility to discipline, intelligence and devotion to duty that are the basic ingredients of the Superior Officer.

With his severance from this Service it seemed most appropriate to forward these personal observations to you.

Sincerely yours,



ROBERT J. CONNELLY,
Colonel, A. U. S.,
Chief, Field Operations Branch.

July 6, 1943

Mr. J. E. Hoover
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Hoover:

In General Donovan's absence, I wish to acknowledge receipt of your letter of June 24, 1943 in which you made inquiry concerning Mr. C. R. Oillard.

Mr. C. R. Oillard was recently authorized by one of our Branches to proceed to New Orleans with several officers of OSS in an attempt to recruit certain Italian and French speaking personnel.

Mr. Oillard's mission was duly authorized by the Chief of the Branch in question.

I trust sending the information you desire. I am,

Sincerely yours,

G. Edward Burton
Assistant Director

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES


OFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE 8 July 1943


TO: Colonel O. Edward Buxton
FROM: Ellery C. Huntington Jr.
SUBJECT: SO Operations - APHQ - C.R. Gillard

1. In reply to your memorandum of 1 July 1943 and Mr. J.E. Hoover's letter which was enclosed of June 24, 1943, I am attaching a proposed reply to Mr. Hoover.
2. Mr. Hoover's letter is returned herewith.

Attachments



Ellery C. Huntington Jr.
 Colonel, AUS
 Deputy Director - PW Operations



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

JUL 21 1942

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER


Brigadier General William J. Donovan
Office of Strategic Services
29th and E Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

The New Orleans Field Division of this Bureau has received information that one C. R. Galardi has stated to a confidential source of this Bureau that he was an intelligence officer employed by the Office of Strategic Services and that he was interested in obtaining approximately six boys of Italian descent who spoke the Italian language fluently for training in espionage work in Italy. He indicated that it would not be necessary that these boys be American citizens.

It would be appreciated if you would advise me whether you do in fact have an individual named Galardi employed in the above mentioned capacity.

Sincerely,



SECRET

March 18, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lt. Leo J. Brady
FROM: Mrs. Murray

Mr. Hughes is in receipt of your memorandum of March 17th with regard to Charles Gilardi. Unfortunately the memo you planned to attach to your memorandum was not attached. Mr. Hughes will await Mr. Gilardi's telephone communication but meanwhile we suggest you forward the original memo.

O.M.

W/T
3/18/43

X18043

March 17, 1941

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO: Mr. John C. Hughes

FROM: Leo Brady

Mr. Carlos Gilardi, memo attached,
phoned today asking to see the Colonel. As the
Colonel's schedule this afternoon is rather
crowded, he has suggested that you might be kind
enough to interview Mr. Gilardi after his return
to New York. He having, therefore, suggested to Mr.
Gilardi that he communicate with you and ask for
an appointment.

LS

SECRET

27 August 1943

MEMORANDUM TO CARLO RICCIARD GILARDI

SUBJECT: Order

1. You are hereby authorized and directed to proceed to Algiers, where you will report to Colonel William J. Eddy, O.D.B.C., who is in charge of all OSS activities in the North African theater. You are, thereafter, to act under Colonel Eddy's instructions.
2. Authority is hereby granted to carry such secret and confidential documents as may be necessary to the proper performance of your mission. These documents may be shown to authorized persons, but must remain in your possession at all times until they are delivered to their addressee, if any.

William J. Donovan
Director

20 August 1963

~~MEMORANDUM TO CHIEF DIRECTOR OF SPYING~~

~~DIRECTOR, CIA~~

1. You are hereby authorized and directed to [REDACTED] to Algiers, where you will report to General William [REDACTED] [REDACTED], who is in charge of all CIA activities in the North African Countries. You are, thereafter, to act under [REDACTED] authority [REDACTED].
2. Authority is hereby granted to carry out [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] documents as may be necessary to the proper performance of your functions. These documents may be [REDACTED] or otherwise prepared, but must provide for your protection [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] to their effectiveness. If [REDACTED]

William J. Buckley
Director

Approved, N.A.T.O.
James W. Buckley
[Signature]

June 1, 1945

To:

The Director of Strategic Services.
The Chief of Naval Personnel.

Subject:

Arch G. Gorlach

1. Mr. Gorlach is applying for a commission in the
U.S. Naval Reserve. He is employed in the Office of
Strategic Services.

2. He is hereby released for service with the
armed forces.

3. He is qualified for appointment and is appointed,
to be requested that he be certified and ordered to the
Office of Strategic Services for assignment.

4. Mr. Gorlach is recommended as being qualified
under Special Program No. 5000.

5. The nature of Mr. Gorlach's duties will be
such as to warrant a waiver of any mandatory physical
exams and it is requested that such waiver, if required,
be granted.

6. Mr. Gorlach's address is:

Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.

William J. Donovan.

WJD:ms

15 Steel Pickels
C-IV

May 28, 1948

Mr. Malcolm Morrow,
Chief, Staff Specialists
Bureau of Special Services
Office of Far Information
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Morrow:

✓ Referring to your letter of May 18, 1948, we are returning herewith the original letter received from Mr. Walter P. Garrick under date of May 7, 1948. Arrangements have been made for Mr. William Kip of our Topographic Intelligence Section of the European Affairs Division to interview Mr. Garrick in New York this week.

We are very deeply indebted for your cooperation in this matter.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan,
Director

Original letter of
Garrick attached.

2 copies to Langen - 3/20

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE: 5/20

To: Dr. W. L. Langer
From: Caw. Heerman
Re: Mr. P. Garrison.


Geographic Intelligence is asking
Mr. William Key to interview Mr. Garrison
in New York this week. This will
suffice for our immediate needs

EJ:

OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION

WASHINGTON

May 13, 1943



General William J. Donovan, Director
Office of Strategic Services
25th and E Streets, Northwest
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Donovan:

In compliance with a telephone conversation between Mr. Fay in your office and Mrs. McMillan of this office, we are sending you herewith for consideration and reply a letter from Mr. Walter P. Garrick, 76-46 Austin Street, Forest Hills, New York.

Mr. Garrick's letter refers to information and knowledge he has regarding steel mills and other important industries, railroad centers, public utilities, transportation systems, power centers, armories, and camps in Germany.

We shall appreciate your cooperation.

Sincerely yours,

Malcolm Marrow

Malcolm Marrow
Chief, Staff Specialists
Bureau of Special Services

Letter ref. to
General J. W. D.
May 13, 1943

Enclosure

To
John L. Hargan



OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: GENERAL DONOVAN
 FROM: WILLIAM A. KIMBELL
 SUBJECT:

DATE: MAY 11 1943

We have been advised as follows concerning Rear Admiral William A. Glassford.

At the beginning of the war he was with the fleet in the Pacific near the Philippines. He successfully maneuvered his ships out of danger and was able to proceed to other areas. He is thoroughly familiar with the Far East.

Subsequent to his Pacific command, he was made Commandant of the 6th District at Charleston, South Carolina. He was then sent to Rabat and Oran as an observer for the President. He has a comprehensive knowledge of North Africa.

"Unofficially" he made a trip to Iran. We helped him at that time by giving him survey of the country which he used as a basis for his observations in the Near East. Admiral Glassford is a close friend and associate of Admiral Hart and the so-called "Iron" group of old-line Admirals in the Navy.

W. A. K.

cc'd: General Hartman
 General Donovan
 Colonel Washington
 Mr. George
 Mr. Thompson

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

SECRET

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: GENERAL DONOVAN
 FROM: WILLIAM A. KIMBELL
 SUBJECT:

DATE: MAY 11 1943

I received a request from the Department of State to call for the purpose of meeting Rear Admiral William A. Glassford, who has been appointed personal representative of the President with the rank of Minister, at Dakar. It is my understanding that he will be head of all military and civil activities in that area.

My conversations with Admiral Glassford indicated the fact that he was at present developing the establishment of his organization. He was vaguely aware of OSS activities and requested me to provide for him some basis for the organization and purposes of an intelligence service to be included under his direction. I expressed our willingness to cooperate with him in every way and proposed a meeting with General Donovan and others of this organization best qualified to provide him with the guidance and assistance which he was evidently seeking. Admiral Glassford is now planning to depart for his post in Dakar the end of this month. He expressed the willingness to devote as much time as might be necessary to conversations with General Donovan and others here in OSS.

It may be of interest to note that this meeting with Admiral Glassford resulted from a series of conversations which I have had with Berle, Shaw and others in an effort to establish OSS representation in Dakar. Previously such attempts had not been viewed favorably, owing to the fact that U.S. interests in Dakar and the status of that entire area had not been yet sufficiently defined.

May 11 1943

Pursuant to your instructions, I am endeavoring to make an appointment for you with the Admiral at a time mutually convenient.

Admiral Glassford can be reached at the Navy Department, Extension 5054, any morning, or in the office of Mr. Henry Willard, Extension 2237, at the State Department in the afternoon.

*R. Q. K.
R. A. H.*

cc: General Magruder
General Burton
Colonel Huntington
Mr. Shepardson
Dr. Longue

P.S. An appointment has been fixed with Admiral Glassford for Wednesday, May 12th, at 11 a.m., in General Powers's office. I have arranged to meet Admiral Glassford. He will find it impossible to remain for luncheon that day, but expressed pleasure in the suggestion that he might have lunch with General Powers sometime before his departure.

SECRET

Bob Brown has any interest
in this man because
he is only passable in
radio & in Italian. They
have other better qualified.
However, if you would like to
have either or both of them
train him, they will be glad
to do so. Done - 430 AM

Bill
Carl Blair & tell him
the time for visiting him in proj.

Galassi, Harvard - 11/4/79

55 WALL STREET
NEW YORK

November 5, 1943

Dear Bill:

I just find that young Gerard Galassi
is in Boston on a very short furlough. He
has to be back in Fort Wayne, Indiana,
Baer Field, on Wednesday. I think your
people have already interviewed him so
perhaps it is not necessary for you to do
anything further in that regard but I just
wanted to let you know that he is avail-
able and possibly could fly down to Wash-
ington if your people wanted to fix it up
for him to do that.

His address is #1 Walker Terrace,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, Telephone Kirkland
8748.

Sincerely yours,

Brigadier General William J. Donovan
Office of Strategic Services
20th and K Streets
Washington, D. C.

15 Oct 459 Hanover Street
Weston Field

CIA - 11/6/48

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: General DeGrawe

DATE: 11/6/48

FROM: Lt. Colonel Lowman

SUBJECT: Gerard Galassi

Colonel Bigelow called me to say that Mr. Floyd Blair had inquired again about Gerard Galassi.

When this matter was originally brought to my attention by you, I asked Mr. Brennan if he would be interested, since in all probability the fact that the subject could speak Italian would be of more interest to him than to us.

At the time, as now, we had sufficient base operators for our own needs and the pressing need was for the agent operators.

Mr. Brennan had somebody interview him in a hospital somewhere out in the Middle West and reported back that he was unavailable for duty because of illness. One of his lieutenant's who handled the matter is now abroad, but assured me that they would get in touch with him at such time as he might be available.

I have his file before me which I borrowed from Mr. Brennan's office. It consists of approval of his security by the Security Office.

According to a report of the classification officer, it states that he reads and writes Italian fairly well. That as a radio operator he is passable.

Since Mr. Brennan did not seem to have any continuing interest in continuing him, and if for any reason you still feel that we should take him and train him for base station work, we would be glad to follow through on it. This would depend on locating him. We have no idea how to do this and wondered if you cared to write Mr. Floyd Blair to find where he was located and if he is still in this country under training.

[Signature]

PC
Pinned to
your wall 6/4

35 WALL STREET
NEW YORK

October 8, 1943

Dear Bill,

You might like to pass on the enclosed letter about Gerard Galassi to Colonel Bigelow. He knows that I was responsible for suggesting him to your organization but has not mentioned the matter, even to me, until the present time. I gather he is all right to do any sort of job except one that requires a lot of physical Army work.

Sincerely yours,

Flory

Brigadier General William J. Donovan
Office of Strategic Services
20th and H Streets
Washington, D. C.

Enclosure
Monday Oct 18th
7.30 Klineer-
Walter Clark -
Business Plotter!



X Blay, Floyd

Pfc. Gerard G. Galassi
Flight D, 1st R & FPU
Troop Carrier Command
Baer Field,
Fort Wayne, Indiana

October 2, 1943

Mr. Floyd G. Blair
55 Wall Street
New York, New York.

Dear Mr. Blair:

It is now more than a year since I paid you my last visit at the Bank prior to entering the service. I had high hopes then of making some sort of record for myself comparable to what Marie has done in the Navy, of winning a commission by earning it, but the past year in the Army has been an experience of enlightenment - little else. It has been accompanied by a long series of personal disappointments topped by an extended illness which still threatens to jeopardize whatever military future remains for me. Not only that, but in all this time, I don't feel I have performed any service for my country as a contribution toward the prosecution of the war. Except for a brief interval of ten days early in May, from the end of April till the end of August, I was hospitalized here at Baer Field with rheumatic fever. When finally released, I was told I was unfit for any sort of tactical or heavy work for a period of six months. I took an Officer Candidate School physical examination last month, but was told that because of my recent illness and because I am on "light duty" for six months, I would be disqualified from applying for OCS for an equal period on medical grounds.

Yet, I continue to be classified as a radio operator (solely because I graduated from an AAF radio technical school, as Regulations so provide), which is a tactical job, and I am not yet assigned permanently to any unit or organization after nearly a full year in the Army.

However, during the past two or three weeks, on my own request, after talking with a Flight Surgeon and Classification Officer, I have been given a temporary job with the S-2 (Intelligence) Office of the Reception and Final Phase Unit to which I have belonged while at this



field. It is a step in the right direction, but it is only a temporary job, and I have no idea how long it may last. Not only that, but since it is only temporary and since I am not actually assigned to the office, I have no chance for promotion and receive no recognition for my work other than verbal appreciation from the officers in charge. It will continue to be this way for so long as I remain classified as a radio operator and am unassigned. The Captain under whom I am presently working has expressed a desire to have me permanently attached to his office, but he does not know if it is possible in view of my present classification. However, he has said he will see what can be done. But, I may well find myself in just such a state of doubt and uncertainty until my six months' period of light duty is up.

This is why I am still interested in knowing how I stand with reference to the matter for which I was interviewed, as a result of your kindness and trouble, the first week in May of this year. Nothing was told me concerning the duties it might involve except that it was related to intelligence work which appealed to me, and it also seemed to evidence recognition of my background and education.

I should have written long before to acknowledge once again your kindness on my behalf except that I was pledged to say nothing to anyone. I am still interested in winning a commission and shall continue to be so long as I must be in the service. My long illness last summer was a keen disappointment to me, for I well realized that because of it I lost out again. Now I am writing, first, to express my belated but none the less sincere thanks for your efforts in my behalf, and, second, to apprise you of my present situation and inquire if there is still any chance for me in this latter connection.

With Best Wishes,

Sincerely yours,

Harold

May 4, 1943

Miss Rita Hart
Secretary to Mr. Dreyfuss
501 Madison Avenue
New York, N. Y.

Dear Miss Hart:

In answer to your inquiry, we did receive Mr. Dreyfuss' letter of April 8th and General Donovan asked one of our men here to get in touch with Mr. Gabriel. We understand this has been done.

Thank you for your interest in this matter.

Sincerely yours,

John M. Tamm

Secretary to General Donovan

April 22, 1943

Copy, to Brig. Gen. William Donovan
Office of Strategic Services
29th & E Streets N. W.
Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir:

We did not want to bother General Donovan again but wondered if you could tell us if our letter of April 9th introducing Mr. Gilbert Gabriel ever reached General Donovan's desk.

Mr. Dreyfus would appreciate your letting us know about this and if by any chance you are not familiar with it, we would be delighted to send another copy.

Very sincerely,

Rex Hare

Secretary to Mr. Dreyfus
NSC

* Oreg/less, Henry

April 3, 1943

To Fred Donovan

Brig. General W. Donovan
Office of Strategic Services
20th & K., S. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Donovan:

My very good friend Gilbert Gabriel has just returned from ~~working in the Office of War Information in Alaska~~. He has asked me if I would introduce him to you as he is anxious to make a new connection in the Government service.

For your information:

He has worked with ~~Col. Gaster~~ (Col. Gaster) in Alaska. He was asked by Col. Gaster to accept a Majority Privately, while in the New York O.W.I. office (under Col. Stanley) he wrote the first booklet published by that office on the Four Freedoms -- which the President later asked to have put into his ~~book~~ ~~and~~ ~~and~~ ~~and~~

You will probably remember him as the well-known newspaper man and author. He has also spent a good deal of time in Hollywood with Paramount doing scenario work.

I hesitated bothering you with this request for an appointment for Mr. Gabriel, and would not do so unless I felt I were doing you both a service in introducing you to one another.

If you would let me know how to arrange such an appointment, I will gladly take care of conveying your message to

Ed Taylor -
what have
seen
~~Don't know
how big it should be
with you~~
887

E. Taylor

~~CLASSIFIED BEFORE 2010~~ ~~EXPIRES 2010~~ ~~CLASSIFIED~~

(Date July 4, 1995)

Deutsche-Welt-Park, Oaklawn, Indiana.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED BY
DECISION OF THE AUTHORITY THAT
MADE IT CLASSIFIED

September 14, Camp Mills, Long Island. (Duties, -reported 150th Field Artillery, to Division Chief of Staff, Col. Eugene Mather, and Brigade Commander General G. F. Sommerville. Special duties, Senior Captain on 1st Cavalry Scout, in War time, which sat at Camp Mills until division sailed October 17.)

October 14, Sailed U.S.A., Minotin. (Special duties, -liaison and coordinating services with army commander aboard ship, General G. F. Sommerville and Captain, of the ship, before departing during the entire voyage.)

October 15, Arrived St. Nazaire, France.

October 16, November 27, Camp, Cote d'Or, Brittany, France.

November 28, January 4, French Army School, British Expeditionary Forces, St. Omer, France.

January 5 to January 14, Inspection duty with inspecting officer General Sir R. L. E. Dyer, (Major, inspection of balloons and barrage balloons). Started at army headquarters, ended Headquarters, division headquarters.)

January 15 to February 28, Assigned for special duty at front with 15th Royal Horse (6 guns) Battalion R.F.A. in position in the Cote d'Or, France, Major P. A. [redacted] commanding. Captain, Battery Commander with Major Dwyer commanding entire unit. Observation Officer commanding three gunnery Ordnance with observation squadron in reserve, in close liaison with 15th Balloon Company assigned to command for 15th Royal Horse Battalion.)

February 15 to March 15, French Army School, St. Omer, France, and Paris, France.

February 16 to February 28, Camp, Cote d'Or, Brittany, France, assigned to command of 15th Royal Horse Battalion.

February 28 to April 1, Commandant, Baccarat Sector, assigned to command of 15th Royal Horse Battalion and Assistant Adjutant and Adjutant.

May 1 to May 15, Commandant, Baccarat Sector, commanding three units, commanding three units under command of Major Dwyer, 15th Royal Horse Battalion. Regiment assigned to command of 15th Royal Horse Battalion. (Duties, -Detailed to command of 15th Royal Horse Battalion from the heavy artillery commander of 15th Royal Horse Battalion for which company made inspection of 15th Royal Horse Battalion, with the division commander and Major Dwyer, 15th Royal Horse Battalion to act as Regimental Adjutant of 15th Royal Horse Battalion.)

May 16 to June 15, Commandant, Baccarat Sector, Chateau-Thierry.

June 16 to July 15, Commandant, Baccarat Sector, assigned to command of 15th Royal Horse Battalion. Assigned to command of 15th Royal Horse Battalion, 1st Battalion, 2nd Battalion.

July 1 to July 15, Commandant, Baccarat Sector, (Duties, Commanding

Page 3--Military Service--Captain Daniel Independence Glassbrenner

1918	October 12 to November 11. Meuse-Argonne Offensive, first and second phase and Sedan. (Station, Commanding Battery "D"). November 11 to November 21. Army of Occupation, France. November 21 to November 23. Army of Occupation, Belgium. November 23 to December 3. Army of Occupation, Luxembourg. December 3 to April 6, 1919. Army of Occupation, Germany, Station Bad Münster. December 18 to March 16. Commanding Battery "B".
1919	March 18. Commanding 2nd Battalion, Batteries "C" and "D", 150th Field Artillery. April 18. Received the V.D. on U. S. S. Leviathan from Brest, France. Captain, Master Gunner, Executive Officer for Army transport ship Leviathan, while in command of Boats "A", "B", "C". April 27. Arrived New York. April 27 to May 27. Camp Everett, New Jersey and Camp Zachary Taylor, Louisiana. May 27. Received oral orders from Camp Zachary Taylor, Captain of 2nd Battalion, 150th Field Artillery, Commandant of Battery "B" and 2nd

SIXTY MAY 27, 1919.

- 1919 Member of Rainbow Division Veterans Association and Indiana's life member of its National Executive Committee since the formation of the association at Bad Neuenahr, Germany, February 1919.
- 1919 Member of American Legion since September 1919.
- 1920 Post Commander of John Shidmore Post of American Legion.
- 1923 Vice-President of National Rainbow Division Veterans Association and Chairman of Executive Committee for holding their annual reunion convention at Indianapolis on July 18-19, including distinguished guests General John J. Pershing, General Henri J. L. Gouraud, with Col. William J. Donovan, National President of the Rainbow Division Veterans during the year 1922-23.
- 1923-4 Post Commander of the Indianapolis Memorial Post #3, American Legion.
- 1923-4 Member of Distinguished Guest Committee State of Indiana, American Legion.
- 1928-9 National President of Rainbow Division Veterans Association.
- 1941 December--VIA Member Marion County Civilian Defense Staff in Charge Industrial Resources and Protection.

MEMBERS OF FAMILY

Now in Military Service:

Air Cadet W. A. Vonnegut, Squadron 20, Air Force Training Center, Santa Ana, California. (Orphan Orphan living at Glashrenner household: Voluntary, enlisted)

Private D. I. Glashrenner, Jr., Engineer Department, Camp Gladstones, Louisiana (Non-Voluntary, enlisted)

Other Members:

Wife - Mrs. S. Glashrenner
 Daughters - Emily L. Glashrenner
 Mary E. Glashrenner
 Dorothy H. Glashrenner
 June R. Glashrenner

Page 5--SUBSEQUENT BUSINESS DETAILS ASSOCIATED WITH MILITARY
DEPARTMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES WAR DEPARTMENT, MARINE
CORPS, AND FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1931.

- 1931-1942 November 12, became Secretary-Treasurer of Harmon-Harrington Company, Inc., Indianapolis, Indiana in which capacity have been one of three senior executives. From that date principal efforts of this company have been to develop commercially and for military purposes all-wheel drive trucks and track laying vehicles. Constant contact and associations with all officers of the army in the different divisions, such as Quartermaster, Ordnance, Field Artillery, Marine Corps, has been maintained during this period, 1931 to date.

1931-1942 Personally assisted President A. W. Harrington of this company, studying and formulating policies of the future motorization and mechanization of the army in connection with all United States Government contracts held by the company since 1931 to 1942.

1933-1939 During this period, 1933-1939, due to the efforts of President A. W. Harrington who acted in the consulting capacity for the Persian (Iranian) government, our company furnished motorized artillery equipment and armored vehicles for the Persian Army. Several staff officers of the Persian Government assigned to our company, worked out with the writer their tables of organization for artillery and mechanized armored forces.

1934-1939 Inspection trips were made annually in 1934-39 to the Camp of the 10th National Guard Division at Fort Knox, Kentucky, Major General Robert E. Spaulding, Commanding.

1939 Since September 1939 our company has played a large part in supplying the mechanized equipment and armored tanks to the Netherlands Free Dutch Government during which period the writer has consulted and been much time in all conferences with the general staff commanding officers of the Netherlands Free Dutch Government representing the Royal Netherlands Government in New York City.

Since 1939 have consulted and participated in the conferences with army officers of the following foreign governments:

Since 1959, have attended and participated in the conferences with other officials of the following Foreign governments:

Indian Government and the New Indian Government

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(these include General Staff representatives)
(these cover Command, General Staff and Field
Military representatives)

COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON

EX-17 SECTION
X FEB 1943

B-2798

104

Minister,

Office of Strategic Services.

My dear General Director:

I have been received your letter of April 26, 1943, as follows:

"Please refer to my letter of March 25, 1943, wherein a request was presented for authority for the Office of Strategic Services to use pay-roll forms identical to W.D. Form Nos. 40 and 44, approved by your office on January 7, 1943, and December 14, 1942, respectively.

As a result of conversations between representatives of the Finance Branch of the Office of Strategic Services and Mr. Chapman of the General Accounting Office, it has been determined that Payroll and Individual Service Payroll Forms as approved by the Comptroller General on April 2, 1943, for the use of the Office of Strategic Services will meet the needs of this office. We are, however, desirous of securing the support of funds in my letter of March 26, to the extent that the Payroll and Individual Service Payroll Forms identified in W.D. Form No. 40, Payroll Form, or approved on April 2, 1943, be substituted for use in the Appendix Section of the Office of Strategic Services.

"We are desirous that the copies of the Payroll Form be numbered on the reverse side, 1943, 1944 and 1945. The individual service form should be numbered 1945 only. For your convenience, there are attached two copies of the "New Payroll Form Appendix" and "Individual Service Payroll Form" which this office desires to use in connection with payroll preparation by machine process.

"We would appreciate your approval at an early date in order that we may commence using the new form as soon as possible."

- 2 -

The proposed individual coverage report is substantially similar to the form approved by this office for the Office of Civilian Defense, except as to the spacing in which to reflect the employee's full name and as to the position of the title of the form. In the interest of uniformity with the form approved for the Office of Civilian Defense, the title has been placed at the bottom of the form and provision made for showing the individual employee's full name.

In respect to the proposed payroll form, for which the designations quoted and numbers GS-140, 141a, 142a, and 143a are suggested for the original and copies thereof, it is suggested that since the submitted form is identical with Standard Form No. 1470-A, numbered, the standard payroll form approved by this office should be used without change for the form designations, viz., standard form No. 1470-A-revised, 1470-A-revised, 1470-A-revised, and 1470-A-revised. If the proposed form is to be prepared by interlocked carbon, directions for the printing thereof outside the Government Printing Office may be copied from the Public Printer, and supplies thereof ordered bearing the standard form designations.

Subject to the recommended changes and comments, OAS Form No. 140 (hereinafter "Individual Coverage Report"), is approved and it is suggested that this proposed form copies of the form be furnished the Office [redacted]

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) Frank C. Weller

Controller General
of the United States

March 28, 1943

FEB 26
FEB 28

The Honorable Lindsay C. Warren
Comptroller General of the United States
General Accounting Office
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Warren:

In order to permit the Office of Strategic Services to maintain essential and required records in connection with the payment for personal services without the employment of additional personnel in our Fiscal Office, we are desirous of adopting bookkeeping machine posting of salary record cards. Standard Form No. 1108, "Individual Service Record" and Standard Form 1013, "Pay Roll for Personal Services" are not adapted to the Remington Rand Bookkeeping Machine which we propose to use.

Authority is, therefore, requested for the Office of Strategic Services to use a form identical to G. D. Form No. 48 (Remington), approved by Comptroller General, U. S., January 7, 1943, such form to be assigned OSS Form No. 80 and forms identical to G. D. Forms 44, 44a, 44b, and 44c, "Pay Roll for Personal Services," approved by Comptroller General, U. S., December 10, 1942, which would be assigned OSS Form Nos. 181, 181a, 181b, and 181c.

Funds for the 1944 fiscal year for the Office of Strategic Services will be included in the War Department request for appropriation which is an additional reason for the Office of Strategic Services desiring to use forms identical to those in use by the War Department.

To expedite the handling of our salary records and pay rolls, we will appreciate approval at your earliest convenience.

Sincerely yours,

W. J. Donovan

cc: Colonel Donovan
Mr. Bedding
Mr. Gray
Mr. Kuhn
Colonel Vanderbilt
Mr. Harboe

William J. Donovan
Director

The Honorable Lindsey C. Warren
 Comptroller General of the United States
 General Accounting Office
 Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Warren:

Please refer to my letter of March 25, 1943, wherein a request was presented for authority for the Office of Strategic Services to use pay-roll forms identical to W. D. Forms Nos. 48 and 49, approved by your office on January 7, 1943 and December 10, 1942, respectively.

As a result of conversations between representatives of the Finance Branch of the Office of Strategic Services and Mr. Glomphier of the General Accounting Office, it has been determined that Pay-Bill and Individual Earnings Record Forms as approved by the Comptroller General on April 8, 1943, for the use of the Office of Civilian Defense will meet the needs of this office. We are, therefore, desirous of amending the request set forth in my letter of March 25th to the extent that the Pay-Bill and Individual Earnings Record Forms identified as "W. D. Form No. (Blank)" as approved on April 8, 1942, be authorized for use in the Pay-Bill Section of the Office of Strategic Services.

It is desired that the copies of the Pay-Bill Form be numbered OAS form numbers 181, 181a, 181b, and 181c. The Individual Earnings Record should be assigned OAS form number 182. For your convenience, there are attached samples of the "Pay Bill for Personnel Services" and "Individual Earnings Record" forms which this office desires to use in connection with payroll preparation by machine process.

We would appreciate receiving your approval at an early date in order that we may commence using the new forms as soon as possible.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Deane
 Mr. William J. Deane (S) ✓
 Comptroller
 Mr. S. E. Ogden
 Mr. V. L. Buffum
 Mr. J. Mapp McIke
 Mr. F. S. McMurtry

William J. Deane

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

MOST SECRET

DATE January 1, 1941
FROM

TO **SECRETARY****DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**FOR ACTION**DISTRIBUTION****SECURITY**

(FOR INFORMATION)

ACKNOWLEDGED
PRIORITY
ROUTINE
DEFERRED

SECURITY, SECRETARIAT

INCLINING HEADINGS

RECEIVED

11326. Maxine: report on Frank H. Galloza.

The Embassy does not believe that Mr. Frank H. Galloza, a former clerk at the Embassy, should be entrusted with handling any secret and confidential material. Mr. Galloza is now in the United States and has been appointed to a position with the Army Air Corps Command at Patterson Field, Fairfield, Ohio.

Maxine

(This telegram is a reply to an inquiry from Patterson Field Headquarters, and might well be kept on file in case Galloza should, at a later date, seek employment with O.S.S.)

MOST SECRET

TDD 4/4/43 11:42 a.m.

Copy for File & Declass.

March 2, 1943

Pvt. John A. Gault
Battalion 12 - Battery E
Platoon 1
Port Austin, Virginia

Dear Pvt. Gault:

Correspondence from Mr. Edmond W. Lee, 2nd, to Colonel William J. Donovan, the Director of the Office of Strategic Services, stating that you are in possession of a collection of pictures of various parts of the world, has been referred to the Pictorial Records Sub-Division for attention.

Will you please be so kind as to inform us as to the areas covered by your collection, the approximate dates the photographs were taken, and where the photographs are at the present time. Upon receipt of this information, it may be necessary for us to get in touch with you for the purpose of reproducing that part of your collection which might be of service in the war effort.

Your cooperation in this matter is appreciated.

Very truly yours,

John Francis Langan
Pictorial Records Sub-Division

JFL:GLA

HOTEL SENATOR
12TH AND L STREETS
SACRAMENTO - CALIFORNIA

Jan. 5, 1943.

Dear Bill,

This will introduce to you, although I believe you already know him, my friend Frank Gigliotti of La Mesa, Calif., formerly welfare and relief commissioner of California.

Frank is coming to your office on some national defense matters in connection with your office, and I wanted you to know of this first-hand.

I have known Frank for several years, and wrote you about him a year or so ago. He is a real chap and a good friend of mine.

Many regards and every good wish for 1943, Bill.

As always,
Bill Foyard

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF G-2
PRES D C OF SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

IN REPLY REFER TO
(cia)

Branch Office, G-2, WDC & FA
San Diego, California
January 5, 1943

Mr. James Murphy
Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Murphy:

This will introduce Dr. Frank B. Gigliotti, who has a background and information which I believe will be interesting to Colonel Donovan and to others in your organization.

He already is well acquainted with Major Bruce and Mr. Brennan.

Very truly yours,

Carroll T. Harris
CARROLL T. HARRIS
Lt. Colonel, CM

CTH/
le

Frank B. Gigliotti

Branch Office, G-2, WDC & FA
San Diego, California
January 2, 1948

Mr. James Murphy
Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Murphy:

This will introduce Dr. Frank E. Siliotti,
who has a background and information which I believe will be
interesting to Colonel Donovan and to others in your organi-
zation.

He already is well acquainted with Major Bruce
and Mr. Freeman.

Very truly yours,

CORNELL V. MORRIS
Lt. Colonel, CM

cmv/
ls

Send him to
see Major Wells
S G-2

11/11/44
X-12000
(CLASS. 8/10/60)

To: Colonel Donovan
From: F. L. Mayer

Attachment is a translation of a memorandum from our London Office, which, according to our source, was written by General Giraud during his captivity as a prisoner of war. General Giraud is understood to have given a copy to Marshal Petain on his return to France after his escape.

We have had our London Office make every effort to confirm the credibility of this highly interesting document, with the result that there is every indication of its authenticity.

We are also reliably informed that G-2 knows of the existence of a memorandum by General Giraud of a similar nature, but have thus far not been able to lay their hands on it.

JJD
F. L. M.

~~Enclosure~~

AMERICAN: CAO, NOV 1968
- ERNST THINER REPORT

- I. Introductory Discussion on the Subject: pp. 1 to 5 inclusive.
- II. "Military Causes": pp. 6 to 21.
- III. "Social Causes": pp. 21 to 29.
- IV. "Political Causes": pp. 29 to 35.
- V. Conclusion: "Could We Have Won?"

SECRET

THE CAUSES OF THE DEFEAT

France was conquered. In six weeks her army was forced to lay down its arms, although from 1914 to 1918 she first resisted, then pushed back and finally overthrew a German army just as strong proportionally as the army of 1940.

What are the causes of this unforeseeable defeat, unheard of in the history of France?

To discover these causes honestly, to state them frankly, and to find suitable remedies should be the aim of every Frenchman proud of the past, aware of the gravity of the present and filled with indestructible confidence in the future. Our history shows us too many examples of catastrophic ruin followed by extraordinary revival for us to remain crushed and resigned.

A great nation like France has a role to play in the world. Our motto is not "France above all", but "Gesia Dei per Francos" (God works his way through France), and we prefer the second to the first.

France entered the war in 1939 with a land army of

20 active divisions,
8 North African divisions,
3 colonial divisions, and
3 light mechanized divisions,

forming the peacetime army. To these were added at the mobilization

20 divisions Series A,
20 divisions Series B, and
15 colonial or North African divisions,

making a total of approximately 90 divisions.

The active divisions included 7 motorized divisions relatively better equipped than the corresponding horsedrawn ones. In the Series A divisions, the officering by active cadres was weak, and equipment was not as good as in the active divisions. The Series B divisions had as cadres from active service only Colonels, some of whom came from Mobilization Centers or Administrative Posts that had not prepared them for so difficult a command as that of a regiment composed entirely of reservists. They had no anti-tank equipment at all.

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

S-102

The average age of the troops in the active divisions was 25 years, in the Series A divisions, 30 years, and in the Series B divisions, from 35 to 40. Most of the men had had only a year of military service. Their training left much to be desired.

The North African peacetime divisions were excellent troops, but handicapped by their French reservists. Those formed at the mobilization were not of as good a quality. The colonial divisions had neither the training nor the cohesion needed in European warfares. Although capable of individual acts of heroism, they were poorly prepared for resistance to the death.

The divisions of horse or motorized cavalry were magnificent units conserving the traditions not of the cavalry, but simply of the army, with a sense of authority, a love of their calling, and a taste for chances. Perhaps it could be proved that there were still too many horses and not enough armored cars. However that may be, both kinds sacrificed themselves heroically, and their exploits in Belgium added some glorious pages to the history of the French Army.

The tanks were not divided into divisions; each army having two battalions of R35 tanks. Until the beginning of 1940 the other R35, H39, D2, or D battalions were in the G. d. Q. reserve. Starting January 1940, two armored divisions were formed that had time neither to be amalgamated nor to be trained. A third Light Mechanized Division (D. L. M.) had, however, been formed at the end of 1939. It figured very honorably in the cavalry corps in Belgium.

I am purposely omitting here all questions of armament and equipment. We shall come to this later.

The Air Force included formations peculiar to that branch and others attached to the land forces, although of course retaining its special status and a quasi independence. It was an imposing array of Generals, General Staffs, and Services. Unfortunately it only lacked planes!

At no time during the war, and in no theater of operations could one have the slightest illusion as to the number or quality of the planes, the general attitude of mind, or the coordination between land and air troops. We had neither pursuit planes nor bombers nor reconnaissance planes.

The total number of pursuit squadrons did not exceed twenty, or a maximum of 750 planes. There was no day bombing at all. For night bombing there were only a few hundred old planes. As for reconnaissance, on May 1, 1940, it reached

SECRET

barely twenty modern planes per army, or a total of scarcely 200.

When one thinks of the fantastic sums poured into the Air Arm between 1930 and 1940 one wonders how the government and the country were able to tolerate such a swindle and end up so utterly empty-handed.

Besides its airplanes, it was the function of the Air Arm to organize and command anti-aircraft artillery. There was the same dearth in that field as there was of aircraft proper. On May 10, 1940, we had neither high altitude artillery nor artillery for close-range fighting. No batteries of 90 millimeter guns, a few batteries of 75 millimeter guns, many of them dating from the last war, and a maximum of one hundred batteries of 25 millimeter guns, some of which were kept behind the fighting zone, and most of which had no more than 100 rounds per gun. A lamentable situation!

One can say that only the Sea Arm was ready for war. Since 1920, methodically, patiently, the French fleet had been progressively modernized. Psychologically and materially the Navy had recovered confidence. In itself, its traditions, its faith. The ships were often superior to foreign ships of the same type. The crews were disciplined, the specialists.... The Navy had retained its own aviation and It wished to prove everywhere it operated that it was better than the German fleet and could rival the English fleet.

Whenever it had to collaborate with the Land Army it gave proof of a comprehension, a breadth of view, a camaraderie (a brothers-in-arms feeling) to which a land soldier is happy to bear witness after observing its excellent results.

Along side the French Army there was the English Army, for the war was at first, we must not forget, a war of coalition declared on Germany by France and England to fulfil their pledge to Poland.

In 1939 there was no English Army, and little more in 1940. The expeditionary force that started to land in October 1939 consisted of 4 divisions. In May 1940 there were no more than 3 in France, divided into 3 Army Corps. Except for 4 professional divisions, the rest included only freshly formed units, bold in behavior, full of vigor and spirit, but with mediocre officering and only relatively well-trained; on the other hand, luxuriously equipped with incomparable transport material, but without anything necessary for modern warfare such as, for example, armored cars or anti-tank equipment.

SECRET

An excellent Air Arm, especially as regards pursuit, but, even confined with the French Aviation, inferior in number to the many German formations.

There again the notorious doctrine of separation of the Land and Air forces. General Jort, Commander in Chief of the English army in France, had, for instance, nothing to do with the English squadrons stationed in Champagne which were under the command of a Vice Marshal for Air who received his orders from England.

The units stationed in England were for a long time kept specially for defense of the English coast. Some came to fight, but we must, alas admit that when the fate of France was at stake in Flanders, they did not take part in great numbers and with great enthusiasm.....

As far as the British Navy, it was what it has been for centuries, the best in the world, with its traditions, a will and a heroism to which one can only pay respect. Perhaps like the French Army, it underestimated the importance of the air arm. Of its ships suffered far more from bombs than from submarines. As long as the small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery has enough ammunition the risk is less, but as soon as the size and the range down, the precision of its aim and the weight of its bombs make it a terrible adversary.

It is difficult or impossible to say that the cooperation between France and England was perfect up to May 15, 1940, if one leaves out England's inadequate preparedness as regards men, personnel and equipment. England could and should have done more. But that magnificent and likeable soldier, General Jort, behaved himself entirely, unreservedly under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the French army, who in turn was able, with his usual courtesy, to smooth ruffled feelings that a man wanted to act. This lasted only until May 15th. From then on the House front was pierced, as soon as the anti-Nazi victory turned to defeat, the attitude of the English towards us, to "friends" gave way to selfishness. To the Belgian Army, to the Luxembourg, ard, alas, Metz El-Kef etc....

In a French and English union the Belgian and Dutch allies were not included. In May 1940

It was too late, and here we must speak frankly, the fault was all the interventionist blindness of the governments of the neutral countries claiming neutrality; several citizens of liberal and moderate leanings witness to it better than myself. In France tried to make Holland and especially Belgium to see that war was forcibly, inevitably, the

SECRET

in the eyes of a certain drunk with pride and ambition
that he was willing to undertake the contact between
the United States, to report upon secret movements, no information
of which they most strenuously bind. A mad urge and ambition
led him to the conviction that they would hold the Albert Canal
for weeks and if the Ardennes, for days. But was what the
self is expected. What were the facts?

The Albert Canal was forced the morning of Aug. 11th, the
Ardennes Light Infantry did not hold a single day. The Dutch
Army slipped away via Antwerp and the Isthmus of Vodrecht
the next day 11th, when the divisions of the Seventh Army were
rushing to the battle of Brodau and that of Trier. (Turbulent?)

An act of dissidence and surrender that caused half a million
to fall camped at the down their arms. A nation incapable
of resistance from sheer. Those who remember the concur-
rence of "Spartacus" (B. W. Thackeray) in 1914-1918 will do
well to recall it. And the worst of it is, that
they were not incapable of fighting, who had not been
overcome by fear of being beaten, cried for help and then
had no one to help them. Their fortifications
were not destroyed. They intended to give
battle to the last. The weak French Regiments attempted
to hold the line, but were and has broken. Still
there is no end, no French army, no organized unit, no mil-
itary organization (the 1st Regt. Eng. Regt.) and to counter-attack and
retreat. The most regretable intelligence, organization,
and leadership in the world, kings, understand; be informed,
and determine the fate of the earth".

S. C. M. 2

2292 The same effects were produced by the other compounds.
2293 Some of them, however, showed the same effects.

the people of all nations, who wished to believe that war was a foolish effort, had lost respect, regard, and also to fear. The dominant theory was to be sick that war would be a curse. If not so, continue to come. The commandant said it was a mere show; It was a philosophy, which is

Military and security forces must be given comprehensive
organizational training, including a regular military training, and
by Int. The rear military service.

After 11 days of daily 10 mg/kg doses, the same normal changes, the same normal

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the first year and usually the entire two-year period. From one year to the military career period was reduced to three or four months during which the recruit term passed the elementary stage. This was followed by eight or nine months in which the soldier, as a clerk in some establishment, listened to forget the basic principles which he had learned. The system of one-year military service was pitiful for the men in the ranks and lamentable for the officers. It provided a wise no corporals, no non-commissioned officers, nor auxiliary officers. It was useless to compare the number of intensive training schools; the oval had been done; there was no spirit. Our officers in 1940 undoubtedly had good qualities, but they lacked both military spirit and training. The lack of stimulation in the Army could give birth to no real spirit. At the same time, the German, in earnest and with a sense of mission, had created, during our stay in France, their spirit of Panzer Army and the spirit of the Wehrmacht, which spread over France. They were convinced.

During the one-year service improved methods were used, but the Service had done its best to do what it could. In 1940, however, the war began. The war was won by the Germans and resulted in a majority of our divisions being disbanded, annihilated, and captured. Some units survived until May, 1940.

In the spring of 1940, the 90th regiments the only unit left in France. It was the commandant officer. Often this commandant had to be sent away from troop duty for a considerable time. In 1940, SAS commandant is an instructor. The division, General de Gaulle, 1st Armored Division had to set up instruction centers where great efforts were made to teach in a few weeks what had not been taught and never learned. General de Gaulle served for itself the training of the battalions and squadrons. This was better than nothing, but a 100% result in eight months.

On the 10th of May, 1940, the majority of the divisions of the 5th and especially of Series B were not trained.

The war has been quite unfortunate in that it has been easier to drag those divisions away from the setting of the battle front, to positions where they could hold a few days before having to disintegrate. But the insufficient number of tanks obliged us to utilize everything available. Thus the 1st and 2nd Armored Divisions that were routed in the battle of France Series B division that was unable to hold off the 9th and 10th. Newly formed units were less capable of holding resistance against the German attack on the Somme and the Marne because we had not relied in peacetime to

SECRET

maintain an imperceptible minimum of active divisions, and because we were satisfied with mere reserves of the National Army, it was impossible to hold our positions defensively or to manoeuvre offensively.

In addition, it must be said that since 1920 the Army had never been trained for the offensive. Whenever a politician or minister made a speech he took pains to emphasize that the French Army was strictly a defensive one. This idea was firmly ingrained in the minds of the enlisted men and, perhaps, in the cadres of our army. Battles were fought on a selected battle field which had been prepared and fortified. The firing time was ample at leisure. The army submitted to the will of the captain and never attempted to impose its will on him.

The regimental and divisional head-quarters were "all decked up" - pipers, far from the excitement of battle. Every soldier always felt a sort of position. When this sort of normal discipline army was forced to operate on a terrain of fire, it could not be prepared, organized and studied out. It could not understand the spirit of a young army, bringing with enthusiasm to whom the officers marched upon the very souls of their men. In which the initiative of each man was given. On the plain of combatment was the first reaction, then shattering, then the witnessed the unheard of and unforgettable spectacle of entire divisions disintegrating by groups, their sticks down their arms, fleeing helter-skelter.

It is true that this was the exception, and other units can be mentioned in which, until the last moment, the officers kept perfect control of their nerves and their men, and forced the enemy to confer honors to the remnants of troops falling before them. However, the fact that certain retreats should have occurred, in which the routed soldiers leaped in one bound from the Meuse to the Somme, is beyond our comprehension, and demonstrates how different the army of 1940 was from that of 1918.

Let all go even further. The army of May 10, 1940, was less ready for war than that of September 1939. When we first declared war, let us not forget that mobilization was carried on without either enthusiasm or opposition.

The great mass of the people felt in a confused manner that it was all inevitable, since Germany and its leader could not be repudiated, in to leave other nations in peace. Perhaps not every single citizen was entirely certain just where Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, were on the map of Europe, but all felt that each country would in turn undergo the same fate as, that it was better to liquidate the affair immediately rather than to wait the will of the new war lord.

SECRET

Even the war came to a standstill before the German fortifications and the neutral frontiers. In France, as in England -- especially in England -- the opinion arose, spread, and took firm root, that there was to be a war of blockade, far more economic than military, where each side would remain in its respective positions, dealing a few blows, firing a little artillery, making a few air raids.

Those who pointed to the Polish campaign and its teachings were reminded that the conditions there had been quite different, which was of course true, and that the methods employed there were not practicable in the west.

But by and in the front as well as in the rear, something too placid which might be termed the "demobilization of mind," if not of individuals. They adjusted themselves to a sham war. All normal activities were pursued; concrete was manufactured, agriculture was carried on normally, the theatre and the movie-pictures were as important as ever. Everything was given attention, with military training enjoying last place. As for a few divisions, the army was nothing but a framework, carrying on the most diversified activities, and a "right" idea of war became more and more blurred. The matter of fortifications was one for general preoccupation, and the most extraordinary formulas were devised to make these as frequent and as long as possible. The spirit at the front was certainly not bad, but it was far from being military. As for the state of mind in the rear, more interest was evinced in the latest scandal, the latest soccer game, or in the latest racing event than in what the Germans might do.

Due to our low birth rate and to our losses in the First War we were unable to muster the necessary number of divisions. However, we could at least have compensated for quantity by quality in the form of special units supported by armored vehicles, patterned after the German models.

Individuals advocated taking this step, and one or more distinguished statesmen became the apostle of this doctrine. The armored corps or the armored army found no response. In the High Command,

France feared that this would reverseent the first step toward a professional army which, in all history has been the obverse of democratic regimes. Others approved it only grudgingly with the slowness characterizing all French understanding since the First World War.

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The division was organized in January, 1936 as
the 1st Division, and it was completed in December,
1936. The division has 201,000 men, the result of the pres-
ent distribution of 1,334,120.

17. The altered liver was to be connected to the infant's body, but the crisis of 1933 prevented us from doing this. The crisis of 1935 prevented us from attempting it again.

as far as the two divisions mobilized at the beginning of
the war, went to expect the possession of orders,
and the logistic services. Then to consider the
possibility of tanks in 1939 in view of all the un-
certainty which could be leading us to address
ourselves to the problem of tank armament.
The first thing to do was to make mistakes to
allow us to learn from them. The following year
we had the opportunity to do so, in attacking Poland
in September 1939. In 1939 we had
fifteen tanks per division. We ran into
several difficulties on which we could not have fully foreseen
not in the nature of our armor, not in organization and maneuver,
but in familiarizing ourselves with those tanks, nor with war-
fare as such, weapons more familiar to us. We did not manu-
facture tanks, nor anti-tank equipment. The Northern Army
group was early, for this blunder.

It would be our loss if armored units, in quantity at least as important as compared with our aviation forces, were to fall into the hands of the Germans. This is the essential reason for our military preparations. I am well aware who fought in Flanders to the last gasp of the war. i.e. French Air Force was the best in the world during the first World War. It can be said that the results of its comparison with German aviation in the present conflict.

was the first to recognize that the
first step in a systematic re-integration
process is to analyze the organizational slowdowns of
the firm in the market.

basic supplies to main command post and to the rear units. The force is to be supplied by the rear unit and where it wished, convoys. That is, supply through the supply line.

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elements fortifications - all were attacked by the Stukas and the aerial burners. The posts of command did not function; the liaison cars and the motorcyclists were pursued on the roads. There were frantic preparations for attack and attacks at full speed and force. An added factor was the constant fear of parachutists, whose number was magnified one hundred and one thousand times by the imagination.

The losses inflicted upon us by the German Air Force were sometimes heavy; however, in most cases they were far below the casualties following an artillery bombardment in 1916 at Verdun. But the psychological effect was tremendous, particularly on the units not led by capable officers. Certain defensive positions were abandoned by their defenders even before the attack of enemy infantry was launched, solely because of the action of the air force. And yet, however decisive the Luftwaffe's action was against a column, a route, or badly concentrated concentration of troops, it was not dangerous to a line of infantrymen or a hidden battery. It is true that many non-commissioned infantry and artillery officers had neither the authority nor the energy to provide their men with adequate cover before the battle.

On a few occasions when the land army had pursued planes at its disposal, the enemy did not make an appearance. Certain requests to execute in broad daylight, under cover of Curtiss and Morane patrols, were completed with no interference at all from enemy aircraft. How many times, alas, did the commanders of land armies have any such opportunity? Their requests to the Army were, for the most part, ignored. The unfortunate Army Air Force commanders, conscious of the needs of their comrades on land, could only telephone, explain, beg. Nothing came of it, because the Air Force had nothing to send.

Let no one affirme that it was impossible to do better. Since the month of September 1939 the land army had been begging for aid, but no one needed. Much was made of a few individual successes. There was no strenuous effort made to construct planes and to train pilots. If this had been done, we could perhaps have built in nine months a pursuit force equal to that of Germany.

I do not speak of bombing planes, for in their case we obviously could not make up for lost time. However, our fields in Morocco, our French factories, and the American factories afforded us ample opportunity to produce pursuit planes.

We were late in making our decision and the thirty-odd pursuit groups which constituted our defensive air force were sacrificed in vain. They payed with their blood for the lack of foresight on the part of our command.

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In the absence of pursuit planes we could have provided anti-aircraft artillery. We had no such weapons or had only an insignificant number of them. On May 10, 1940, we had only 1918 model "auto-cannons" with a range of 3,000-4,000 metres and some 25 MM. batteries. Nothing was done between 1930 and 1938 in France to organize an anti-aircraft artillery, either from the point of view of personnel or of materiel. Between 1938 and 1939 there was no longer time for that. The small number of modern guns turned out by Bourges or Creusot was simply ridiculous. There was no battery with an 8,000 to 10,000 meter range because the Army did not want to adopt the 70 MM. guns used in the Navy. It is mystifying to contemplate such party quarrels.

There there was artillery, especially 25 MM. guns, there was either no ammunition or a supply which lasted for a very short while. Still everyone knew the number of German planes, their method of attack, and the frequency of their attacks.

All this had been said, written, repeated for years by the responsible leaders. During a time when in Germany one could follow daily breath taking progress of that country's preparation, when military attaches warned of the impending danger and foreign observers kept us informed, in France, words, studies, plans, all formulated with great slowness, took the place of action.

The same Minister of Defense remained in his post for six years, under different titles. One had reason to believe in the existence of unified doctrines, in the execution of a plan well studied and logically executed. There was only a long series of unsystematic actions, and those who spoke most reassuringly had the final word while pessimists were considered as trouble-makers, and astronomical sums were spent fruitlessly.

Now the General Staff -- to use a word dear to those who seek out the war-guilty -- have acquitted itself better? Accountability, it might have, but it would have had to have the qualities of character befitting its intelligence. We have too many intelligent persons in France; we have not enough men of character. Our bureaus know how to present a plan but do not know how to carry it out, and they prefer to utilize a man whom they consider incapable rather than to clash with the person in power. When such a man has only a superficial energy, when he is surrounded by a selfish circle whose interest lies in concealing the truth from him, the ground is prepared for the 1940 disaster. This would be laughable had France not been at stake.

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In general, the equipment of the divisions, in organization and quantity, was such that it could at least give fires. But if ours were effective the defensive armament was necessary to resist the German army, which we knew to be powerful, even though it did not possess sufficient destructive weapons such as aircraft, tanks and heavy artillery. German could then have been more successfully stopped.

The armament of the field units, or divisional and collectedly, was almost adequate. I am referring to the Model 1933 machine-guns, the P.M. 1929, and the 75 MM. gun. Even those arms did not exist in sufficient quantity. However, the manufacture of this material was easy and we were thoroughly familiar with its ammunition for these and presented no difficulty either. In spite of this, from September 1939 to May 1940 we were unable to give to our regional regiments and to our artillery groups the 100-millimeter guns and the 45-mm. machine-guns which they needed for defense against airplanes. We had been with Saint Chamond machine-guns and F.M. 18's, which an infantryman wanted.

As for the artillery material, neither the howitzers, 105 MM. guns, nor the 165 long guns were available in the quantities prescribed.

If we now turn our attention to modern anti-tank and anti-aircraft arms, it is shameful to state that on the 10th of May, 1940, certain division left for battle without a single anti-tank arm and what is more unfortunate, without a single anti-aircraft arm.

Besides, no division had the same equipment. A "D.F.M." with arms for G.R.G., had eighty anti-tank guns, eight 25 MM. guns, and thirty guns of the Charbon-30 type.

A "D.F.M." had forty-eight anti-tank guns and four 30 MM. machine-guns. Another of the same series had only thirty-nine anti-tank guns, but on the other hand, it had six 20 MM. machine-guns.

An active Infantry Division had 56 anti-tank weapons and sometimes thirteen 30 MM. machine-guns. Many had only 40 anti-tank weapons and no anti-aircraft. A Series A Infantry division had 47 anti-tank guns but not a single anti-aircraft arm.

One Series B. Infantry division had neither anti-tank nor anti-aircraft weapons, whereas another division of the same type had 30 anti-tank weapons and no anti-aircraft.

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Then, when we saw the German materiel our eyes were opened. Whether it was combat or transport vehicles, anti-air guns or anti-air guns, we could see that their war materiel was simple, crude, solid, designed for a war of movement; and it made this type of war possible by means of spare driving wheels, workshops, ideal personnel.

We were still living in the days of the 35 MM. horse-drawn gun, and that of the outmoded I.H.'s of our G.P., or of mounted dragoons.

Here again, let it not be claimed that we had not been informed. All our previous manoeuvres, all our inspections brought to the deficiencies to light.

In certain regiments experiments were made with materiel which proved quite satisfactory. Nothing more came of those tests? Why? It remains a mystery. This passed; the danger grew. The Minister closed his eyes to it all.

The friend or a political opponent, it mattered little which, in the brotherhood of comrades, came to see him after having been frightened by some general, he was received with pleasant words, he was shown false figures. That was the extent of the action taken.

If this matter came up in Parliament the discussion was closed by a sufficient speech which brought applause from all unqualified quarters, and the Army, the "Great Silent Partner", had only to accept the situation or else perish.

Our military preparedness was tragically inadequate. The responsibility for this rests upon the Minister and his colleagues. Those duty it is in a democratic country to prepare for national emergencies.

As I have stated above, only the Navy was ready for the war and, in effect, did its part brilliantly.

Let us now see the PLAN OF WAR and how it was executed. The plan is strictly the creation of the military based on general policies, alliances and resources. It is modified in conformity with changes in the general situation of the nation, as the political chessboard alters.

After many vicissitudes, in 1939 the situation had become brighter: Germany and Italy were hostile, England and Poland were allies.

All the others were neutrals, either favorably disposed, such as France, or unfavorably disposed, like Spain and others, with all possible shades of neutrality.

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The German frontiers are strong, formidable, easily penetrable from both sides.

The French personnel: very inferior to the German.

Material: entirely deficient.

In September of 1939, after a lightning campaign, the Polish army disappeared. Only the English army remained as a fighting force side by side with the French army. There were in France 9 English divisions with the hope of double that number by the spring of 1940.

As for the French army, there were in France approximately 80 divisions, of which about thirty were well-officered, well-trained, and in good condition. The rest needed long months to re-learn the art of war.

Under such conditions the plan could scarcely be an offensive one.

A defensive plan was possible based on an economy of forces at certain points and armies reserved to meet the unexpected, from Switzerland to the Black Sea.

It seems likely that the Belgian hypothesis influenced strongly the strategic notion of the Commanding General.

After requesting in vain the right to pass through Belgium, in order to establish ourselves firmly on the eastern frontier of this country, we made the error of going to the aid of Belgium and Holland with the best French divisions and the entire English army when it was already too late.

Again, we had no reserve division at all to resist an incident on the Meuse front, where the fortifications had by no means the strength and the depth of those in Lorraine.

Well prepared by the extremely competent General-Staffs and admirably protected by a mechanized cavalry operating magnificently, the movement was executed from Namur to Tilburg in a perfectly satisfactory manner. We arrived duly on the battle field chosen by us and we received there the attack of the enemy forces, without the Belgian and Dutch Armies, which had promised to hold out for many days, offering the slightest resistance except at Liege.

Meanwhile, the Meuse front was collapsing, first at Sedan, subsequently at Metz, Givet, and Dinant. This was entirely the result of a plan which could have been carried out in a perfectly safe way, had the English and French divisions been held in reserve.

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Thereat lay the first error of my plan of strategy. One can manoeuvre with reserves. No reserves, no manoeuvre. Therefore, we should have been less ambitious in our plan and should have outlined more distant objectives.

It should have been a primary consideration of ours to analyse the resources at our disposition. The high command deceived itself about the strength of those resources. To confuse a division of Series I, and even one of Series A, with a motorized division, was a sad error. These poorly trained divisions, badly prepared, inadequately armed, were capable at least of holding a fortified front; they were not able to fight on open ground, to utilize their terrain, to attack or counter-attack.

The artillery regiments in the general reserve were also of mediocre quality. They needed the advantage of additional months of training, plus a number of firing schools.

The armoured divisions, finally, were obviously incomplete and absent cohesion.

I realize that there was no desire to fight until 1941 and that those who predicted the German attack in 1940 were considered a bit insane. It would have been better, under these conditions, to follow a plan for 1940 and 1941, to concentrate strong reserves behind the weakest sector which was evidently the one in the North, disposing a minimum of forces where the permanent fortifications displayed evident superiority.

Instead of this, the armies deployed in a line the whole length of the front. Some of them had local weaknesses, still. It did not alter the final result, and when the German massed to storm through our lines, there was nothing to prevent its progress, to say nothing of launching counter-attacks.

The German High Command was able to execute its manoeuvre as originally planned, from Coblenz to Dunkerque. In three weeks it had put the best French units out of commission. The war was already lost by the first of June. Those who fought on the Somme and on the Aisne merely saved their honor. They could not save France.

The plan was too ambitious. The execution was varied in nature. At various sectors there was perfect order, complete discipline, firing plans rapidly sketched, troops well covered, posts of command functioning normally in spite of the intensity

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of the enemy bombardment, expertly organized and vigorously launched counter attacks, tank attacks broken against prepared points of support, numbering of pieces carried out without confusion, in perfect order.

This was true of the cavalry, of the torrid divisions, of the "metropolitan" active divisions, of the North Africans and of the Colonial, of all the troops which, to express it briefly, had some sort of corps, good leadership, equipment, coupled with the will to hold firm and the desire to win.

In other sectors there was a significant slowness in the disposition of the troops, an incurable ignorance of the terrain, complete lack of liaison between the different branches.

Tired even before the battle, neither the infantry nor the artillery took regular cover; communications did not function, orders were not transmitted, and reports did not reach their destination.

No enemy aircraft went into action, minds became confused or reacted flinchingly. Even when the attack was made behind a wall or obstacle as the French our forces retreated.

The German Infantry infiltrated our tanks, but it was especially the German tanks which made their mark, driving ahead without regard to their tanks. Methodically, they directed themselves to the crossroads, to the most important topographical points, cutting off telephone connections, machine-gunning isolated individuals, destroying liaison cars and supply trucks. At intervals parachute detachments came upon the scene, far in the rear, to support the action of the tanks.

Louder and louder, first in the service units, later in the combat units, the rumor was spread: "We are outflanked." Since the men in the ranks quickly realized our tragic inferiority in aircraft and in tanks, and since the non-commissioned officers had neither the authority nor sufficient knowledge to impose their will on the men, the withdrawal became a retreat; the retreat degenerated into a rout.

Alas, this was facilitated and aggravated by the mass of civilian refugees fleeing toward the West, cluttering up the villages, blocking the routes, creating disorder. The immense majority of these unfortunate were much to be pitied. They fled before the invasion, recoupling the pillage, the deportations, the exacting demands of the German occupation between 1914 and 1918. They hoped to find a secure refuge somewhere in France, and each day they drove farther and farther with their heavy wagons.

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Revert please to the class in which you were columnists. All made their way where they were sent at their will, spreading terror, sowing the seeds of demoralization, encouraging desertion. Moreover, how many deserters made use of Belgian automobiles and bicycles? How many took off their uniforms to camouflage themselves as civilians? Not everyone is of the stuff of which heroes are made, and panic is contagious when the officers do not have the stamina to keep each person in his proper place.

Of course, we laid down barrages. Of course, we concentrated barrages of men at certain points, tons of thousands at others while the Germans were fleeing toward Paris, in the yawning breach that they had opened, a few excellent divisions sacrificed themselves, unable to stop the avalanche, in attempt to limit the destruction caused by the advance of the Allies. These divisions, just as the men who fought to the bitter end before Dunkirk, were deserving of their laurels, but they were too few in number. Their losses were heavy, their efforts were in vain.

When the second act of the tragedy began, the odds were no longer even. In personnel and in materiel, the French army lost it, had run in Flanders. The armies of the Allies and of the Free did their duty. They inflicted serious losses upon the enemy and caused them several days of delay. It was virtually impossible for them to win without aircraft, without tanks, and almost without artillery.

Beginning the 3rd of June it was purely and simply a race, in the face of an enthusiastic enemy, unrestrained, master of the skies and of the earth.

The enemy reached and passed the Seine and the Loire. The plateau of Langres was surrendered to him and the Jura was taken in the rear. France had nothing left but its Lorraine and Alsace armies.

The order was given at this time to give up the positions on the Maginot line and to withdraw toward the South. It can logically be queried whether it would not have been more advisable to cling to our positions in Lorraine and Alsace territory.

The fortress troops, able to offer static resistance, were unable to manoeuvre in the open field. Forced marches were imposed upon them and they were engaged in unprepared terrain. Their losses were out of proportion with the results obtained.

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It is interesting that the defensive units and fortifications at Epinal, Tonk, and Verdun, separated from the rear by Metz and Thionville and covered to the East by the undamaged installations of the RFL and of the RFA, might have permitted the LXXXI, LIXth, and XII Armies to await the armistice in equally good, if not better condition than on the "inspired hill" or on the approaches to the Charnes.

When a game is lost, it is better not to be obstinate, and to reduce losses as much as possible, especially when these losses are paid for in French blood.

In this sinister adventure which I have just described in its general outlines, did the officers of all ranks do their duty? Their whole duty?

First of all, in the higher echelons, the French General Staff was composed of intelligent, hardworking men, who had all studied a great deal, fought in the last war, and many of whom had won fame in the colonies. They believed in the power of fire; they did not believe in the value of manoeuvre. They were static-minded rather than mobile-minded.

The information which they possessed did not reveal the German army to them in its true light. They underestimated its resources. They believed in the value of reinforced concrete and the anti-tank ditch.

Brusly, however, they were jolted away from this concrete and from these ditches to be thrown forward, 80, 100, and 200 kilometers from their base of operations.

The movement was executed successfully because the General Staffs were well-prepared and were extremely well qualified, but the posts of command were too heavy and not easily moved, the communications did not function, messages arrived late, and when a new order was sent to the high officers in the front lines it was too late for action; the enemy tanks were already in position.

Then came nervousness, astonishment, and at times withdrawals to distant points in order to escape the emotions of battle. This was perhaps ideal for those with weak hearts, but lamentable from the military point of view. For then, there was no information, no communication of orders, the fighting was done blindly; absurd and impossible orders were given.

It is difficult for an officer to know where to place himself in order to command his group. I must say that I prefer those who remained too near the front to those who

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with whom to live. In the same year, he is
supposed to have been married to the
daughter of a rich man, and this man had the desire
of seeing her.

As I say, in our case, we expect to find a com-
munity, and now, even if the number of those who
filled the army returns, most of them served like tragic
heroes "isolated in the desert".

Unfortunately, the women, the children and others must
be killed. For me, it is very hard to believe that people
can do such things. As far as I thought at first,
such a thing was the result of some kind of a repre-
sentation of the government, but then I began
to think that it was not so.

Now, we see a different people than of old.
The young people are all kinds of half-breed.
They are not educated, ignorant men, or simple laborers, or
farmers, but they are witnesses to all kinds of public
and private crimes. To think that the Czechoslovak
people are backward, at present, and that he fled
from his country, and therefore is a foolery. The
youngsters at present were born and raised those at
present, and twenty-five years suffice to change a nation.
In the next twenty-five years, not only that the nation will
lose its independence, but also that the nation will
lose its soul, and that before finding future solutions
for the state, it will be lost. They will
not be able to live, their love of freedom is strong, never
will they give up. They have no character and who is he who
resisted the order of Gestapo.

SOCIAL CAUSES

It is evident from the statistics who appear
in the press that as the nation, in the Army, the
population of the country decreased from 1939
and goes down in the spirit of the half-breed army.

Now, in parts, partition, that of the birth rate.

During the war, was on the road to suicide. The
family was disappearing, giving way to the childless couple.
Together in the middle, bourgeois, or working classes, there
were more families in which one could count three or more
children. Any had no only son. In the richest country in
the world, where the earth grows for whoever will work it, the
country was losing population, and Italian, Polish, or Czech
workers came and earned large wages which they sent to their
families in their native lands, without any profit to the
economy of France.

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as this youth, inadequate in numbers, at least of high quality physically and morally? The professors, alas, assert the contrary.

As regards physical training much was said in France, wonderful programs set up, many prizes awarded. Soccer, Rugby, and boxing matches, horse, bicycle, or automobile races became more and more popular. Does anyone think this is the sort of athletics suitable for children, boys, or men who need to strengthen and develop themselves to get in training? It is very like the circus days of the Roman plebs.

Neither in elementary nor high schools, no more in rich families than poor, did anyone think of useful exercise, progressive, educational, often tiresome, that develops the body harmoniously and tempers the will. Neither the teachers nor the professors were concerned with it. In the one case, it did not contribute to their political influence, in the other, it had little importance as regards the "general competition" (i.e., a competition held every year among the best pupils in the senior classes of French secondary schools.)

And the result was fatal. In a racial stock that used to be robust, rusted, hard to weary, but in which alcohol and syphilis have opened suppurating wounds, the frame has grown smaller, the tissues slack, resistance has been lowered. The number of men discharged or classified for limited service has increased every year. The soldier of 1940 does not rival the one of 1914 either in endurance or training, whether he belongs to young class or one already old. A very mediocre aptitude for marching, an even lesser capacity for work, and an insuperable need of sleep, are three characteristics of the soldier of 1940. It is not under conditions such as these that one can meet an army as young, well-trained, and enthusiastic as was the mass of German shock-troops, armored and motorized division, unless one is upheld by a fantastically high morale and a superhuman idealism.

Unfortunately, the idealism must be created and morale built up. There must be at the base a faith or a mystique. There must be as educators those who are convinced or who are apostles. From 1920 to 1940 victorious France, disillusioned France, the France of leisurely living had neither the one nor the other.

From 1914 to 1918 we made a superhuman effort, at first to hold, later to conquer. We came out of the test physically and morally exhausted. And our ideal was not to make use of the victory to build a better world; it was to enjoy, to enjoy in every way, including the lowest and the most stupid, meanest, sordid as little as possible. From the first to the last stratum of society everyone wished to have fun, or rather

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... it is this school and its school. People travelled for miles, from 100, 150, or the 300 miles further, to put up with themselves, to return for going to see the finals of the French Cup, or the "six days" (July 15 race), or the gala night at Longchamps. They had "air weekly, or even bi-weekly movies, and paid vacations. An excellent institution on the primary level - were simply an excuse for trips that were expensive in spite of their reduced prices, exhausting, and disappointing.

What had school taught these boys, these men?

Egotism first of all. selfishness and indulgence in envy.

Next, the negation of all spirituality, divinity, idealism. A nationalist philosophy, if one may combine those two words with all the moral and social consequences they entail. Atheism, if not proclaimed, at least encouraged. The idea of Country not merely neglected but made game of, for the benefit of the International Proletariat or to the obvious advantage of Germany, avid for revenge. At the National Congress of Teachers, the speeches made should have caused the speakers to be haled into court. Instead they won them promotion.

Will this atheistic, pleasure loving youth at least have the taste for effort, for work, and for work well done that has always characterized the French artisan or worker? Not at all. A wage-earner owed 40 hours of work. He gave them without enthusiasm, diligence, or pleasure.

This conception of modern industry kills all initiative, skill, or self-improvement. Man is no more than a part of the machine. It is really the machine that leads and that cannot be led.

Could military service better or correct this school and factory training? Certainly not when a year's service was reduced practically to four months, during which, as I was able to observe myself, some of the men did not even learn the rank of the officers.

Not a lieutenant, not a captain had his own unit that he knew and commanded; the men were pawns who ran from one instructor to the next; they never got to know the instructors, nor did the instructors get to know the men. Even the commissary unit had disappeared, under the pretext of forming..... Let me add that in many cases the Army had to make up for the

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insufficiencies of public education by exacting the rudiments of the language to an illiteracy that increased in number every year. So much time lost for military instruction proper. So many added burdens on causes already overworked.

To sum up, a youth inadequate both from the point of view of quantity and of quality. That is what twenty years of peace following our victory had given us. Certain signs of improvement could indeed be detected. In the last years materialism was certainly on the wane. We must hope that the terrible ordeal inflicted on us will retemper the souls of French youth and restore to grown men their sense of the national life.

If from the youth which made up only a very small part of the army (nation) we pass to the nation as a whole, let us see what were the characteristics of the last years.

On the basis, a lack of authority. Here the persons chiefly to blame are the members of the government on the one hand, the men who held command on the other.

Authority cannot be delegated. It asserts itself. In France, from 1919 to 1939, it merely exhausted itself.

In the government, under whatever label, we saw only parties, we never saw France.

Personal interest, nepotism, fraud.....stifled the public interest. Free rein was given to each man's appetites, in a free-for-all, where success came to the most cunning and the least honest. The organization of each Ministry, and there were many of them, was a scandal. Ministers changed indifferently, from Public Works to Colonies or to National Education. Only the bureaus were permanent, and little by little they ascended to authority.....

Non a Minister remained in office for sometime, his will was merely a series of caprices constantly influenced by a concern for the electorate or else the parliamentary..... The Republic of the comrades was harrowing from the point of view of constructive action.

This bankruptcy of the government had repercussions, especially during the Popular Front, among the employers of France, large, medium, or small. There were few who considered it their duty to command with all that word implies of greatness, wisdom, and responsibility. First one must know, then one must will. A few who knew had not the civic courage to will. And we witnessed the scandalous scenes of 1938, the surrenders, the capitulations. The seizures of factories were

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as well, the result of irresolution on the part of the directors and owners is of the root of the difficulties. Through timorousness or weakness, those who had had the power to prevent these troubles were unwilling to make a stand against them. Certain social improvements could and should have been introduced in advance.

Our reserve officers and non-commissioned officers who made up the immense majority of the cadres did not dare to give orders, whether during the simplest fatigue duty or on the most important mission. The day the war broke out they had not had time to become reaccustomed to authority. They were unable to keep at their posts, at their holy task, those whom they had the honor to command. Certain failures, certain routes, certain mail flights cannot be explained in any other way. Modern warfare based on aircraft and tanks subjects the human animal to a terrible trial. If the cadres are not firmly steeled to服从 on the march, the man hesitates, always, and breaks up at the blouse.

After work, discipline. The one results from the other.

For long the Frenchman has never been a model of discipline, at least not in the German or Russian sense of the word. But the formula: "They grumbled, but they kept on going" used to apply to civilians as well as soldiers. In the factory, the workshop, or the store, the faultfinder used to growl at protest, but he none the less carried out, intelligently, the orders of the employer, the foreman, the engineer, or the floor-walker.

For several years this conception of intelligent discipline has lost ground, to the benefit of anarchy and to the detriment of production. There was less and less observance of established rules, regulations that had been carefully thought out and had proved their worth; men indulged instead in fantastic demonstrations in which free rein was given to individualism, to the detriment of the common good.

And this observation could be made as well in the street as in a business, in a train as at a soccer match, in so-called "elegant society" as at the most disorderly meeting. One might have thought that for amusement men had put chaos on a pedestal.

Whether it was a question of crossing a street, driving in the right direction in traffic, standing in line at a window, putting one's things in a place specially arranged for them, behaving properly in a railroad compartment attending a full-dress ball or the six days of the "Vol. d'Automne" (Winter

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little more in the way of the usual "caveman" type of
delightful because it is so much more than the mere
fellow. These little men upon whom the general heavy load
of afflictions have rested, have been the best of friends received
and supported.

It can withstand any degree of fire, it is difficult to melt by demonstration, it melts at 1200° C. It is very dense, so good. Unfortunately it is melted at first from the top to the bottom of the industrial plant. This results in loss. In working out a method, it is necessary to separate expenses incorporated with a delivery, and those which are used to pay the storekeeper's account. The cost of melting is 8 or 10 rubles on per tonne a quarter of a cubic meter. After roasting five minutes per tonne truck goes in barrels at all border stations of Russia; this tool heat it up to 100° C. at a cost price and the exhibit, if it can succeed to rival for the economy.

It may be all the arm is no general than material.
For instance, I have to do with the history he informed me
of his progress from a certain point to the recent told
is particularly the two years of all very early he
had been spending time into contact with people who expected
from him what is more succeeded easily. He found
it was a good work for it, so as soon as he got out, pos-
sibly he had nothing greater than a simple environment,
but the way.

... if he reserved it returned to his regiment he no longer remained either how to obey or how to make his squad fit to be led. From the Colonels or the Generals have to do with it. The ruin crushes chiefs and subordinates alike, and if the one or the other group does or has not done its

The first point - lack of discipline; now we come to
the last item of work that is the most outstanding character-
istic of the 1910-1940 period. The four years of war taught
them how to suffer. It did not teach them how
to work. The post-war period were the consequences (part the

Until I did the farm's portion and peasants were hard workers, who knew how to work and to work well. Almost always sparingly, sometimes even frugally, they knew the value of the

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Money they earned by the sweat of their brow. The dream of most of them was to end their days in the little house they had failed to build in his place or that, thanks to the sustained efforts of a lifetime of hardships or privations.

At the top of the ladder, the employer had not yet given way to the corporation, large or small; he too worked hard to make his business succeed and pass it on to his son when the time came. Days were long, the week had six full days, and vacations were cut to a strict minimum.

How many manufacturers and tradesmen never left their factories, shops, or offices except for short trips, eager not to desert even in the slow season, the business they had so close to their hearts. They knew that their place was on the commanding bridge. Only in very exceptional cases did they pass the helm to a temporary head.

"Our French society knew neither great fortunes nor sordid poverty... Our country was one of small bourgeoisie, urban and rural... Here the golden stocking was not a legend, where thrift some said virtue... was the chief characteristic of the French citizen... It is true that we lacked豪華, that we did not richness too much like residents of Chicago or Buenos Aires, but we knew how to be content with what we had, we envied our neighbor moderately, as one should, but (were ready to?) help him out if necessary.

The war of 1914-1918 did not help to maintain this atmosphere of "little people". In the great shuffle, men who were sent from the Ise to the Vardar by way of Brindisi were bewildered by the kaleidoscope that unfolded too quickly before them. The coming of the Americans, American methods and goods contributed not a little to unsettle ideas. One learned to count in billions or not at all.

Then the question arose of repairing the damage caused by the war, after crying "Germany shall pay", we turned back to the East (est) and drew on our cash boxes and paper-baggers for all we were worth, every one wanted his slice, and never thought that this prospectivity was artificial, that there can be no fortune that is not based on work.

Meanwhile, the shoddy luxury keeps increasing the working girl cannot do without silk stockings and artificial furs in which the rabbit plays the chief part. Perfumers make fortunes; at every level, in all spheres, the spirit changed. The employer, the worker, the chief, the subordinate - every one thinks part of the time should be reserved for pleasure and work reduced to a minimum. They do not yet speak of "leisure", but the idea is in the air, and certain good-natured

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... In fact, it is now...
 ... I consider, however, that it is important to continue
 to publish your statistical reports, and my state
 that all of this will be the responsibility of the
 Statistical Bureau, the only organization involved.

First of all, the workers must be aware of the nature of
 their contract, either the number of hours because the basis of
 the contract between employer and employee is that they work
 for a certain time. The workers will then have no time, they
 will be free to leave a quarter of an hour before the time.

... It is necessary to give them over 200 thousand
 hours of work, and if the workers, in summer, there is
 a period of leisure, making hunting, snow sports, etc.,
 it is necessary to notice it.

... They are good workers, but conscientious
 workers, but they did not understand in their work.
 They did not understand the religious office to carefully performed.
 They did not understand the existence of French government, its
 principles, its laws, its institutions, its missions or disappear.
 We can say that they did not have either the
 spirit of sacrifice or the ideal, and gradually
 faded interests from the product or that was always expen-
 sive, and the price of which had to be made up for by his
 wife, without even say its perfection.

... It was just as true in the so-called liberal pro-
 cesses of the industry or commerce, but in a different form.

... I do not mean that our literary men, our doctors
 and lawyers did not work and did not provide the intellectual
 welfare of the country. Many followed in the path of their
 great fathers, but some had observed that it was easier
 to make one's way, by intrigue than by work. Politics had be-
 come a career with all this work, implying of compromises, ad-
 visements, publications. Now many lawyers, professors, journalists
 considered themselves incapable like capabilities, as soon as
 they became at the most unimportant offices - if they had one
 to all, especially as soon as they had inclined them-
 selves into the office of an Under Secretary of State, or
 into the entourage of an influential woman. The Ministers,
 the heads of departments, and various Administrations, etc.,
 etc., were also occupied with young men who had not used their
 opportunity to produce their ideas, but instead the idea
 of their wives or their mothers, who take useful and prof-
 itable opportunities.

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... a lot of things didn't go well. I am not very
well at present, either physically, monetarily, banks,
etc., etc., and the sort of shoes we had, work certainly did
not exist. The inevitable 40 hours of the cap-wearing profes-
sional, and that sort of thing has to be paid for, and it
was ... for between the house and the office.

The military equipment, the unsatisfied requests, the
attempt to never say, the cars that were out of class, the
machines waiting for in vain, all that as the result of work
incompetence regards quantity and quality.

"... and in a certain situation; they made her
a proposal."

(Black 64 4*3*)

"... probably most of the debts were in the foreign
as well as in the Soviet Union."

"Openly speaking from 1919 to 1940 was a long
train of events, failures, weakness, and error. Conquerors
in 1919, no doubt to us we wished, we did not know what to
do. We vacillated between the most uncompromising severity
and the greatest weakness. We succeeded neither in
convincing Germany from risin, again nor in cooperating
with Britain. We benefited neither from the English
resources nor the American enterprise. We were able neither to
impose nor to influence nothing to win them to our cause.

"... at summer, West to object, 'I prefer to 'dictate'
a law of history. Clemenceau and afterwards the most
realistic, with his personal eloquence, allowed themselves
to be led by the English and German colleagues. Naturally,
they followed Tracy, and of the greatest among them,
would not agree to their position. The peace treaty was
signed without any guarantees, at a time when there appeared
from the League of Nations (League of Nations, an excuse for
large or small and well said John, but without any construc-
tion whatsoever, than the ultimate practical usefulness.

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And little by little the links of this trifled spider became separated, dispersed, while certain policy skilfully, tirelessly worked to loosen the bonds that lay heavy on it at country.

England's role during this period was inadvertent; her actions is she was to return to the colony or the continent, in her fear of seeing France too powerful. She sometimes openly facilitated the rise of Germany.

Italy, her woes complicated, claiming that she had been wronged in the distribution, began by isolating herself, before taking sides.

The question of who debts engorged America, who withdrew into herself, the time in the name to discriminate aversion those against her her sons had fought and those to whom she, due to her, her obligation to pay.

Sugar, trafficking of her islands, was far more concerned with her Asiatic interest, than with the peace of Europe.

To all, on a so look to France and count on France were the nations we had raised from the tomb: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Roumania. Out of loyalty as well as self-interest, they all had confidence in France, her promises and her future. They counted on our support, our advice, and our example. Our civilian and military missions at first received from all of them a hearty welcome. Our industrialists and merchants were able to make interesting contracts. The spread of our culture was intensified and extended. There we were truly the winners of the Great War.

However, our policy of renunciation became more and more apparent. One by one we gave up all the pledges the Versailles Treaty granted us. As we yielded, Germany increased her demands, and at our side we found no allies. The support is, on the contrary, for our domestic policies neutral in our foreign friendships. Our flirtation with the Soviets worried our friends; the outbreak of the Popular Front disengaged them.

Belgium abandoned us, denouncing her military agreements, proclaiming her strict neutrality. Italy, after resisting Germany with regard to Austria, asked us carte blanche for its doppia. She obtained the tacit agreement of the Savoia government, but met with the absolute opposition of the Blum government, and the policy of sanctions undermined all the agreements previously reached. Threatened by France and England, Mussolini threw himself into the arms of Germany. It is the government of alliance; it is the beginning of the Rome-Berlin Axis.

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After the election, the new government will be located in
the capital, government buildings will be built up, and
the members of the Foreign Service will be permanently
employed. See if the opportunity.

and, given to me as the two local districts had been
and the experience of nations of power, I proposed to
make it, i.e., took advantage of our time from the very
first to draw up early positions from which it will be
difficult to pull them and from the military point of view
to keep an exceedingly difficult expectation. As far as
this is carried on manfully, with real partners (friendly
or at least not openly hostile) and which give them an
economy to justify the political inequalities of their
class, those, military, and especially their anti-tank
units, will receive their profits considerably. We
will be able to establish in our party, on this meeting, est-

On our way home we stopped at the hotel in White Sulphur Springs and made up our minds to make the trip to the Black Hills. We were to leave the next day.

On the 1st of April, 1865, General Lee sent his last order to the Army of Northern Virginia, which read as follows:

and you will say to him about all these things, we have heard them; we have seen them; we have done them; but we will not do them. This is the spirit of the world, but it need not be yours. If you have seen the light, and have done the right thing, which was originally carried out, should have been done, you will be delivered from the power of darkness, and exalted almost to the

... was followed by the humiliating collapse of the
Sudetenland; then the official ... of aviation; then
annexation of the Saar; then the occupation of Sudetenland; then
the annexation of the Sudetenland; then the conquest of Poland.

... is written down in Mein Kampf; only the lightest and most trivial part of it exists, we can not add the whole part now.

that day, it can were allowed to take amid such trials
it would be refusing to turn back to the 1935 diatribes against

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Stalin, and copy of the first of his secret military telegram of 1940. Those are the names of enemies, and Michailovitch here found his master. Which does not prevent the fact that the German-Russian-Italian collusion ruined France.

Why did France, why did the governments that held office in France between 1930 and 1939, not see, observe, and draw from their observations the necessary conclusions?

French foreign policy was out of touch. That the man in the street felt confusedly the government did not want to see at all, no matter what its affiliations or label. Warnings, cries of alarm were not lacking. Those who predicted war were called visionaries or fanatics. We neither prepared for nor avoided war.

In a single man, Maginot, had seen clearly when in spite of the opposition of a great number of men still in office today he decided to build the rampart that protected France from Switzerland to Luxembourg. This barrier certainly caused the leaders of Germany to hesitate. We should have prolonged it by an unbreakable territorial alliance with Belgium... a methodical, complete military understanding with England. We were able to carry through neither the one nor the other. England receded from the military burden, and Belgium retreated before the popular front.

As far as the nations to which we had given new life by the Versailles Treaty, and who had long remained faithful to us, they also changed their minds when they saw the course we were taking of them, how we were abandoning them.

The Anschluss was the prologue to these successive capitulations. It is true that we had promised Austria nothing. We had even voluntarily crushed her in 1919, but we had formally ("") forbidden Germany to become bound to her economically, and we did not raise a protest when she was annexed politically.

Then it was Czechoslovakia in two acts: first the Sudeten, then the rest, in September 1938 and March 1939.

A word of epilogue on what we should have done in 1938. Permit an opponent of Munich to give his opinion. The disaster could not have been any worse, and our honor would have been saved.

Even a big country like France binds herself by treaty to a little nation like Czechoslovakia, she does not disown her signature when the time of danger comes. The Czechoslovakian army had forty good divisions backed up by strong fortifications. It is practically certain that Poland would have marched with us. All we had to do was to make the Prague Government cede the Sudeten. We had there a total of 80 divisions that would have put up at least twice

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the resistance of the unarmored Polish army.

The German Westwall was not finished throughout. The German General Staff had not yet at its disposal the armored and motorized mass of shock troops that it had on May 10, 1940. It had its victim, it is true; but does anyone think it was better than that at the same date of May 10, 1940? Everything indicates the contrary.

Conceding that a decision could not have been reached before winter, we will expect to carry the war into the Palatinates, thejuris to the banks of the Rhine. There was no need to violate Belgian neutrality, and the British army could have been just as large - and as weak - in 1948 as in 1940.

Which is the basest of surrenders, and that is the truth.

The result of this basest peopled faithfulness to us, the Pugnacious and the abstemious, fortuitously separated themselves from political incapacity or kept their promises, and that the whole world... of the principles of the totalitarian states. The Rome-Berlin axis became the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo triangle. Nationalist France remembered who had helped and who had ruined her. America noted the terms exchanged. Such was the foreign policy: a dearth of illusions, ideological dreaming, hollow phrases, a spinelessness that led us from the most difficult of victories to the most lamentable disaster.

Our domestic policy yielded in nothing to our foreign policy. The Place Beauvau had no need to envy the Quai d'Orsay.

From 1918 to 1930 France had indulged in the luxury of all the administrations called Republican, from horizon blue to the red of the Popular Front. Ministries fell like a house of cards, scandals piled up, riots even stained the streets of the capital with French blood, but always the same men remained on the same seats.

More or less worked, were or less colored with white, pink, or red, they made up the team that for twenty years shared the controls with as much incompetence as cynicism. The Republic of the Bourgeoisie had free play, only to die away in the minister adventure of two years 1930-1938.

The ruins the Popular Front piled up in France are incomparable, but far greater responsibility is that it taught the French people nothing under the pompous title of "Gouvernement". For "not very" truly not waited 20 centuries in

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...and the whole world is to be won over to the cause of
Truth and Justice by the efforts of each individual
and every nation making a reasonable effort.

For more information about the study, contact Dr. Michael J. Koenig at (314) 747-2100 or via e-mail at koenig@dfci.harvard.edu.

the first time in history
that the people of
the world have been
so well informed about
the progress of
the world's civilization.

On the 20th, the ship sailed for the islands. On the 21st, the natives were seen. The next day they were at the village. The natives were friendly.

the miners are profited! The 40 hour week brought
the miners to the mine. The miners spent in the
mine, 10 hours, 10 hours. The miners spent in the
mine, 10 hours, 10 hours. Alcohol is made
from grain, it is to be used to bring the miners
back to the mine.

as the unemployment, the inevitable consequence of the
war, which has reached unprecedented proportions, will
be met by forces reaching unparalleled proportions, either
from the State, the departments, and the communes.

The sentence and one is to be served by the defendant. It was observed that had until at the same time, he would have been soon the fanatical tendencies to exist, esp. the Schlesovitch area.

but the battle had been won. We had still lost the slopes at this upper, and we climbed up again to safety. In 1917 when France began to decline of herself again, it took time to make a new and bold of the hill cover from the killing of the past.

and during + 199 long months, India will not escape the
war's cruel system. The deficit of munitions yes on record,
especially as the last civilization of factories had already
affected like "cannibal world". For this time, the Navy, no
less than Air force.

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were crushed by the military butchery, and those who had neither anti-aircraft nor ground defense equipment, nor ammunition, fell out for very soon upon the day when he did not want to manufacture the armament, and especially upon those whose injurious ideology and anatomy.

To preach indecisiveness, it is done that Germany was proclaiming that it was better to have our wife than butter against the light. Those who did so furnished the totalitarian governments with the most revolting successes, the most significant assistance they could have hoped for. And truly, any German can see Germany as a place of war and health. She perhaps does not have freedom, but she certainly has a ruler, a master, her master. And everywhere one finds work, he is a master of a people that wishes to live and be happy. Let France remember this and learn her lesson!

WHAT IS WAR FOR?

After these social, political and military causes for the defeat, honestly presented, it is fitting to derive from them the proper lesson and conclusion.

With our inadequate manpower, our unpreparedness and our political psychological attitude, could we have won, and how could we have won? I consider those who rush into a war without the least possibilities for success as insane. The politicians and the military men must, then, have believed in victory.

In the first place, could we have avoided the war? I reply quite simply: No. Sooner or later it was inevitable. I have already stated above that it would have been better to have fought it in 1938 than in 1939, in 1936 than in 1938. Time certainly did not operate in our favor.

How should we have conducted the war?

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Let it first be remembered that it was the case of a war of coalition where we had the right and the duty to play the game in our own manner and to demand from our allies an effort equal to our own. All this should have been done as early as 1938, when it was quite evident that a reformed Germany would stop at nothing in order to dominate Europe.

We had numerical inferiority. We should have required England to bring us at the beginning, not five, but fifteen divisions with corresponding aircraft and tanks.

Poland was surprised when she was still in process of mobilizing; she could not have done more or better than she did. She satisfied her commitments loyally and for three weeks she drew on herself the German Army which had left only a part, although an important part, of her air force, facing France.

Could we have taken advantage of that situation?

Assuredly we could have profited by it more than we did. To a small extent, certainly; to a large extent, perhaps.

On the first of September, 1939, the German Army had almost nothing on the left bank of the Sarre. From Sarrebruck to Treves, the terrain was unimpeded. It was possible to reach that point, providing that this was done rapidly and a stop was made at the Sarre. We might have done this with the admirable troops of the 6th Corps, which were thoroughly familiar with the region, and which had studied the problem in detail. To be sure, they would not have been mobilized and they would have had only their scarcely reinforced echelons. With tanks from Metz and from Verdun, that would have been sufficient for the task. Mobilization would continue in the Sarre where the bridges would have been blown up, where the barbed wire would have been stretched, and pillboxes would have dotted the surface of the earth. We could certainly have occupied the Sarre from Sarrebruck to Saarburg and got a firm hold there before the enemy could counter-attack in force. We could have held with our fire the mining and industrial basin of Sarrebruck.

The same was worth the candle, and the enemy would have had to make a forceful attack to dislodge us from that point. That is what I term the limited offensive.

All this was insufficient. It was necessary to go much farther, and for that reason to adopt a different attitude and plan of action toward Belgium.

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From the very first day, all intelligent men in Belgium as in France understood that the small countries of northern Europe were doomed, in virtue of their geographical position, to enter the war. However, though far the government did so its best, full fear could not be dispelled by forcing these states to see where their interest lay, and to advance in one secret, to the northeast frontier of Belgium, or the way to Hasselt and the Ruhr.

The question will perhaps be raised that America might have interceded against the entrance of the French troops into Belgium as a violation of contracts and that she would have done the task for us. In reply, I ask what all she rendered as a result of the material her nation expended in cold France.

It is a record to play a role as terrible as that of Hitler. But Britain merely hit we should have hit the Germans first, after being exhibited by Germany to the world.

In recalling the battle near Liège in September 1914, we may contrast how, say of Belgium, Holland and Denmark from Britain, and on the 10th of May, 1940, we would have been in a far different position to face the German attack ... one less severe than the front reached with so much difficulty by the Northern armies.

It above remains to not take into consideration the case of England, which has special interests in these North Sea coasts, could not less have found ways and means to mobilize and train a more adequate force than the meager divisions of its expeditionary corps, and that the English Army could have afforded a more substantial and effective aid.

However, neither of these two solutions was envisaged by Britain, but, still we, nevertheless, have avoided the overwhelming disaster which amazed even the Germans?

It would have been necessary in the first place to be better informed than we were. In the French General Headquarters they analyzed the new divisions of the enemy, but failed to make note of the tanks and the planes.

It would, however, have been logical to assume that a country like Germany, highly industrialized, well disciplined, and hard-working, was not willing away the months between the Belgian and the French campaigns, and that we could naturally witness the appearance of thousands of planes and hundreds of additional tanks.

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...as far as possible, we had to be contented
with lesser fortifications, which were built in
the soil and facts of the country, with available water
and materials, and in the fortifications.

This is perfectly what happened. And those who, in
particular, in the month of May, spoke of 1,000 enemy planes
and 10,000 men, were very probably, far from the
truth. They were not as numerous.

If we pursued along such a preparation, it sufficed
only to look at our own to understand that we had
but one hope of salvation: to exploit to the utmost the
strength of our fortifications, concentrating there those
cavaliers capable to maneuver, and disposing in the rear of
such points the divisions known to be experts at manoeuvring,
mobile defense, and mobile attacking.

The fortifications were firm, even very firm, in certain
certain respects, but fragile... it was there that savings
had been well made.

The fortifications were weak, or very weak, from
beginning to the end. That is where the supreme effort
should have been made.

This was attempted. After came, and an exceptionally
difficult one, I added, the concrete and embankment works.
At least it is not interfere with manufacturing and pro-
tection of structures.

Now, let us take up an example, the question of mines.
To my knowledge there was no attempt made to reinforce the
fortifications in the North by sending miners from the Army
there, except for a few battalions allotted to each division.

I well deserved to correlate the effectiveness of German
mines, against both tanks and men, and knew that mines are
as easy to manufacture as shells and airplane bombs. In
spite of this, we were still unable to provide a sufficient
supply of these to sow the approaches to our Northern frontier
with them. In certain sectors where the fortress troops did not
move at all, we had no more mines than elsewhere. A lamentable
lack of foresight!

Let us consider what might have happened on a well-
equipped and occupied frontier, without giving our imagina-
tion free rein.

had been prepared, both motorized and non-motorized,
would enter Belgium at the date of May. South of Namur, it
would meet on May 10th, the 3rd, while the "A" Army, which indeed

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at its pillboxes between Maubeuge and Valenciennes you can lay two mines, triggered in sequence at a distance of some tens of meters, before the anti-tank ditch.

In the rest of the ist and 11th Armies there were a few divisions.

The attack would be made on Sedan, just as it had been made to the left of the 11th Army.

The line of the division concerned would be pierced.

But nearly would be the reserves who could fill in the breach, and this breach, filled on the left by the Commander of the 11th Army, would not become wider. Rocroi would hold, the Chimay gap would hold, Mauberge would hold.

In the places where the armored divisions of the enemy pass the Meuse, on a narrow sector, they would advance boldly from the front and attempt to spread out, but their flanks would be threatened and the fall of the pillboxes would be slow.

Now, the German generals know their job. They would not allow their lines to broaden a single inch; otherwise they lay themselves open to all sorts of attacks, before having established their positions on the amount of terrain necessary for a safe advance.

And in this battle, foot by foot, the mines cause the enemy as many losses as the anti-tank arms. It would be like the cavalryman coming to a sudden stop on the haunches of his mount, he has followed an easy route from Vlandain to Mons-en-Baroeul and finds a very considerable obstacle at Baroeul and at Chimay.

Let us assume that in spite of the losses, these mounted troops have passed after ten days and have progressed along the ist's of their march; they would then find before them the manoeuvring army composed of all the army corps which the General Headquarters was able to muster for the battle.

This battle would be fought in Thierache or in Artois, with the exception of aircraft. Our arms would be the same, we would employ competent officers, able to fight and desiring to win.

Of course, our inferiority in aircraft would have influenced strongly the conception and execution of the plan of battle. In the light of past experience it is reasonable to suppose that the defeat, if defeat it was to be, would not have amounted to disaster. The 1st Army, the English Army.

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the Belgian Army could even have been able to retreat toward the Somme. The Marne or France would perhaps have been lost, but the Aisne and the Somme line would have been able to hold against an exhausted enemy unable to take advantage of a dearly-bought victory.

It would have been trench warfare imposed by us on an adversary who had prepared for lightning war, and which could not accept a long drawn-out conflict.

Italy would have remained neutral.

The East would have regained hope.

America would perhaps have taken a position.

However, success goes only to those who merit it, and we did not win. We were neither on the offensive nor the defensive. We were passive. We chose the worst of all possible solutions. Our attitude with regard to our Allies was one of contempt at a time when it was necessary to give orders and to have them carried out. The Belgians would perhaps not have understood because they did not wish to fight. However, the English, whose interests coincided especially with ours, would certainly have understood and could have cooperated with us, would have played the game openly and would have known how to die, just as the English Infantry has always known how to sacrifice itself.

We could then have won. We only needed the time to wait for English effort, whether it be one, two, or three years. In order for us to be victorious this war had to be a long war. Germany could not afford to look forward to a long war; she counted upon a short one. As far as we are concerned, she won.

"... now we are defeated. The conquerors of 1918 are the conquered of 1940. I have tried to analyze the causes for the defeat. It is not a question of discoursing ad nauseam about them. The problem now is to rebuild France. It can be done. We must do it. It will certainly be difficult and our neighbors will not help us. But our resources are quite ample, if we know how to utilize them, so that we may elevate ourselves spiritually and materially.

All men of good will ought to contribute their efforts, without distinction of belief, of party or of ideology. We were by this Frenchmen and not foreigners, who have already caused us trouble enough. We must not allow them to raise their heads again. We banish no one from our midst, but we

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SECRET

26 August 1943

Captain Philip E. Gilbert, Jr.
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5,
Headquarters XII Corps,
Pt. Jackson, South Carolina.

Dear Captain Gilbert:


I enjoyed hearing from you and was most interested to learn of your career in the Army.

I well understand and commend your desire to get into the Ground Forces, and it would appear that your application therefor was proceeding under good ~~hands~~. In my opinion it would be unwise for me to attempt to influence the course of this transfer on good intentions often times more harm than good in such matters.

Wishing you good luck in your Army experience and hoping you secure the assignment you are seeking,

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan
Director



HEADQUARTERS XII CORPS
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
St. Jackson, S. C.

August 24, 1943

Dear General Donovan:

I heard unofficially some time ago that you had been appointed a Brigadier General, but I did not get it officially until the current copy of the "Kernel" came to me last week. I offer you my heartiest congratulations and tell you that I hope that your success in this war is no less than your success in the last.

Since I wrote you a few months ago I have had a rather eventful career in the Army, all of it culminating in a situation in which you might be able to give me some help. I hesitated long before writing you about this, but I decided that if you heard about it you might be able to say something in the right quarters that would be of inestimable value to me. I shall deeply appreciate anything you can do.

Here is the situation. As you may remember from the dear dead New York days, I had a Reserve commission in the Quartermaster Corps. As early as 1939, however, I decided that I should like to be in the Field Artillery, and accordingly I completed my Reserve work qualifying me for Field Artillery. I did not effect a transfer, however, because I was called on active duty with the Q. M. C. before the transfer went through. I think you know the story of my experiences between then and recently, but here they are... After a short stay at Camp Lee I was assigned to the 33rd Infantry Division as a member of the 108th Inf. Battalion. In September, 1942 I was sent to the newly activated XII Corps as Post, Quartermaster and Corps Transportation Officer. In April, 1943 I was sent to take the General Staff Course at the Command & General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth. (Incidentally, Major Bob Wilson, now G-2 of the 78th Infantry Division, was a member of the same class.) Fortunately I did quite well at the school and was encouraged by members of the faculty to transfer to the Infantry or the Field Artillery. Shortly after I got back to the Corps I was relieved from the Quartermaster Section of the Corps Headquarters and made an Assistant G-2 of the Corps. The reason for this transfer, I have been told, was that I had demonstrated a capacity for combat and tactical work which the Corps could use to better advantage in the G-2 Section. Then last week I was told that if I still wanted to go over to the Field Artillery the Corps Commander would approve it. As a result I put in my formal application for detail to the Field Artillery, a copy

of which I enclose. The Corps Commander, Major General William H. Simpson, put on this application a very strong personal endorsement, recommending approval, and forwarded it to Second Army, from which it will go to Headquarters Army Ground Forces.

Now I have very little doubt that in view of General Simpson's strong endorsement Second Army will approve the application. What I am afraid of is that Army Ground Forces may refer it to the Quartermaster General who will stop it on the ground that officers cannot be spared from the Q.M.C. That might have been true at one time, but recently it was announced that there was an excess of officers in all arms and services. I am afraid, though, that it might be stopped down there in Washington by the Quartermaster General or, less likely, by the Chief of Field Artillery, or the Army Ground Forces.

I do not know whether or not you are in a position to help me out on this or not. My application is now on its way through the official channels, but a suggestion from you might be worth more than all the official channels put together. If you can make a suggestion in the right place it might help enormously, and I should be tremendously grateful. I rather think that you can understand my desire to stay in tactical and combat work, something which the Quartermaster Corps can afford only in limited measure.

My best regards to you and to Dick Heppner, if he is still there. I had hoped to give you these regards personally, in response to the kind invitation in your last letter, but we have been so very busy supervising the training of our Divisions (the 26th, 78th, 100th and 106th) that I have had no time off from duty for going any place. If I do get to Washington I shall certainly call on you if I may.

Sincerely yours,

Phil E. Gentry Jr.

HEADQUARTERS 82D CORPS
R. Jackson, G. C.

SF 202

20 August 1963

SUMMARY: Application for detail in Field Artillery.

To : Commanding General,
Army Ground Forces,
Washington 25, D.C.
(New Channels)

1. Pursuant to provisions of AF 605-163, application is hereby made
~~for detail in Field Artillery from the Quartermaster Corps.~~

A. Early Life:

- a. Born January 12, 1924, Chicago, Illinois.
- b. Graduated Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire, A.B.,
~~Mid. Aug., 1946.~~
- c. Admitted law school of Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.,
~~Mass., 1947.~~
- d. Barber of New York City, Attorney at Law, New York, N.Y., 1950-
~~1954.~~

B. Education and Training:

- June 4, 1942 - Graduated Series 10, Field Artillery Reserve
Graduation Class.
- September 4, 1942 - Commissioned 2nd Lieutenant, Quartermaster
Reserve Corps Reserve.
- October 4, 1942 - November 14, 1943 - Attended school, Field
Artillery Section, Headquarters Reserve Corps Area,
Army Air Force - reported for active duty, Camp Lee, Va.
- January 10, 1944 - February 27, 1944 - attended Reserve
Commander Infantry Course and Motor Operations School,
Camp Lee, Virginia.
- February 28, 1944 - August 21, 1944 - Assigned 2nd Infantry
Division, Camp Pickett, Virginia as Acting Commanding
Officer, Company F, 10th Quartermaster Battalion (attached),
and served as Commanding Officer, and Adjutant
of 10th Quartermaster Battalion.

June 25, 1942 - promoted to 1st Lieutenant.
 November 1, 1942 - August 6, 1943 — assigned Headquarters XXI Corps, Columbia, S. C., as Assistant Quartermaster and Corps Transportation Officer.
 February 11, 1943 — promoted to Captain.
 April 19, 1943 — June 19, 1943 — attended 11th General Staff Course, Command & General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Academic Ratings Excellent.
 August 6, 1943 — date — Assistant G-3 and liaison officer, Headquarters III Corps, Fort Jackson, S. C.

a. This detail would be to the advantage of the Government and in the best interests of the Government, and would benefit the service for the following reasons:

a. In my capacity as Assistant G-3 and Liaison Officer, Headquarters III Corps, my work is largely with officers and units of the combat arms. If I were a member of the Field Artillery, a combat arm, my duties as Assistant G-3 and as Liaison Officer would be expedited.

b. As a civilian and as a Reserve Officer before reporting for active duty, I applied to the Field Artillery and Quartermaster Sections of Headquarters First Corps Area and Headquarters Second Corps Area for transfer from the Quartermaster Corps to the Field Artillery. I was instructed first to complete the Series 10 Course in Field Artillery and to attend a school conducted by the Field Artillery Section of Headquarters Second Corps Area. I successfully completed the Series 10 Course in Field Artillery and attended the school until December 12, 1941, when I received orders to report for active duty at Camp Lee, Virginia. Since reporting for active duty I have, by observation and study, kept my interest in and knowledge of Field Artillery alive.

c. Selected active duty has demonstrated to me and to my superiors that my abilities are in the field of tactics and combat, not in administration and service. I believe I should be a more efficient officer in the branch of the service in which I am qualified and in which my interest and ability lie.

MAT. S. GILBERT, Jr., O-626779
 Captain, USA

AMERICAN
CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
INTERIOR DEPARTMENT AND OTHER AGENCIES

UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

ADDRESS ONLY
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
IN YOUR REPLY ENCL. IN
FILE NUMBER
AND DATE OF THIS LETTER

RECEIVED

JUN 14 11 13 AM '43 JUNE 14, 1943

CIVILIAN PERSONNEL
OFFICE OF
THE CHIEF
COMMISSIONER

Action of St. Albans Board
29th and E Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Attention Director of Personnel

CONFIDENTIAL


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Reference is again made to the letter of April 14, 1943 from the Acting Director of Personnel requesting early disposition of the appeal of Mr. Russell G. Gillmor from the Commission's finding as a result of personnel investigation that he is unsuitable for Federal employment.

This is to inform you that the Commission has completed consideration of Mr. Gillmor's appeal and has reached the decision that the previous unfavorable finding may be reversed in part. Mr. Gillmor's finding of unsuitability for the position of Assistant Chief, Material Research Division, Naval Ordnance Bureau, Office of Comptroller of Commodity Price Control (Planes and Services) has been affirmed and the last named has been appointed to the Federal service. His term of appointment will commence July 1, 1943. He is now qualified for other Government service as he may be found qualified to undertake.

Mr. Gillmor is being currently advised concerning the action taken in his regard.

By direction of the Commission,



11-25-Tri
April 8, 1948

Aviation Cadet Daniel S. Gillmor
4222 Butterworth Place
Washington, D. C.

Dear Cadet Gillmor:

I am writing this in reply to your letter
to me of April 1, 1948.

It is not, of course, possible for me to
make any statement regarding the charges involved
in your pending appeal before the U. S. Civil Service
Commission. These charges, I understand, relate to
your activities prior to your employment by this
agency and are not matters concerning which I have
personal knowledge.

I am glad, however, to be able to tell you
that our records show that during the time you were
employed by the Coordinator of Information as
Assistant Chief of the Reports Section of our Visual
Presentation Branch from February 19, 1942 to
April 4, 1948, the performance of your duties was
eminently satisfactory, and that no question has
been raised in connection with your employment with
regard to your ability, loyalty, or devotion to the
war effort.

Yours sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Brig. Gen., AUS
Director

LBS:BLACK

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: James B. Opsata *JBO*
TO: Colonel William J. Donovan
SUBJECT: Letter from Daniel S. Gillmor

DATE May 15, 1942

Attached is a letter handed to me by Mr. Gillmor last week when he was in my office. In accordance with his conversation with you, I explained to him that as soon as we heard the results of his investigation from the Civil Service Commission I would get the report and bring it to you personally for review.

The final report on Mr. Gillmor has not been completed, but as soon as it is I will get in touch with you.

Attachment

DANIEL S. BILLMEYER

Mr. 1311
 171 Madison Avenue
 New York, N. Y.

May 7, 1947

Col. William Donovan
 Coordinator of Information
 Washington, D. C.

Dear Col. Donovan:

I understand that the investigation which you ordered the Civil Service Commission to carry out has now been completed and that the results thereof will shortly be turned over to you for your study.

About a week ago I had a talk with Mr. Charles and he suggested that I drop you this note.

Even though the investigators who questioned me seemed to be rather prejudiced in the manner of their questioning, I think you will agree with me that there is nothing in the testimony which shows that I am anything but a loyal citizen of the United States and, on the contrary, there is a great deal which shows that I am a desirable government employee and could be particularly of service in your office.

In going over back issues of my magazine and my past activities, I have rather come to the conclusion that my main mistake has been to speak out too soon and thus arouse the enmity of many persons whose opinions later have come around to my own.

When I talked with you on the phone you expressed regret in not being able to see me and promised me my day in court. Now that the investigation has been completed I would like very much to see you and talk over with you how I may be of further service, particularly because I have a few ideas in mind which might be of help. Also, I suppose that there are some questions you would like to ask me in order to give the matter as full a hearing as possible before you make your decision.

I am naturally keeping my promise that I would not refer this matter to any one else and that I would await your decision. I don't mind waiting as long as I have not often engaged in and the I am able to withstand my temporary impatience only because you have been so fair in dealing with me. I can and will wait as long as in your judgment is necessary, but I hope this will not be much longer.

Sincerely,
Daniel S. Billmeyer
 Daniel S. Billmeyer

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

WASHINGTON, D. C.

S E C R E T

~~S E C R E T~~

April 10, 1949

Memorandum

To: Colonel Donovan
 From: Atherton Richards
 Subject: The Gillmor Case

Answering your inquiry as to the reasons given Mr. Gillmor for his dismissal on April 6th, please be advised that in the conversations the writer held with Mr. Gillmor it was repeatedly stated that his severance from the Coordinator's staff was due to his non-acceptability to the Military Service. Gillmor was given to understand that in the review conducted of all personnel prior to their gaining permanent status in the Coordinator's Office, the Military Service had bluntly informed us that so long as he, Gillmor, was a member of the Coordinator's staff it would be impossible for them to conduct business with the Coordinator's Office.

All of the writer's conversations directly with Mr. Gillmor were held with Mr. deRochemont, head of the Pictorial Records Section, present.

Information as to Mr. Gillmor's unacceptability was conveyed to the writer Friday afternoon, April 3d, at about 5:30 by Mr. Kimbel. Mr. Kimbel stated that he had been called on the telephone by Commander Riheldaffer of Navy Intelligence and first asked as to whether there was a Mr. Gillmor in the Coordinator's office. On being told that there was, Mr. Kimbel was informed that the Navy would immediately cease to have any relations with the Coordinator's Office because of Mr. Gillmor's Communistic activities.

After informing the writer of this situation, Mr. Kimbel attempted to get Commander Riheldaffer on the telephone so that Mr. Kimbel and I might go to see him immediately. Word came back that the Commander had left the office for the day.

Saturday morning, April 4th, Mr. Kimbel proceeded to the office of Naval Intelligence and was shown an extensive file on Gillmor by Commander Riheldaffer and Lieutenant Commander Gackey. The statement was again repeated of the Navy's impossibility of carrying on relations with the Coordinator's Office while Gillmor was a member of its staff.

Colonel Donovan
-2-

April 10, 1948

Later the writer was informed by Mr. Kimbel that comparable statements to the foregoing had been made by Naval Intelligence to Mr. Quay of the Liaison Office.

Prior to taking action on Mr. Gillmor, the writer discussed with Mr. Opsata and Mr. Lehman of the F.B.I. the results of the search to that date which the F.B.I. had made on Mr. Gillmor. Mr. Lehman stated that their study indicated there was no question as to Gillmor's Communistic affiliations and advocacy of the doctrine.

AR

(THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS TO BE DELIVERED

IMMEDIATELY TO COL. WILLIAM J. DONOVAN BY COURIER- ACKNOWLEDG'D.
 COL. WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
 ST. REGIS HOTEL
 NEW YORK CITY, NEW YORK

THE APPOINTMENT OF DANIEL S. GILLMORE WAS MADE UNDER
 EXECUTIVE ORDER 8564 WHICH IN BRIEF AUTHORIZED THE
 EMERGENCY APPOINTMENT OF INDIVIDUALS NOT HAVING CIVIL
 SERVICE STATUS WHEN CIVIL SERVICE ELIGIBLES WERE NOT
 AVAILABLE TO FILL URGENT NEEDS. THE E. O. 8564 HAS
~~BEEN~~ SUSPENDED SINCE MARCH 16, 1942 BY THE NEW WAR SERVICE
 APPOINTMENTS UNDER E. O. 9063.

EMERGENCY APPOINTMENTS MAY BE TERMINATED BY NOTIFYING THE
 APPOINTEE IN WRITING SHOULD HIS CONDUCT OR CAPACITY NOT
 BE SATISFACTORY. THE REGULATION V OF THE WAR SERVICE
 APPOINTMENTS UNDER E. O. 9063 TO WHICH YOU REFERRED IN
 OUR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING:

TERMINATION V- APPOINTMENT, SECTION 3.

TRIAL PERIOD- EXCEPT FOR PERSONS APPOINTED FOR A SPECIFIC
 PERIOD OF ONE YEAR OR LESS, THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF SERVICE
 SHALL BE CONSIDERED PART OF THE ENTRANCE EXAMINATION.

* * * * * IF AND WHEN AFTER A FULL AND
 FAIR TRIAL THE CONDUCT OR CAPACITY OF THE TRIAL APPOINTEE
~~IS~~ NOT SATISFACTORY TO THE APPOINTING OFFICER, THE APPOINTEE
 MAY AT ANY TIME THEREAFTER DURING THE TRIAL PERIOD BE SO
 ADVISED IN WRITING AND SUCH NOTICE SHALL TERMINATE HIS
 SERVICE."

IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION, I SHALL
 ASSURE MR. GILMORE THAT THE ACTION TAKEN WILL BE
~~AS NECESSARY PERTAINING TO THIS SITUATION~~ RATHER THAN
~~AS NECESSARY PERTAINING TO THIS SITUATION~~

YOURS Sincerely,

CHARLES E. COOPER
 CHIEF, PERSONNEL DIVISION, 4/2-1934 BC

WT

(PLEASE TELETYPE THE FOLLOWING TO THE NEW YORK OFFICE,
TO BE DELIVERED) TO COLONEL DONOVAN AT THE ST. REGIS HOTEL
IMMEDIATELY:)

GILLINOR APPOINTED FEBRUARY 19, 1942 UNDER EXECUTIVE
ORDER 8384, AS TEMPORARY APPOINTEE, AND SUBJECT TO
CHARACTER CLEARANCE BY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. ALL
SUCH APPOINTEES AUTOMATICALLY BROUGHT UNDER NEW WAR
SERVICE REGULATIONS (EFFECTIVE MARCH 16, 1942),
ACCORDING TO DEPARTMENTAL CIRCULAR 323 FROM THE COMMISSION.
UNDER THESE, REGULATION V (APPOINTMENT) PROVIDES THAT
THE FIRST 6 MONTHS OF SERVICE SHALL BE A "TRIAL PERIOD"
EXCEPT FOR THOSE APPOINTED SPECIFICALLY FOR A YEAR OR
LESS, AND SAYS "IF AND WHEN AFTER A FULL AND FAIR TRIAL
THE CONDUCT OR CAPACITY OF THE TRIAL APPOINTEE BE NOT
SATISFACTORY TO THE APPOINTING OFFICER, THE APPOINTEE
MAY AT ANY TIME THEREAFTER DURING THE TRIAL PERIOD FILE
A GROUNDED IN WRITING AND SUCH NOTICE SHALL TERMINATE
THE SERVICE.

REGULATION VII (REMOVAL) ALSO PROVIDES THAT CIVIL
SERVICE RULE XII DISCHARGE FOR CAUSE ONLY, ON DELIVERY
OF CHARGES, WHICH WILL APPLY EXCEPT TO THOSE SERVING A
TRIAL PERIOD AND THOSE APPOINTED SUBJECT TO A CONDITION
WHICH THE COMMISSIONER HAS NOT COMPLIED WITH. NECESSARY
IMPLICATION IS THAT THOSE IN TRIAL PERIOD MAY BE
DISCHARGED WITHOUT CAUSE, AND WITHOUT DELIVERY OF CHARGES
IF.

IF GILLINOR WERE PERMANENT EMPLOYEE, APPOINTED
BY COMMISSION AND WITH CIVIL SERVICE STATUS, HE COULD BE
DISCHARGED BY APPOINTING OFFICER FOR ANY CAUSE FROM GOOD
TO THE BAD, AFTER DELIVERY OF CHARGES TO HIM IN
WRITING, AND OPPORTUNITY TO HIM TO REPLY TO REMOVING
OFFICER TO WRITING, NO PLEADING HEARING AND NO APPEAL
RIGHTS. IF GILLINOR IS PERMANENT EMPLOYEE BUT NOT
CIVIL SERVICE STATUS, THE APPOINTING OFFICER MAY
DISCHARGE HIM FOR CAUSE, BUT MUST FOLLOW THE PROPER
PROCEDURE, WHICH IS NOT THE SAME AS CIVIL SERVICE.

SERVICE RULE XII (DISCHARGE FOR CAUSE ONLY, ON DELIVERY OF CHARGES, ETC.) SHALL APPLY EXCEPT TO THOSE WHOV HAD A TRIAL PERIOD AND THOSE APPOINTED SUBJECT TO A CONDITION IMPOSED BY THE COMMISSION NOT COMPLIED WITH. NECESSARY IMPLICATION IS THAT THOSE IN TRIAL PERIOD MAY BE DISCHARGED WITHOUT CAUSE, AND WITHOUT DELIVERY OF CHARGES, ETC.

EVEN IF GILLMOR WERE PERMANENT EMPLOYEE, AP. MED BY COMMISSION AND WITH CIVIL SERVICE STATUS, HE COULD BE DISCHARGED BY APPOINTING OFFICER FOR ANY CAUSE "FOR GOOD OF THE SERVICE", AFTER DELIVERY OF CHARGES TO HIM IN WRITING, AND OPPORTUNITY TO HIM TO REPLY TO REMOVING OFFICER IN WRITING. NO FURTHER HEARING AND NO APPEAL MAY BE HAD. COPIES OF PROCEEDINGS MUST BE FURNISHED EMPLOYEE OR COMMISSION UPON REQUEST. COMMISSION MAY INVESTIGATE REMOVAL WHERE PROOF OFFERED THAT PROCEDURE REQUIRED WAS NOT FOLLOWED, OR THAT REMOVAL WAS MADE FOR "POLITICAL OR RELIGIOUS REASONS", AND MAY THEREAFTER CERTIFY EMPLOYEE AS ELIGIBLE FOR OTHER GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, BUT CAN'T COMPEL REINSTATEMENT. PENDING ACTION OF REMOVAL AS ABOVE, OR FOR DISCIPLINARY REASONS, EMPLOYEE MAY BE SUSPENDED FOR NOT TO EXCEED 90 DAYS.

TEMPORARY EMPLOYEES, UNDER PRE-WAR RULES, COULD BE DISCHARGED WITHOUT CAUSE, WITHOUT DELIVERY OF CHARGES, ETC., AND WITHOUT ANY RIGHT OF APPEAL.

THURSTON DRAKE,

4/9/48 CDR/SPB ED.

[REDACTED] THIS IS A COPY AND NOT TO GO TO GENEVA DONOVAN